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Abstract (English) 
 Can music be done with words alone, artistically arranged? Can music be 
part of a novel or a short story? Can a novella realize a musical form, and does it 
mean it is a musical piece? Is being a piece of literature incompatible with being a 
piece of music as well? If so – in what way or ways? If not, for what reason? 
These simple questions are the conceptual starting point of the research 
developed in the present dissertation. It investigates the essential interrelation 
between music and artistic prose in cases of imitation of music within the latter. 
Musica textualis, its central concept, is introduced in the first part as a meeting point 
of two distinct traditions of study, namely Philosophy of Music, on one hand, and 
the Word and Music Studies, on the other. It is an aporetic field emerging 
organically in the course of the historical development and dissolution of the system 
of the arts. Mutual intermedial imitations on the level of artistic creation and 
appreciation are continuously counterpointed by parallel processes within the 
history of aesthetic thought, metaphysics of art and musico-literary criticism, 
influencing greatly ways of perceiving and understanding distinct artforms and the 
aesthetic experiences they elicit. 
One of the main aims of the present research was to establish the actual status 
of the literary incarnations of music in artistic prose. The initial hypothesis was that 
there are some special cases, where music is not only represented in words by means 
of description, evocation, allusion and other standard literary techniques, but is 
actually there in the text, strictly speaking. Such local cases are possible and 
instantiated: the paradigm example is (Mann, 1967) with its model interpretation in 
(Scher, 1967), but there are also antecedent cases such as (Woolf, 1921) interpreted 
in (Harmat, 2008) or very recent artistically outstanding realizations as (Libera, 
2013), interpreted here. What emerges as a positive theory from this research is the 
category of musica textualis. It denotes a mixed form which unites word-made-
music with literary prose in a compound whole sui generis. It is conceptually 
symmetrical to programme music, where the real presence of music and literature 
in a compound structure perceptually made solely of musical sounds without words 
is not contested. Through its complex nature and fragile statute, it functions as a 
regulative ideal for the above-mentioned eponymous aporetic field. 
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The explanatory force, methodological and interpretative implications of this 
theory are significant. Especially, the very process of its historical emergence 
through the aesthetics of Romanticism, the development of programme music and 
R. Wagner’s musical drama technique and the “intermedia turn” characterizing 
Modernism, unveil its necessary place in the conceptual map of the complex 
interrelation of these two temporal allographic arts: epics and music. 
The dissertation takes into account the vast and problematic discussion 
internal to the Word and Music studies and similar branches of 
intermodal/interart/transdisciplinary studies in their classical Anglophone version 
cf. (Scher, 1970; Wolf, 1999; Petermann, 2014), as well as in their Polish 
counterpart, anticipated critically in the work of Tadeusz Szulc (1937), and recently 
developed in, e.g. (Balbus, 2004; Hejmej, 2008, 2012). Also French and other 
studies are taken into consideration, cf. e.g. (Pautrot, 2004; Picard, 2008, 2010). It 
can potentially contribute to some significant clarifications in these controversial 
fields, but it is methodologically autonomous. It combines some elements of 
conceptual analysis and argumentation typical of analytic Philosophy of Art with a 
broader “continental” contextual horizon and interpretative ambitions. The main 
source of its insight comes from the immediate aesthetic experience of prose 
containing crucial instantiations of what can be interpreted as musica textualis. 
These insights are confronted with the achievements of the classical Philosophy of 
Music on one hand and the Word and Music practice on the other. As far as it is 
known, this is a novel approach within Philosophy. 
This method, intended as facilitating future mutual dialogue between the 
disciplines, is potentially beneficial for both (and open for further dialogue with 
musicology, which today is keen on borrowing research tools from Literary 
Theory). For the philosophers of music it discovers a neglected area of study, 
through a meticulous polemics with the conceptualizations of music at hand in the 
analytic tradition. It shows that works of musica textualis are, at least in part (like 
operas or Lieder, for that matter) works of music, and that there are no substantial 
grounds for excluding them from philosophical scrutiny of music. It shows that only 
the most anti-essentialist, accidentalist philosopher could find a coherent reason to 
reject a work of musica textualis from the realm of music on contingent grounds of 
the communis opinio; even his reasoning, though, is ultimately proven fallacious. 
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Other philosophers are invited to rethink the way they localize essential features of 
the phenomenon in question.  
For the literary scholars interested in the practices described as musicalization 
of fiction, intermedial transposition / translation / transfer, the musical novel, music 
in the words within the venerated tradition of the comparison of the arts on the axis 
Music – Literature and especially in the 20th Century born Word and Music Studies 
– musica textualis can become a helpful tool in the on-going methodological 
dispute. It helps to distinguish genuine problems of method within the Word and 
Music Studies from what emerges as the vital aporetical core of interart phenomena 
such as Mann’s Doctor Faustus. This core confronts us with questions which cannot 
be resolved through some consensus within the scholarly community, but are better 
accepted and cherished as fertile sources of artistic and intellectual inspiration. 
The dissertation is divided into three parts. The first part introduces the 
concept of musica textualis, and places it within the contemporary philosophical 
discussion on music, explaining in detail its Boethian pedigree as well as its relation 
to the state of the art within Word and Music studies, as discussed in the 
Introduction. In the chapter Music Beyond the Senses it offers some novel 
arguments against definitions of music that would exclude musica textualis a priori; 
it defends a slight modification of the definition of music advanced by (Kania, 
2011). Problematic cases of silent music are discussed extensively and the notion 
of intentional calibration – inspired by stances taken by Husserl, Ingarden, Iser, 
Wittgenstein, Wollheim, Scruton and others – is introduced. The second part 
consists of three chapters consecrated to three Polish authors (Iwaszkiewicz, Libera, 
Bartnicki) whose work is interpreted as displaying three radically different modes 
of musica textualis. This choice, by no means exhaustive, is intended to illustrate 
the introduced concept at work in dissimilar cases, sharing though one property: all 
have been paid little or no attention by the international musico-literary scholarship 
(not to mention the philosophers of music). The third and conclusive part shows 
musica textualis as a genuine aporetic field. 
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Abstract (Italian) 
 
Al centro della ricerca presenata nella dissertazione si pone la domanda se la 
musica possa essere parte di un romanzo o un racconto breve o, in altri termini, se 
il fatto che un’opera sia letteraria sia (in)compatibile con il suo essere anche 
un’opera musicale. Si può far musica con le parole? E se sì, in che modo? Se invece 
la risposta è “no”, per quali ragioni?  
La dissertazione indaga le relazioni tra musica e prosa artistica nei casi in cui 
all’interno di quest’ultima vi sia un’imitazione della musica. Il lavoro è articolato 
in tre parti. Nella prima parte introduco il concetto di musica textualis, lo colloco 
nella contemporanea discussione filosofica sulla musica e ne spiego la discendenza 
Boeziana. Si tratta del concetto centrale della ricerca, il punto d’incontro di due 
diverse tradizioni di studio, vale a dire, da  un lato la filosofia della musica e, 
dall’altro, i cosiddetti Word and Music Studies, offrendo lo stato dell’arte. Sempre 
in questa parte, nel capitolo intitolato Music Beyond the Senses, offro alcuni 
argomenti nuovi contro le definizioni della musica che escluderebbero a priori la 
musica textualis. Inoltre, vengono discussi estensivamente casi di silent music. Nel 
capitolo successivo viene sviluppata la riflessione sul carattere intenzionale di ogni 
proprieta musicale, ispirata a posizioni di Husserl, Ingarden, Iser, Wittgenstein, 
Wollheim, Scruton e altri. Una definizione di musica ispirata a Kania (2011) viene 
proposta per accomodare musica textualis. 
Il mio lavoro prende in considerazione l’ampia discussone interna ai Word 
and Music studies e agli analoghi filoni di studio sull’intermodalità sia nella classica 
versione anglofona (Scher, 1970; Wolf, 1999; Prieto, 2002; Shockley, 2009; 
Petermann, 2014), sia nella controparte di lingua polacca, anticipata nei lavori di 
Tadeusz Szulc (1937) e sviluppata in anni più recenti ad esempio (Hejmej e 
Głowiński). Anche contributi provenienti dall’area linguistica francese sono presi 
in considerazione (Pautrot, Picard). 
Nei tre capitoli della seconda parte del lavoro mi rivolgo a tre autori polacchi 
(Iwaszkiewicz, Libera, Bartnicki), interpretandone le opere come esempi di tre 
modi radicalmente diversi di musica textualis. La scelta di questi autori, in nessun 
modo esaustiva, è volta a illustrare come i concetti precedentemente introdotti 
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operino in casi diversi che, tuttavia, condividono una proprietà: tutti hanno prestato 
poca o nessuna attenzione alla scholarship musico-letteraria internazionale (per non 
menzionare la filosofia della musica). 
Nella terza e ultima parte della dissertazione offro ulteriori riflessioni sulla 
musica textualis in quanto nozione che fa sorgere un genuino campo aporetico. 
La dissertazione mostra come il complesso campo d’indagine della musica 
textualis emerga dallo sviluppo e dalla dissoluzione del sistema delle arti. 
Reciproche imitazioni intermediali a livello della creazione e dell’apprezzamento 
artistico trovano riscontro in processi paralleli nell’estetica, nella metafisica 
dell’arte e sul piano della critica musicale e letteraria, influenzando il modo di 
percepire e comprendere forme d’arte diverse e l’esperienza estetica che 
occasionano. 
Uno degli scopi principali della ricerca è stato di stabilire lo status attuale 
dell’incarnazione della musica nella prosa artistica. L’ipotesi iniziale è stata quella 
di una presenza della musica nel testo, inteso come spartito per un’interpretazione 
musicale, e non tanto in descrizioni, evocazioni e attraverso altre tecniche letterarie. 
Al riguardo l’esempio paradigmatico è il Doktor Faustus di Thomas Mann, ma vi 
sono anche antecedenti come Monday or Tuesday di Virginia Woolf ed esempi più 
recenti come lo straordinatio Toccata in do maggiore di Antoni Libera (trad. it. 
2015), di cui la dissertazione offre un’interpretazione. Alla luce dell’analisi di 
questi casi, un risultato della ricerca è di mostrare che la categoria di musica 
textualis denota una forma mista che unisce musica-fatta-con-le-parole e prosa 
letteraria in un tutto sui generis. Si tratta di una realizzazione concettualmente 
simmetrica alla musica a programma, nella quale la presenza reale di musica e 
letteratura in una struttura composta, percettivamente costituita solo da suoni 
musicali senza parole, pur essendo contestabile da parte dei formalisti estremi, 
rimane pur sempre chiaramente concettualizzata. 
Nel mio lavoro metto in luce la forza esplicativa e le implicazioni 
metodologiche e interpretative di questa prospettiva teorica, il cui luogo nella 
mappa concettuale delle relazioni complesse delle due arti allografiche temporali – 
l’epica e la musica – è del resto rivelato già dal processo della sua emergenza storica 
nell’estetica romantica, nello sviluppo della musica a programma, nel dramma 
musicale wagneriano e nell’“intermedia turn” modernista. 
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La dissertazione combina elementi di analisi concettuale tipici della filosofia 
analitica con le più ampie ambizioni interpretative “continentali”. La fonte 
principale delle sue intuizioni deriva comunque dall’esperienza (estetica) di una 
prosa contenente esemplificazioni cruciali di ciò che può essere interpretato come 
musica textualis. Tali intuizioni sono confrontate da un lato con i risultati della 
classica filosofia della musica, dall’altro, con la pratica della Word and Music. Si 
tratta di un approccio filosofico che apre, per la filosofia della musica, un campo di 
studio trascurato dalle teorie sulla musica presenti nella tradizione analitica.  Mostro 
che le opere di musica textualis sono, almeno in parte, opere musicali, e che non vi 
sono ragioni sostanziali per escluderle dall’indagine filosofica della musica.  
La ricerca mostra inoltre come, per gli studiosi di letteratura interessati alla 
pratica descritta come musicalization of fiction, trasposizone intermediale o music 
in the words, all’interno della tradizione del paragone fra le arti lungo l’asse musica-
letteratura, l’ipotesi musica textualis possa essere uno strumento utile nella continua 
disputa metodologica. Essa aiuta a distinguere i genuini problemi di metodo interni 
ai Word and Music Studies da quanto emerge come il vitale nucleo aporetico di 
fenomeni inter-artistici come il Doktor Faustus di Mann. Questo nucleo presenta 
questioni che, secondo me, vanno accettate e coltivate come fertili fonti di 
ispirazione artistica e intellettuale. 
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Introduction 
 
‘ὦ Σώκρατες,’ ἔφη, ‘μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου’ 
 
Plat. Phaedo 60e1 
 
Transgressive attempts to imitate music within the means traditionally 
proper to other temporal arts, since Romanticism, through Modernism and Post-
Modernism have been constantly gaining importance in Western Literature. The 
stream of musicalized fiction includes, among many others, Thomas De Quincey 
with his Dream Fugue, Virginia Woolf with her String Quartet, then it reaches its 
opus magnum in Thomas Mann’s Doktor Faustus flowing down to numerous Jazz 
novels and novels imitating Bach’s Goldberg Variations published in the nineties 
and after 2000. Musical fiction by imitating mechanisms and features of music on 
all levels (structure, performance, reception2) seeks to transcend the limits of the 
literary medium. In the present thesis, I reflect on these intermedial attempts at 
realizing music beyond what apparently are its traditional means: “sounds regarded 
primarily, or in significant measure, as sounds” (from the definition of music by 
Jerrold Levinson3). While some writers overtly speak of making music with words 
(Huxley, Mann, Iwaszkiewicz), some express skepticism on the very possibility of 
such an enterprise (Burgess). Many leave us with their musicalized texts alone.  
                                               
1 Plato, Platonis Opera, ed by. J. Burnet, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1903. Emphasis added – J.C. 
2 Cf. E. Petermann, The Musical Novel. Imitation of Musical Structure, Performance, and Reception in 
Contemporary Fiction, Camden House 2014. 
3 J. Levinson, The concept of music, [in:] Music, Art and Metaphysics. Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics, 
Oxford 1995. 
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 Philosophy of Music 
This thesis is designed strictly as a thesis in Philosophy of Music. Therefore, 
it is to be read and understood within the primary context of this discipline (both it 
its Analytic and Continental branch, subdivided in Metaphysics, Ethics, 
Epistemology and Aesthetics of Music). If we live in an epoch of few solid 
certainties, one thing is less unsure than many others: Philosophy of Music is as old 
as Philosophy tout court. The concept of musical harmony as a metaphysical 
principle was central to the Pythagorean thought; Socrates was called in a dream 
recurring throughout his whole life to “make and cultivate Music”, and this 
encouragement was repeated when his hour was come (note the resonance of this 
passage of Plato’s dialogue with the otherwise completely amusical Gospels: the 
last thing Christ does together with all his Disciples is to sing the prescribed Pesach 
hymn, before they live for Gethsemane, cf. Matthew 26,29-31, Mark 14,25-27). For 
Plato and Aristotle music was primarily a matter of Paideia, of public affairs and of 
moral impact, though mysterious in its core and offering no easy explanations as to 
the inner mechanism of its workings. The Middle Ages, contrary to many prejudices 
of illuminist descendance, which still are often unthinkingly repeated, were a 
millennium full of musical and intellectual diversity, within the unifying framework 
of Latin universalistic culture, nurtured in monasteries, cathedral schools and 
universities. This period, to be sure, is indeed characterized by an articulate 
depreciation of the musical practice from the perspective of the writers. They favor 
theological and philosophical knowledge of music’s abstract rules over its sensuous 
exercise in the form of what we are accustomed to call making music. This 
intellectualistic climate marginalizing actual singing and playing instruments by no 
means corresponded to any real underdevelopment of musica practica of the period, 
which, quite the contrary, flourished all over Europe both in its many liturgical and 
profane forms. It flourished especially from the 13th C. onwards as a developing 
innovative practice, despite the abyss separating the elevated musicus from the 
uneducated and unautonomous cantores whose herd he had to lead4, but it 
                                               
4 Cf. Guido d’Arezzo’s opinion on singers reported in Chapter One infra. 
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flourished also earlier as a living tradition5. We find a polemics against the doctrine 
of the Pythagorean inaudible harmony of the spheres in St. Thomas’s commentary 
to Arist. De Cael. On the other hand, the traditional picture is defended with 
dedication by Jacques de Liège in his Speculum musicae. The great Humanists, Mei, 
Galilei, Zarlino, Cardano, Ficino, still under the preponderant influence of 
Boethius, discussed passionately about the place of music in the human world, 
applying also experimental methods of investigation within the acoustics, a practice 
which was not neglected by the Pythagoreans despite their theoretical orientation. 
For Schopenhauer and Nietzsche music is the apex of all arts, with an incredible 
potential of energy and liberating force (even within the pessimistic system of the 
philosopher from Danzig; in fact, he says, music would continue to exist even if the 
whole world lacked6). Nietzsche’s first work7, which gives him a university 
cathedra in Classical Philology and such a severe criticism from the part of fellow 
philologists that he gains autonomy as a philosopher, is perhaps the closest great 
philosophical text to the path we are stepping on in the present humble essai of a 
dissertation: it exposes the vital principles of music, the necessary tension between 
the Apollonian cool, clear-cut proportionate order and the unruly élan of ecstatic 
Dionysian commotion which are the arch (first bow instrument) of every music. 
Adorno’s8 role of the “musical consultant” of the Old Master from Lübeck strikes 
us with maybe even greater power, as it is not “dead letter” but vibrant crystalline 
form embodied in Mann’s last tremendous masterpiece. Wagner and Hanslick are 
                                               
5 What I mean here is that there is no intrinsic reason for which we should regard traditional liturgical music 
based not on innovation but on continuity as a form of stagnation. Quite strikingly we see a revival of these 
musical practices and ideas on music in the last several decades, where they seem to respond to a profound 
dissatisfaction with at least certain aspects engendered by the “organic development”, to borrow Schonberg’s 
phrase, of the new music (Cf. . These “archaic” non expressive and non progress-oriented music making forms 
(conserved to this day in certain traditional communities preserved in the local European and global South) are 
concentrated not at producing aesthetic effects or expressing any sort of meaning (be it theological or 
emotional) but anchored in the everyday practice of prayer within the traditional monastic community. 
6 A. Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, ed by. A. Hübscher, Sämtliche Werke, Wiesbaden 1972. 
7 F. Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik, E. W. Fritzsch, Leipzig 1872. 
8 See his own T.W. Adorno, Philosophie der neuen Musik, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. Main 2013. and, among 
other works on music, T.W. Adorno, Essays on music, University of California Press, Berkeley Calif. 2002.  
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figures which till now provoke violent disputes among the philosophers of music 
and musicologists engaged in an interdisciplinary dialogue. Works of Eggebrecht 
and Dahlhaus, written from the musicological perspective, offer pages of unrivalled 
philosophical profundity and musical relevance9. This is a tradition which continues 
in today’s philosophy and philosophical musicology, with excellent minds 
dedicated to its cultivation: Guczalski, Dankowska, Chęćka, Brożek, Jadacki, 
Jabłoński, Moraczewski, Baranowski, Berger, Gołaszewska, Skowron, 
Szyszkowska, Kurylewicz, Lipka, Nakoneczny in Poland, following the great 
Ingarden, as well as Lissa, Twardowski, Regamey and Pociej; in France Sève, 
Accaoui, Nancy, following the great Jankélévitch, Brelet, Boucourechliev, de 
Schlœzer and Sartre, in the tradition of Rousseau and Rameau, not to mention 
Descartes; in Italy, which after the humanistic secolo d’oro of the Camerata 
Fiorentina gave us in the recent times the fundamental historical syntheses of 
Fubini: Arbo, Bertinetto, Giordanetti and Lisciani-Petrini; and in the Anglophone 
globalized philosophical agora: Levinson, Kivy, Scruton, Ridley, Goehr, Davies, 
Dodd, Kania and Zangwill to quote only the few most eminent. 
Philosophy investigates music in its ways of existence, conducts axiological 
disputes on the values of music, both intrinsic (aesthetic) and extrinsic (social, 
educational, moral, life-enhancing10), comments on music’s impact (or its lack) on 
our moral lives11, continues the endless and fascinating disagreements on musical 
                                               
9 H.H. Eggebrecht and C. Dahlhaus, Was ist Musik?, Florian Noetzel Verlag, Wilhelmshaven 1985; C. 
Dahlhaus, Musikästhetik, Musikverlag Hans Gerig, Köln 1967. 
10 See, for instance, the chapter Values of music in J. Levinson, Musical Concerns. Essays in Philosophy of 
Music, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015. Published also in: J. Levinson, Values of Music, [in:] Handbook 
of the Economics of Art and Culture, 2014, pp. 100–117. An early version of this text was discussed by 
Levinson at a Workshop in Philosophy of Music at the University of Warsaw in April-May 2014. 
11 Philodemus’s criticism of the theory of ethos can be seen as the great ancestry of the recent polemics on the 
topic of music’s moral force. Kivy, the advocate of music alone, argues against the existence of such a force, 
quoting the famous scene with Wehrmacht soldiers playing and discussing music while ploundering and 
burning a household in Warsaw in the search of hiding Jews from the Pianist by Roman Polański. Levinson 
revisits Kivy’s argument in the chapter Popular Song as a Moral Microcosm of his latest book quoted above, 
arguing that music can have durable impact on our lives, if regularly frequented, just as “good” and “bad” 
influences in our social and relational life. It is better “to spend time with music of sincerity, subtlety, honesty, 
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meaning and the meaning of music, in contrast or in analogy to language12. These 
many ways in which music becomes an object of philosophical inquiry are the 
reason for which one could cede to the illusion that philosophy is somehow 
epistemically superior to music as its reflexive organ, as the residue of its deeper 
meditation and more rigorous cognition unavailable to music itself and for herself, 
due to the limitations of music’s purportedly a-logical medium13. Or at least that 
the only possible relation between philosophy and music is that of music being the 
subject field of philosophy. Nothing less accurate than that. 
 Musica magistra philosophiae 
In fact – relations between these two branches of human spiritual and social 
activity are far more complex and less evident, than those typically binding an 
academic discipline and its subject matter. Music can also exercise power over 
philosophy, can teach it how to think. In a word: can be magistra philosophiae. 
Music can provide interpretational models which help philosophy, her younger and 
yet far too often condescending sister, understand better herself and her own 
workings. Both, thus, can be treated more democratically, leaving space not only 
for philosophical intellectualistic takes on the deliciously ineffable charm of the 
secretive workings of music, but also for the musical perspective to be accepted as 
                                               
depth, (…) than with music of pretension, shallowness, or vulgarity” – he says – because “musical works are 
person-like in psychological ways” (pp.117-118). Cf. P. Kivy, Musical Morality, „Revue internationale de 
philosophie”, 2008, t.62, no 246, pp. 397–412; S. Hegenbart and V. Simoniti, Beauty and Meaning; Music and 
Morality: an Interview With Roger Scruton, „Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics”, 2011, t.8, no 1, pp. 1–15.  
12 An excellent, rigorous study on this problem, providing a critical reconstruction and revision of S. Langer’s 
theory: K. Guczalski, Znaczenie muzyki. Znaczenia w muzyce, Musica Iagellonica, Kraków 2002.. For a more 
concise argument against theorizing music as language, see: K. Guczalski, O niejęzykowym charakterze muzyki, 
[in:] Filozofia muzyki. Studia, ed by. K. Guczalski, Musica Iagellonica 2003, pp. 94–112. 
13 It is Philodemus’ famous defense of music as a-logos – as free of any sort of servitude to the logos of ethos, 
in his polemics against the Stoics, Aristotle and the followers of Plato, which provides us this powerful term. 
Cf. L.P. Wilkinson, Philodemus on Ethos in Music, „The Classical Quarterly”, 1938, t.32, no 3–4, pp. 174–
181. See also the concise and very dense synthesis by Martinelli, which was useful to me on more occasions:  
R. Martinelli, I filosofi e la musica, Il Mulino, Bologna 2012, p. 34. 
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a way of interpreting philosophical texts14. Just as it is possible to read music as 
discourse – it is as well possible to see formal interplay typical of music and 
efficiently analyzable and understandable in musical terms in classical works of 
philosophy. The subtitle of Bernard Sève’s capital work L’Altération musicale is, 
most eloquently: ce que la musique apprend au philosophe – “[on] what music 
teaches the philosopher”. In the following chapters, we will return frequently to this 
humble (and wise) revision of the relations between music and philosophy, 
characterizing eminently also the ways of Vladimir Jankélévitch who learned from 
music how to listen. His philosophy is a repeated exercise of how to draw back the 
intellectualistic prejudices and open up to the extraordinary epiphanies offered by 
the immanence, on the condition that the philosopher decides to abandon safe 
terrains of the already known and orderly, in line with petrifying concepts. In this 
way Jankélévitch can be said to have learned the method of his Philosophie 
première15 from music, no less than from the ambiguous, elliptic formulations of 
the mystics and from the obscure clarity of Neoplatonic philosophers. Another 
contemporary model, where music is shown as mistress and the musical initiation 
has existential and metaphysical value, is to be found in Pascal Quignard, who, also 
trained as an academic philosopher in France, much more radically than 
Jankélévitch decided to depart from the academic style in his prose. From his 
Lesson of music16 we learn something profound on music, to be sure, but even more 
                                               
14 Let me quote here only two contrasting examples of such an approach to philosophy: M. Gołaszewska, 
Muzyka filozofii. Esej o podwójnych znaczeniach, „Muzyka”, 2005, t.I, pp. 5–29; J. Levinson, Musical 
Concerns. Essays in Philosophy of Music..., op. cit. , Chapter 1 Philosophy and Music, discussed in J. 
Czarnecki, Review of: Jerrold Levinson, Musical Concerns: Essays in Philosophy of Music, Oxford University 
Press, 2015, „Universa. Recensioni di filosofia”, 2016, t.5, no 1.  
15 V. Jankélévitch, Philosophie première: introduction à une philosophie du ‘Presque’, Presses Universitaires 
de France, Paris 1986, 2. ed, Quadrige. 
16 His lesson of music is not limited to the little book bearing this title: P. Quignard, La leçon de musique, 
[Hachette 1987], Gallimard, Paris 2010. See also his other exceptional pieces of prose, engaging with music in 
various ways: P. Quignard, Tous les matins du monde, Gallimard, Paris 1991; P. Quignard, La Haine de la 
musique, [in:] La Haine de la musique, 1996, pp. 213–256; P. Quignard, Villa Amalia, Gallimard, Paris 2007. 
The intricate role of music in Quignard’s work was anaysed by, inter alios, J.-L. Pautrot, De ‘La Leçon de 
musique’ à ‘La Haine de la musique’: Pascal Quignard, le structuralisme et le postmoderne, „French Forum”, 
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importantly, we learn from its music, which is the musique silencieuse of M. de 
Sainte-Colombe17 and of Tch’eng Yen. What we learn is something fundamental 
on the wise proportion between what can be said and taught with words and what 
must be understood and transmitted otherwise. Music can be thus explored not only 
as a formal model for philosophy, but as well as a source of metaphysical and 
existential wisdom, tracing back the origins of philosophy as the love and striving 
for wisdom. This can help the philosopher to reorient his attitudes towards the 
“objects” of his thought which, thanks to the illuminating example of music, 
become less “objects” and more “acts” or “doings”, inviting forms of engagement 
and understanding radically different from that those at hand within discursive 
philosophy. 
This reasoning is part of a broader tendency to regard music as an autonomous 
form of thought18, which not being linguistic or discursive in nature, operates 
primarily with immanent senses, as opposed to transcendent referential meanings. 
As such music becomes worthy of serious reconsideration as a partner in inspiring 
dialogue for other disciplines, so seemingly distant from music as for instance 
law19. In this perspective music becomes so much more than just a mute beauty, 
                                               
1997, t.22, no 3, pp. 343–358; J.-L. Pautrot, La musique de Pascal Quignard, „Études françaises”, 2004, t.40, 
no 2, pp. 55–76. and T. Picard, La littérature contemporaine a-t-elle retrouvé un modele musical? Le cas de 
Pascal Quignard., „Europe”, 2010, t.8–9, no 976–977, pp. 52–76.  
17 P. Quignard, Tous les matins du monde..., op. cit. This little book was congenially realized in the beautiful 
1991 film by Alain Corneau, with music performed and directed by Jordi Savall.  
18 Cf. J. Czarnecki, Czy można myśleć muzyką? Między Levinsonem a Wittgensteinem, „Ruch muzyczny”, 2014, 
no 9. I discuss there Levinson’s remarks concerning the question of thinking through music in Wittgenstein, 
see: J. Levinson, Musical Thinking, „Midwest Studies in Philosophy”, 2003, t.27, no 1, pp. 59–68; L. 
Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, ed by. B. Russell, trans by. C.K. Ogden, Kegan Paul, London 
1922; L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans by. G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell 1986; L. 
Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914-1916, ed by. G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe, trans by. G.E.M. 
Anscombe, Harper & Brothers, New York 1961; H. Ahonen, Wittgenstein and the Conditions of Musical 
Communication, „Philosophy”, 2005, t.80, no 4, p. 513; H. Appelqvist, Wittgenstein and the Limits of Musical 
Grammar, „The British Journal of Aesthetics”, 2013, t.53, no 3, pp. 299–319. 
19 Such inspiring and successful applications to law, for example, are to be found in several publications by 
Prof. Ewa Łętowska, expert in constitutional law and former Judge of the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland 
(cf. E. Łętowska, Communicare et humanum, et necesse est – o komunikacyjnej misji muzyków i prawników, 
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from whom the philosopher has nothing to learn, to say it with reversed subtitle of 
Sève’s book. 
The present work aspires to citizenship in this democratically musical and 
philosophical polis; it identifies with this multi-streamed tradition and its reflexive 
love for music. 
It does, however, as it is evident from even a brief survey of the Works 
analyzed in the Second Part, take as its objects artifacts which hardly could be 
accepted as works of music within the currently dominating framework. The state 
of the art is thus put into question with respect to a fundamental element: its very 
Object Field. In other words – this dissertation takes polemic stances with respect 
to the extension of the Concept of Music, as understood by most contemporary 
philosophers, letting apart the question of its explicit analysis. In this way, its 
workings are twofold: on the one hand, it provides some humbly philosophical 
interpretations of a set of contemporary textual artworks; on the other hand, the way 
it is done calls for a reevaluation of our fundamental conceptualizations of both the 
sister arts in question. The arguments provided throughout the following chapters 
which sum up for a defense of this approach fall, roughly, into three classes: 1. pars 
destruens – where current definitions of music are shown inadequate on the very 
grounds that permitted their formulation, and, as in a mirror, theories which sustain 
or assume an unproblematic inclusion of the analyzed works into the realm of 
Literature are put in question; 2. pars construens – where some positive account of 
the new category of music is advanced (in such a way as to salvage as much as 
possible from what appears to be the philosophical consensus on music today and 
yet permit the inclusion of the new kind into scrutiny); 3. pars ostensiva – where 
the phenomena described and tentatively theorized in pars construens are shown in 
                                               
„Monitor prawniczy”, 2005, t.1, pp. 3–7; E. Łętowska and K. Pawłowski, O operze i o prawie, Wolters Kluwer, 
Warszawa 2014.), as well as in the (much less erudite) recent cross-reading of the notion of interpretation in 
law and in music in M. Brunello and G. Zagrebelsky, Interpretare. Dialogo tra un musicista e un giurista, Il 
Mulino, Bologna 2016. 
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their concrete instantiations. This last class, needless to say, requires the Reader’s 
cooperation, as it is in h e r  aisthesis that they must take body. 
 Word and Music Studies / Interdisciplinary 
Comparative Literature 
To ground such a thorough revision of the reigning philosophical paradigm, 
it was necessary to take into account studies published across the disciplines, from 
History of Literature, through Literary Criticism, Musicology to Comparative 
Literature, Word and Music Studies and Translation Studies. This makes the 
Secondary Literature Corpus utterly disparate and makes the theoretic material 
selection decisions difficult. Thus, I chose to limit this non-philosophical 
interdisciplinary literature overview to a necessary minimum, especially where 
other Authors have accomplished this task elsewhere, and to evoke them in detail 
when it is operative in the course of the analyses in the second part. This permits 
me to concentrate directly on the aspects immediately relevant for the present 
argument, without distracting my Reader by an infinity of problems such a 
discussion would necessarily lead to. 
Literature and Music: Studies in Poland 
My starting point will be a brief overview of the state of the art in Poland, my 
native country and home to a rich autonomous tradition of critical research in the 
field which in the English-speaking world we are accustomed to call the Word and 
Music Studies. My intellectual formation and thus the shape of the theory I defend 
in the present dissertation are much more indebted in this tradition that I can 
possibly advert. In Poland, this discipline is called komparatystyka muzyczno-
literacka and is usually conceived of as a branch of the interdisciplinary 
comparative literature, where the comparanda are artefacts from literature and 
music respectively. The focus is often placed on the question of different types of 
filiations that can issue in artefacts placed somewhere in between the two arts, or 
rather – within works of literature informed in their structure and implied perceptive 
model by the usual means and models of music. 
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Just as elsewhere – these theoretical strivings cannot be understood if not in 
the context of preceding omnipresence of music in the Romantic culture. Literary 
critics and writers in Poland have always been very keen on drawing musical 
parallels and playing with musical themes. Mickiewicz placed an unforgettable ear-
catching musical ekphrasis of Jankiel’s Cymbalom Concert in the XII (final) book 
of the national epic poem Pan Tadeusz20 (first published in Paris in 1834). This is 
a true tour de force of musical romantic intermediality, as the Jewish virtuoso’s 
spectacular performance is understood by the audience in both musical and 
narrative terms. This purely instrumental concert, described as music, is invested 
with great expressive and symbolic force; the cymbalist is depicted as a bard, as an 
alter ego of the poet himself. Mickiewicz uses technical musical nuance in this 
finale brillante, letting the chords of climax of the national epopee to music. The 
repeated discord, produced by touching “that traitorous string” in the middle part 
of Jankiel’s great improvisation, is met with the audience’s mixed reaction, but 
“Warden understood the master, covered his face in his hands, and cried, “I know, 
I know those notes; that is Targowica!”21”22. Subtle phenomenology of musical 
perception is at work here, too: thanks to Jankiel’s mastery people hear different 
instruments (trumpets, bells, drums) within what he plays. We will see on more 
occasions in this thesis, how such fictionalizing music becomes one of the 
primordial devices of musicalizing fiction. 
Chopin, who himself wrote two songs to Mickiewicz’s poems (Precz z moich 
oczu, Moja pieszczotka), has been “translated” back into verse by the poet Kornel 
Ujejski in his 1866 Tłumaczenia Szopena [Translations from Chopin]23. 
Apocryphal programmatic interpretations of his piano ballads as musical renditions 
                                               
20 A. Mickiewicz, Pan Tadeusz, [1834], Czytelnik, Warszawa 1995, vol. IV, Dzieła, pp. 353–360. 
21 Targowica (Konfederacja targowicka) – the infamous confederation against the Polish Constitution of 3rd 
May 1791; the glorious Constitution itself is symbolised in a brighter passage of Jankiel’s improvisation by the 
eponymous Polonaise of the Third May. 
22 A. Mickiewicz, Pan Tadeusz or the Last Foray in Lithuania, trans by. G.L. Noyes, J. M. Dent & Sons, E. P. 
Dutton & Co., London and Toronto, Paris, New York 1917, p. 324. 
23 There seems to be virtually no limit to Romantic intermedial variations, interpretations and violations of 
Chopin’s art. Consider  
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of Mickiewicz’s ballads, and of his epic poem Konrad Wallenrod, were 
numerous24. Some of these readings were suggested by Chopin himself, as is the 
case with “Gładkowska’s portrait” in the Larghetto of the F Minor Piano Concerto, 
evoked in Iwaszkiewicz’s Fourth Symphony25 and used there as one of the means 
of musicalization26. This romantic-driven verbal musicophilia was wide-spread in 
critical and academic writing way into the thirties. In 1937 the situation changed 
abruptly when after a press polemics on the “musical tendency in literature” a book-
long merciless critique of these practices was published by Tadeusz Szulc27. He 
systematically refuted them as abusive, metaphorical use of vaguely intended 
musical terminology to supplant proper terms of the art. He denounced such a 
practice as imprecise, terminologically inflationary and thus – inacceptable in 
serious literary scholarship. He concluded his series of “negativist”28 arguments 
saying that “Music can be o n l y  a n  o b j e c t  within the scope of the literary 
artwork’s world, a world created by the peculiar literary material and directives. 
That is: just what it is in Jean Christophe, in Tristan, in The Magic Mountain, The 
Buddenbrooks…”29. This little quote shows how radically points of view have 
actually changed ever since, for the very same texts, which for Szulc are clear 
examples of “mere thematization”, where music is to be seen as any other object of 
literary description – today seem all but obvious examples to back his theses. For 
the perspective of the present study they exemplify much more ambiguous 
interrelations between music and literature. Hanno’s death in The Buddenbrooks in 
                                               
24 See, for instance, Alfred Cortot’s opinion quoted in Chopin’s Letters, collected by Henryk Opieński, 
translated and with a preface and editorial notes by E. L. Voynich, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1931, p. viii, 
apud: M. Mitchell and A. Evans, eds., Moriz Rosenthal in Word and Music. A legacy of the Nineteenth Century, 
Indiana University Press, Bloomington 2006, p. 161 note. 
25 Czwarta symfonia, p. 242. 
26 This textual piece is analyzed in the second part of the present thesis. 
27 T. Szulc, Muzyka w dziele literackim, Warszawa 1937. The quoted phrase is translated from the p. 31 of this 
monograph (by myself – J.C.). 
28 Label for the supporters of such extreme skepticism used by S. Dąbrowski, ‘Muzyka w literaturze’. (Próba 
przeglądu zagadnień), „Poezja”, 1980, no 3, p. 23. 
29 T. Szulc, Muzyka w dziele literackim..., op. cit., p. 87. Emphasis and transl. mine – J.C. 
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my interpretation, to make just one example, is one of the cardinal instantiations of 
musical agency, which is one of the modi of musica textualis30.  
 This pre-war skepticism prevented serious literary scholars from 
approaching musical contexts of literature in their complexity for nearly half a 
century31, with some significant exceptions in the postwar essays of Tadeusz 
Makowiecki32 and Michał Głowiński33, both great literary authorities in their 
                                               
30 The musical finale of the novel: verbally instantiated piano improvisation by the little Hanno is violently 
clashed with the medical (and specular with respect to the musical) description of typhoid fever. The illness is 
presented as the vest of death, as the outer side of the decision, which has taken place in the last Buddenbrook 
on an intirely different plane, epitomized in Mann’s symbolic poetics by music. T. Mann, Buddenbrooks. 
Verfall einer Familie, Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 2002, 52. Aufl.  
31 It can be observed that even in a much younger branch of musico-literary studies, the one engaged with jazz 
novels, “dilettantish and impressionistic” use of musical terms in literary criticism is also under attack, see A. 
Munton, Misreading Morrison, Mishearing Jazz: A Response to Toni Morisson’s Jazz Critics, „Journal of 
American Studies”, 1997, t.31, no 2, pp. 235–51 mentioned by Petermann (p.41). Of course by noting this 
similarity I do not intend to embrace all musicalizing interpretations, even those which are musically 
incompetent and otherwise nonsensical. On many occasions these anathemas against dilettantish “musical 
impressionism” express the general fear of admitting musical metaphors in literary criticism as being 
unscientific. The necessity of such a critical awareness, though, is constantly proved in popular literary 
criticism. The recent novel R. Tremain, The Gustav sonata, Chatto & Windus, London 2016. has received 
enthusiastic reviews and was awarded prizes (for reasons quite unintelligible to me). What strikes, however, is 
the unbearable banality of the remarks enthusiastic critics duped by the novel’s title had to offer on its purported 
affinity with music: „The “sonata” title is apt, too, in that, like the great classical composers, Tremain shows 
happiness and sorrow can collide – there are moments when the two are interchangeable” K. Kellaway, The 
Gustav Sonata review – the wrong trait at the wrong time, „The Guardian”, 26.05.2016. or „The Gustav Sonata 
is a powerful, profound and unexpected love story about the enduring damage of unrequited love. It is a 
masterful, meditative novel in which Tremain plays with themes and motifs as a composer plays with musical 
refrains” H. Beckerman, The Gustav Sonata by Rose Tremain review – a masterful tale of envy and love, „The 
Guardian”, 29.01.2017. 
32 Makowiecki published a whole monograph consecrated to music in Wyspiański’s work in 1955 (Muzyka w 
twórczości Wyspiańskiego, Toruń 1955.) The initial section, entitled Poetry and music is reprinted in: T. 
Makowiecki, Poezja a muzyka, [in:] Muzyka w literaturze. Antologia polskich studiów powojennych, 
Universitas, Kraków 2002, pp. 5–36.  
33 See: M. Głowiński, Muzyka w powieści, „Teksty”, 1980, t.2, no 2, pp. 98–114. and his Literackość muzyki – 
muzyczność literatury, [in:] Muzyka w literaturze. Antologia polskich studiów powojennych, Universitas, 
Kraków 2002. where he quotes Leonard B. Meyer, as well as his brilliant remarks on the “myth of great 
musicality” in Symbolist poetry and the respective “myth of great literariness” within musical aesthetics of the 
period in: Wokół książki Stefana Jarocińskiego o Debussym, „Res Facta Nova”, 1999, t.12, no 3, pp. 13–17. 
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homeland, Józef Opalski34, Konrad Górski35 and several other important scholars, 
and younger researchers such as Anna Tenczyńska36 and Aleksandra Riemann, who 
developed Głowiński’s conception of “musical reception style” in her study 
Muzyczny styl odbioru tekstów literackich37. A systematic revival of these musico-
literary studies in Poland in the past two decades has his great advocate in the person 
of Andrzej Hejmej from the Jagellonian University in Kraków, who published 
numerous articles in the field, and offered a systematic account of the complex 
possibilities of literature–music interrelations in his monographs: Muzyczność 
dzieła literackiego38 and the earlier Muzyka w literaturze39, which recently appeared 
in an English version as Music in Literature40. His work is characterized by an 
extensive effort at summarizing the past proposals in Polish musico-literary 
criticism, as well as a competent survey of the state of the art in francophone 
contexts and in the core tradition of the Word and Music Studies, from their 
beginnings in the seminal writings of Steven Paul Scher and Calvin S. Brown41. 
Apart from systemizing these areas Hejmej offers his own framework operating 
with the tripartite concept of musicalityI-III inspired by the three Scherian categories 
of “word music” “musical techniques and structures” and “verbal music”. He 
differentiates between the sensu largo use of the term ‘score’ with respect to literary 
texts, as to be found in the writings of Roland Barthes, Paul Ricoeur and Michel 
                                               
34 J. Opalski, O sposobach istnienia utworu muzycznego w dziele literackim, [in:] Muzyka w literaturze. 
Antologia polskich studiów powojennych, ed by. A. Hejmej, Universitas, Kraków 2002, pp. 171–194. 
35 K. Górski, Muzyka w opisie literackim, „Życie i myśl”, 1952, no 1–6, pp. 91–109 reprinted in ‘Muzyka w 
literaturze. Antologia...’ op. cit., pp. 5–36. 
36 A. Tenczyńska, Muzyka w przedwojennej twórczości K. I. Gałczyńskiego, „Rocznik słupski”, 2004, no 2, pp. 
129–150; A. Tenczyńska, Projekt „lektury muzykologicznej” polskiej poezji dwudziestowiecznej Pisząc, „Res 
Facta Nova”, 2011, t.12 (21), pp. 93–96. 
37 A. Riemann, Muzyczny styl odbioru tekstów literackich, Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, Poznań 2003. 
38 A. Hejmej, Muzyczność dzieła literackiego, Wydawnictwo naukowe UMK, Toruń 2012, vol. 53. 
39 A. Hejmej, Muzyka w literaturze. Perspektywy komparatystyki interdyscyplinarnej, Universitas, Kraków 
2008. 
40 A. Hejmej, Music in Literature: Perspectives of Interdisciplinary Comparative Literature, trans by. L. 
Davidson, Peter Lang 2014. 
41 See, for instance: C.S. Brown, Music and Literature: A Comparison of the Arts, Athens-Georgia 1963. 
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Butor, from the strict sense in which this would imply a musical score, as defined 
in musicology. The latter, called by him the “literary score”, is defined in the 
following terms: 
The literary score is nothing but a score for the use of literature; the 
score is as a parent interpretative context of a literary text, or rather in 
another way, a score is a somewhat (far?) modified musical intertext 
function in literature. One could quite easily say that this is a score lying 
in wait for a literary recipient; in this case, it would be a score in the 
hands of the literature researcher. There are generally two basic 
formulae that have a polar sense of disclosure or signaling in a literary 
text: explicite, through musical quotation (examples of this can be found 
in S. Barańczak, J. Iwaszkiewicz, M. Kuncewiczowa, R. Rolland, A. 
Schnitzler, M. Kundera, G. Compère, M. Roche) or implicite, through 
either a description of a musical composition, or other operations of 
music thematization. Musical quotation in literature is always – by the 
nature of things – evident, and therefore does not cause trouble during 
the initial examination as an emblem of literary scores. Undoubtedly, 
much more difficultly is caused by implied score (genologically 
founding text, hidden, determined at the time of reading), because 
everything depends not only on the finesse of artistic interpretation, but 
also on perception by the interpreter and correct reading42. 
In addition to these thorough theoretical discussions, he offered many 
valuable interpretations from the international musico-literary repertoire. He 
analyzed Polish authors, such as the witty and most challenging poet Stanisław 
Barańczak (Aria-Awaria, playing with a humorous verbal imitation of the sound of 
Donna Elvira’s Ah, chi mi dice mai! aria from Don Giovanni, rather than its sense, 
and Podróż zimowa – a cycle of poems “to the music of Franz Schubert” in musical 
dialogue with his Winterreise) or the less known Karol Hubert Rostworowski with 
                                               
42 A. Hejmej, Music in Literature: Perspectives of Interdisciplinary Comparative Literature..., op. cit. See also: 
A. Hejmej, Partytura literacka. Przedmiot badań komparatystyki interdyscyplinarnej, „Teksty Drugie”, 2003, 
t.4, pp. 34–46. This specific use of the term as defined by Hejmej should not be confunded with the 
considerations on the analogies between the literary text and the musical score. An example of such divagations 
based on Bolesław Prus’s unpublished notes can be found in: A. Martuszewska, Tekst dzieła literackiego jako 
partytura, „Przestrzenie Teorii”, 2005, no 5, pp. 39–52. 
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his 1913 drama Judasz z Kariothu, containing a polyphonic quarrel between the 
priests notated on musical staves within the drama’s text43, but also, to quote some 
examples from foreign literatures, Philippe Sollers’s novel, Le Coeur absolu, 
literary fugues by Umberto Saba and Paul Celan or Michel Butor’s Dialogue avec 
33 variations de Ludwig van Beethoven sur une valse de Diabelli. The latest word 
of the younger generation of scholars working under the auspices of the cracovian 
comparatist is to be found in the volume A. Hejmej and T. Górny, Transpozycje. 
Muzyka w nowoczesnej literaturze europejskiej, Universitas, Kraków 2016. 
 
Word and Music Studies Worldwide 
Steven Paul Scher’s influential writings still inspire reflection and have 
influenced greatly my own approach to verbal music in German literature, shaping 
thus many of the ideas expressed in this thesis44. Because the following chapters 
contain more detailed discussions and applications of the theories advanced by the 
Word and Music scholars (see especially the studies contained in the Second Part), 
instead of a more general overview45 I propose a focused discussion46 of the latest 
book publication in the field relevant directly to our topic, the musicalized prose.  
Emily Petermann’s The Musical Novel. Imitation of Musical Structure, 
Performance, and Reception in Contemporary Fiction (2014) is of significant 
interest not only to the literary scholar but also to the philosopher of art. Music and 
                                               
43 K.H. Rostworowski, Judasz z Kariothu, Gebethner i Spółka, Kraków 1913. 
44 Scher, of course, is not responsible for what I have to say here. See in particular his: Thomas Mann’s ‘Verbal 
Score’: Adrian Leverkühn’s Symbolic Confession, „MNL”, 1967, t.82, no 4, pp. 403–420, a paper which had a 
capital influence on my understanding of Mann’s textual musicality; S.P. Scher, Notes Toward a Theory of 
Verbal Music, „Comparative Literature”, 1970, t.22, no 2, pp. 147–156. 
45 This task is more than sufficiently realized by other authors, see, once again, Hejmej’s monographs and 
review articles, as well as the whole “Word and Music Studies” editorial series published by Rodopi and 
containing the evergreen section “Surveying the Field”. I would like to credit here only one recent work, staying 
institutionally apart from the WMS current, and yet most valuable: A. Shockley, Music in the Words: Musical 
Form and Counterpoint in the Twentieth-Century Novel, Routledge 2009. 
46 This brief section is a revised version of my review of the book published in: „Universa. Recensioni di 
filosofia”, 2016, t.5, no 2. 
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literature are intimately entwined in interart phenomena categorized here as musical 
novels. Petermann’s exploration of this literary subgenre, defined as “musical not 
primarily in terms of its content, but in its very form” (p. 2) invites us to rethink a 
series of classical problems – the essence of music, boundaries of art forms, musical 
sense and meaning, the relation between music and language – through the lens of 
these peculiar textual artworks. Petermann’s monograph is not merely the latest 
study on music as described in novels: it is an attempt to theorize the presence of 
music in artistic prose in terms of “imitation of musical structure, performance, and 
reception”. The book, thus, deals with topics of interest in the current philosophical 
debate on music: performance situation and its specificity (both in jazz, and in 
authentic performances of baroque music); improvisation; various ways of listening 
treated democratically, including both the performer’s and the audience’s 
perspectives; music and literature as temporal arts; the question of formalism. 
Petermann theorizes the musical novel through the key philosophical concept of 
imitation. In doing so, she evokes the ancient theory of μίμησις with its rich legacy. 
It is hard not to hear in it also an echo of the polyphonic imitation technique; this 
second reading, if not encouraged by the author, can be meaningful in light of the 
conclusive remarks of this review. Thematization of music and explicit 
considerations of the philosophical problems mentioned above, are often diegetic 
features of the musical novels discussed. For instance, N. Huston’s Les variations 
Goldberg can be read as a rich repertory of such divagations. According to 
Petermann, however, thematizing music is vital only to the extent in which it makes 
the reader attentive to the formal musical features exhibited by the text.  
In sum, the distinct elements that emerge from Petermann’s work are of 
highest interest for the present study: the theoretical framework of the book, the 
class of intermedially involved artworks it delineates, the distinctive artistic features 
of these artworks, and the explicit considerations on music that some of them 
contain. 
The monograph is divided into two parts devoted to two groups of novels 
(Jazz-Novels and Goldberg-Novels, see below) which are preceded by an important 
chapter on Theorizing the Musical Novel, all framed by an Introduction and a 
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Conclusion. An Appendix schematically illustrates the new model of intermediality 
advanced by Petermann and applied to two of the musical novels discussed. I use it 
and propose modifications in the study of Antoni Libera’s Toccata C-Dur (Chapter 
4 below) and in the Annex, where I reproduce a diagram-analysis of this literary 
toccata within the framework proposed by Petermann. 
Word and Music Studies provide a primary context for her work. She 
mentions the still influential writings by C.S. Brown and S.P. Scher, and reviews 
the most recent studies on music in prose, such as A. Shockley (2009), but she 
skillfully resists the temptation of overcharging the theoretical part with meticulous 
discussions of terminological distinctions and internal nuances of the approach: this 
field of study is relatively young and still methodologically unstable. Instead, 
having provided the necessary background, Petermann seeks to give a 
pragmatically clear framework for her own research, a “tool for analysis rather than 
a philosophical interpretation of intermediality per se” (p. 21). Here Petermann 
draws most extensively on the definition of medium and the models of 
intermediality advanced by W. Wolf (1999) and I. Rajewsky (2002). She defines 
intermedial imitation as the use of “techniques of the medium that is materially 
present […] to metaphorically suggest the presence of a foreign medium” (p. 24). 
For heuristic purposes, she advances an open catalogue of aspects of the “foreign 
medium product” (n.b. not a very elegant phrase to my taste) that may be imitated 
or thematized: effect – “real or perceived” impression made “on its audiences”; 
surface – “immediately perceptible elements” thereof; structure – “formal elements 
on the micro or macro levels”; inherent qualities – e.g. “the spatial nature of 
sculpture or the temporal nature of music” (p. 25); context and content – intended 
as subject matter of narration or representation. Petermann makes use of selected 
semiotic terms and concepts, adopting the Saussurean duality of signifiant and 
signifié in a sign. She justly emphasizes the abstract nature of both as well as the 
non-identity of signifié and a referent. Most important for her general approach to 
music, as disclosed in the Conclusion, is Petermann’s assertion that the “referent 
need not be extrinsic to the sign system but can be intrinsic, yielding meaning that 
is self-referential” (p. 30). She adopts J.J. Nattiez’s distinction between the poietic, 
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esthesic and immanent levels of semiotic communication in order to show that 
musical novels result from both esthesis, as “interpretations of and responses to 
music” (p. 213) and poiesis, or the creative processes of text making. 
In the first part Petermann interprets how the following eleven novels imitate 
the genre of jazz (and blues): Albert Murray’s Train Whistle Guitar, 1975; The 
Spyglass Tree, 1991; The Seven-League Boots, 1995; The Magic Keys, 2005; 
Michael Ondaatje’s Coming Through Slaughter, 1976, Xam Wilson Cartiér’s Be-
Bop, Re-Bop, 1987; Muse-Echo Blues, 1991; Toni Morrison’s Jazz, 1992; Christian 
Gailly’s Be-bop, 1995; Stanley Crouch’s Don’t the Moon Look Lonesome, 2000; 
and The Best of Jackson Payne by Jack Fuller (2000). Petermann focuses on the 
aesthetic and formal aspects of jazz, as imitated in these texts, rather than on its 
extramusical (political, social, racial) significance. Such an aesthetic interest in 
verbal jazz resounds well with the increasing attention paid to jazz and its stylistic 
and performative specificity in the current philosophical debate on music. 
Petermann distinguishes various levels of textual imitation of music according to 
the musical element involved: sound (rhythm and timbre – Chapter 2), structural 
patterns (riff, lick, chorus, greatest-hits album, call-and-response – Chapter 3) and 
the performance situation (Chapter 4). While adaptation strategies such as the use 
of gossip-style or second-person address to render the reading experience akin to 
the spontaneous and direct jazz audience interaction seem merely analogous to the 
imitated performative situation, the structural and rhythmic operations, as well as 
the “technique of motivic improvisation” (p. 134) permit a significant degree of 
substantial affinity with the imitated music itself.  
Petermann’s chapters follow the overall method of introducing, first, the 
musical elements in their native context (in jazz and classical music technical terms) 
and, second, the strategies of their adaptation in prose. These include the use of 
poetic devices such as alliteration, rhyme, rhythm, meter and various ways of 
loosening the referential aspect of verbal structures in order to emphasize their sonic 
qualities. Now it is crucial to clarify that these emphatic operations on the prosodic 
and semantic level are not foreign to the medium of literature (if unusual, to such 
an extent, in prose) – in fact, they can be fully analyzed in terms proper to traditional 
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poetics. One is tempted to say that they constitute the matter, just as the physical 
sounds in standard cases of music that must be intentionally formed through the 
artistic process (B. Sève would say: altered) in order to become music (or its textual 
imitation, accordingly). What enable these devices to imitate music are their distinct 
functions within the novels. On most occasions, explicit references to music attune 
the reader’s attention and prepare her to perceive these devices as (imitations of) 
music rather than instances of poetic prose or poet’s novel. At times, this is a more 
complex matter, calling for a firmly justified interpretation of the text as a whole 
(for instance Cusk’s novel never mentions Bach’s Goldberg Variations and still is 
convincingly considered by Petermann as yet a further “literary variation” on this 
cycle).   
The second part focuses on five novels that imitate a single masterpiece of 
baroque keyboard polyphony – Johann Sebastian Bach’s Goldberg Variations 
BWV 988. There are more novels, plays and films evoking Bach’s cycle, but the 
following five, however different in style and plot, derive from it their overall 
structure (with the exception of Der Untergeher) as well as many significant details: 
Nancy Huston’s Les Variations Goldberg, 1981 (English translation by Huston 
1996); Thomas Bernhard’s Der Untergeher, 1983; Richard Powers’ The Gold Bug 
Variations, 1991; Gabriel Josipovici’s Goldberg: Variations, 2002; and Rachel 
Cusk’s The Bradshaw Variations, 2009. This asymmetrical approach (genre 
imitation versus imitation of a particular musical work) is by no means accidental, 
as it faithfully reflects the central role of the musical work as opus perfectum et 
absolutum in classical music contrasted with musical idioms, rules of improvisation 
and the predominance of audience interaction in jazz music. Despite the significant 
differences between these two musical traditions, Petermann highlights the 
similarities in literary techniques involved in their textual rendition. Chapter 5 
analyzes the structural patterns in the Goldberg-Novels (theme and variations form, 
canon, numerical symmetry of the cycle’s architecture), and Chapter 6 considers 
the aspects of composition, performance, and reception as imitated by them. In her 
analyses she refers to tempo markings, and metric and tonal aspects of the 
“hypotext”, such as the minor key used in the variations XV, XXI and XXV, and 
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their textual counterparts, such as the “strong state of loss” on the diegetic level in 
Huston’s respective variationes.   
If Petermann studies in detail the elements of music used and imitated in these 
texts, she emphasizes that the musical novel is “valuable in itself” (p.1) and 
interprets its musical “hypotexts” within the Genettian metaphor of palimpsest. 
Petermann’s approach to the aspects of the works relevant to her inquiry can be 
qualified as broadly formalist, matching the position her study takes on music, as 
she stresses “the intrinsic references of music within its own closed system, through 
the establishment of patterns, repetitions, breaches with conventions, etc., which 
make connections to other parts of the piece or to forms and patterns shared by other 
pieces of music” (p.213). Such a position is not arbitrary: as she acknowledges, 
Hanslick’s view on music (even if he cannot reasonably be “considered the first to 
make a scientific study of music” (p.2)) appealed particularly to the modernist 
writers, offering a stimulating paradigm to transgress. It is precisely the “anti-
literary”, purely immanent conception of musical sense that motivates the 
modernist experiments with prose writing more musico (Joyce, Huxley). Petermann 
studies in depth the post-modern continuation of this line in contemporary fiction. 
On this account sense and aesthetic value are produced in two different ways in 
music and in literature. If text can successfully imitate music, the resulting musical 
prose has the capacity to broaden the scope of fiction to encompass both musical 
and literary modes of signification and beauty. 
Hence, we return to the first defining characteristic of the musical novel: it 
“contains a musical presence not primarily on the level of content, but rather on 
that of form” (p.3 – italics J.C.) This presence is achieved most prominently by 
textual imitation rather than by intersemiotic juxtaposition (typical of the graphic 
novel, where words and images co-exist in print), as in the case of musical epigraphs 
which are considered a marginal phenomenon. 
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Much has been done in the past century to mitigate the uncritical usage of 
musical metaphors in literary criticism47, and Petermann chooses to be very clear 
on the point that being ‘musical’ does not mean for her that a novel qualified as 
such becomes music, nor even aspires to it. This sober assumption, even if cardinal, 
remains just an assumption of her work and should not be mistaken for its outcome. 
It cannot be verified on the basis of the study alone, as it necessarily touches upon 
what music really is – a question explicitly excluded from scrutiny by Petermann 
herself – and thus calls for a philosophical interpretation. 
The present dissertation is one such attempt.
                                               
47 There is a dissenting positive account, which emphasises that a search for „appropriateness” and „rigour” 
misses the point of metaphors, which are a valuable tool of imaginative cognition, and should not be descarded, 
nor „critically regulated” in order to become scientific. Quite the contrary, the more unusual a metaphor is, the 
more it can imaginatively show, providing thus valuable insight. Cf. E. Prieto, Metaphor and Methodology in 
Word and Music Studies, „Word and Music Studies”, 2002, t.4, pp. 49–67; E. Prieto, Listening in : music, mind, 
and the modernist narrative, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln 2002. Metaphors are also something 
inevitably inscribed in the very nature of musical hearing (cf. e.g. R. Scruton, Musical Movement: A Reply to 
Budd, „The British Journal of Aesthetics”, 2004, t.44, no 2, pp. 184–187.), and ineliminable from our ordinary 
and scientific discourses on music (Zangwill disputes the metaphorical nature of musical hearing itself, arguing 
– against Scruton and Levinson – that what we hear in music are not metaphorically intended movements, 
commotions or personas, but directly aesthetic properties of the musical soundstructures; we cannot, however, 
do without metaphors, if we want to speak of such aesthetic experiences, because they are ineffable: N. 
Zangwill, Music, Emotion and Metaphor, „Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism”, 2007; N. Zangwill, Music, 
Metaphor and Aesthetic Concepts, „Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism”, 2014; N. Zangwill, Music and 
Aesthetic Reality. Formalism and the Limits of Description..., op. cit..). 
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PART I. Verbis litterisque scripta Musica 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An unapparent connection (harmonia)  
is stronger than an apparent one. 
Heracl. fragm. B5448 
                                               
48 Apud: Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies 9.9.5, transl. Curd. 
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music […] the object of the great Anders-streben of all art, of all that is 
artistic, or partakes of artistic qualities.  
All art constantly aspires towards the condition of music. 
For while in all other kinds of art it is possible to distinguish the matter 
from the form, and the understanding can always make this distinction, yet it is 
the constant effort of art to obliterate it. 
Walter Pater49
                                               
49 W. Pater, Renaissance Studies in Art, ed by. D.L. Hill, University of California Press 1980, p. 106. 
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Chapter 1. Music Beyond the Senses  
 
Perhaps, said Kretschmar, it was music’s deepest wish not to be heard at 
all, nor even seen, nor yet felt; but only—if that were possible—in some Beyond, 
the other side of sense and sentiment, to be perceived and contemplated as pure 
mind, pure spirit. 
Doctor Faustus, Chapter VIII50 
 
Nichts läppischer, in einem Künstler-Roman, als Kunst, Genie, Werk nur 
zu behaupten, nur anzupreisen, von ihren seelischen Wirkungen nur zu 
schwärmen. Hier galt es R e a l i s i e r u n g , galt E x a k t h e i t  — nichts 
war mir klarer. 
Die Entstehung des Doktor Faustus. Roman eines Romans51 
 
Introduction 
My task here is far from obvious: this introductory chapter is about musica 
textualis, a special case of inaudible music, of music Beyond the Senses. I shall try 
to show how music can be effectively present in prose and why we should 
consider seriously such cases as uncommon (perhaps) and extreme (for sure) cases 
of music, rather than merely linguistic descriptions thereof. In other words, I shall 
try to argue that we have no profound philosophical reasons to doubt that a number 
                                               
50 T. Mann, Doctor Faustus, trans by. H.T. Lowe-Porter, A. Knopf, New York 1948. Original text reads: 
„Vielleicht, sagte Kretzschmar, sei es der tiefste Wunsch der Musik, überhaupt nicht gehört, noch selbst 
gesehen, noch auch gefühlt, sondern, wenn das möglich wäre, in einem Jenseits der Sinne und sogar des 
Gemütes, im Geistig-Reinen vernommen und angeschaut zu werden” T. Mann, Doktor Faustus. Die Entstehung 
des Doktor Faustus, S. Fisher Verlag, Frankfurt 1967. I take the licentia poetica to quote the first excerpt in 
English and not in original, because it contains the crucial expressions which make up for the title of the present 
chapter. Its early, reduced version was read at the 5th Annual Conference of the Royal Musical Association 
Music & Philosophy Study Group, in London (King’s College, 17-18th Jul. 2015). It was conceived as a critical 
contribution to the discussion conference’s main theme, Music and the Senses. 
51 Ibid., pp. 706–707. Italics in original, further emphasis on the words Realisierung and Exakhtheit added – J. 
C. 
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of volumes silently standing on the shelves of our libraries may contain some 
extraordinary instantiations of the musical art; ones that enter in significant 
causal and epistemic relations with standard cases of music. 
From classical Antiquity throughout the Middle Ages what we usually call 
Music today – the human art of audible sounds – was philosophically considered, 
at best, as the last and least important sphere of Music, under the Boethian name 
of musica instrumentalis. The higher kinds of music, mentioned by Boethius in his 
De institutione musica52, but not treated there extensively (perhaps the other books 
were lost, but there is not much ground to believe this, probably he did not manage 
to write them before his execution in Pavia on the order of Theodoric c. 525/653) 
included holistically the harmony of the spheres and natural elements and seasons 
(musica mundana54), and the consonance of bodily and spiritual elements in us 
(musica humana). This is why music was first and foremost considered science, as 
rigorous meditation of these inaudible harmonies, proportions of metaphysical 
order and the science of well arranging sounds according to these universal laws 
(scientia bene modulandi). By consequence this learned speculative aspect becomes 
a necessary element of the definition of music in Augustine’s De Musica55. Guido 
d’Arezzo, if sensible to the impractical character of Boethian theory, maintains the 
strict distinction between musicus (i.e. the philosopher, the theoretician) and cantor 
                                               
52 For the full Latin text (following, with minor revisions, the text established in De institutione musica libri 
quinque, ed. G. Friedlein, Teubner, Leipzig 1867) and for the French translation, see: Boethius, De institutione 
musica, ed by. C. Meyer, trans by. C. Meyer, Traité de la musique, Brepols, Turnhout 2004. For the English 
translation, see Boethius, Fundamentals of Music, ed by. C. V. Palisca, trans by. C.M. Bower, Yale University 
Press, New Haven - London 1989. 
53 Cf. C. Meyer, Introduction, [in:] Boèce: Traité de la Musique, Brepols, Turnhout 2004, pp. 1–16. 
54 This theory was a compilation of views held by antient authors, based on the lost Introduction of Nicomachus 
of Gerasa and Harmonics by Ptolemy, cf. J. Marenbon, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Boethius, Cambridge 
2009, p. 303. It is symptomatic, that this Companion has no chapter dedicated to De Mus. at all and mentions 
the work briefly in the section consecrated to mathematical works (also not treated extensively). 
55 The first full critical edition of the treatise was published only this year: Augustinus, De Musica, ed by. M. 
Jacobsson, trans by. M. Jacobsson, De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston 2017, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum 
Latinorum (CSEL) Band 102. 
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(i.e. the practitioner of musica instrumentalis, or, in to-day terms: musician) in truly 
delightful celebrated invective against the unlearned cantores: 
Musicorum et cantorum magna est distantia,  
isti dicunt, illi sciunt quae componit musica.  
Nam qui facit, quod non sapit, diffinitur bestia. 
These social aspects of the division of musical labor, and the privileged 
position of the musicus over the cantor reflect the primordial fact, that for the people 
of that time, as Fubini puts it: 
La musica mundana è l’unica vera musica e gli altri tipi di musica lo 
sono solamente di riflesso o nella misura in cui partecipano o ricordano 
l’armonia del cosmo56. 
[Musica mundana is the only true music, and other types of music are 
music only as reflections thereof, or to the extent in which they 
participate in or remind of the cosmic harmony]. 
The Pythagorean intellectualistic reduction of music to eternal proportion 
of numbers dominates Western philosophy way into the 18th and 19th centuries 
(if at this point it is already very distinct form music theory): music is interpreted 
as the unconscious exercise of arithmetic (Leibniz) or metaphysics (Schopenhauer), 
incorporating and prefiguring sensibly the invisible essence of things. This is, of 
course, not to downplay the role of the ever more important “empiricist” current in 
musical reflections, present there from Antiquity through all the epochs.  
Music’s direct effects on the body are treated with suspicion within the 
broader Platonic tradition, even if authors such as Aristotle’s pupil Aristoxenus of 
Tarentum in 4th C. B.C. and the Epicurean Philodemus of Gadara in the 1st C. B.C. 
defended the crucial role of the musical ear. It is also striking that Europe’s 
philosophy of music for about a thousand years was based on a theoretical vision 
of the idealized music of the Greeks, that, in terms of musical practice, was at that 
time in complete oblivion. Jacques Chailley insists on the fact that the musical 
                                               
56 E. Fubini, L’estetica musicale dall’antichità al Settecento, Einaudi, Torino 2002, p. 73. 
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theory of Boethius, being compiled from the writings of the ancient authors had 
nothing to do with the actual musical practice of its own time, the Greek music 
being fallen into oblivion57, not to mention the medieval and modern music. Sève, 
as we will see in a while, considers Pythagoreanism simply an error: a 
(philosophically influential) theory radically inadequate to its field. 
 The concrete turn: listen, first! then philosophize 
Today things are different. What philosophers are primarily interested in is 
the sounding practice of musicians and our sensitive experience thereof. It is this 
practice and this experience that come first and constitute the valuable starting point 
for any considerable reflexion on music today. They provide, too, its ultimate 
criterion of adequacy. This is true both of the analytic and continental tradition. For 
us, being audible, seems a prima facie condition on being music (cf. definitions 
by Levinson58 and Kania59). For them, the real music was essentially inaudible. 
The objects in question must, therefore, be different60. 
While the “turn” to the sounding concrete of music is quite obviously the 
universally accepted option for the analytic philosophers (think of Levinson’s 
concatenationism as the theory of basic musical understanding), let us consider 
briefly two of its significant continental exponents: Vladimir Jankélévitch and 
Bernard Sève.  
                                               
57 J. Chailley, Expliquer l’harmonie, Editions d’Aujourd’hui 1985, pp. 23–24. apud B. Sève, L’Altération 
musicale. Ou ce que la musique apprend au philosophe, Seuil, Paris 2013, p. 49. Sève is very severe here, as 
he says that « la philosophie a été successivement victime de son asservissement à un discours de theorie de la 
musique, celui du pythagorisme, qui s’est révélé stérile et stérilisant. […] Ce long asservissement volontaire et 
séparation s’expliquent par une double fascination : par le mathématisme et par le visible. L’œil et 
l’entendement mathématisant ont desservi l’oreille, et la philosophie s’en est rendue sourde » (p.47) and, further 
on : « Le discours philosophique sur la musique a été bloqué durant deux millénaires par le discours mort du 
pythagorisme » (p.49). 
58 J. Levinson, „The concept of music”, op. cit. 
59 A. Kania, Definition, [in:] The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music, ed by. T. Gracyk and A. 
Kania, Routledge, New York 2011, pp. 3–13. 
60 This serious problem must be addressed, in order to exclude equivocation from the very core of the 
philosophical study of music. For further considerations see: On defining music, infra. 
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Jankélévitch’s complex and rich musico-philosophical writings61 can be 
characterized by his manifest reluctance to the metaphysical philodoxy of music. 
Denouncing the misleading uses of metaphors and false parallels with rhetoric, 
Jankélévitch draws our attention to the nude musical act in its immediate sonic 
splendor. Being seduced by the other-worldly visions of music’s presumed hermetic 
meanings, we turn a deaf ear to its this-worldly immanent rewards. This 
apophatic attitude, symmetrical with his negative views in metaphysics, make his 
thought entirely subordinated to the sensual appreciation of music. First, the 
critical moment removes both the rationalist and obscurantist obstacles to the purity 
of perception. Second, the deictic62 moment draws the attention of the listener to 
what cannot be described63 and must be aurally experienced. 
Sève’s position, in contrast to Jankélévitch’s musico-philosophical via 
negativa, offers some sound positive account on the nature of music through the 
concept of altération. He accepts fully the need of describing and conceptualizing 
our complex and rewarding interactions with music. What he has in common, 
however, with his radical compatriot, is the sense of profound discontinuity 
between what we can philosophically state about music and music itself. His 
remarkable book L’Altération musicale. Ou ce que la musique apprend au 
philosophe reminds us that “the musical experience is beyond these pages [hors de 
ces pages]: it is in your ear, not before your eyes; perhaps you should [now] close 
                                               
61 Cf. V. Jankélévitch, La Musique et l’Ineffable, A. Colin, Paris 1961. and its recent English translation V. 
Jankélévitch, Music and the Ineffable, trans by. C. Abbate, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J 2003.. 
62 Steven Rings’ term, cf. M. Gallope et al., Vladimir Jankélévitch’s Philosophy of Music, „Journal of the 
American Musicological Society”, 2013, t.65, no 1. 
63 This is an ineffabilist thesis; an analytic verison of musical ineffabilism is defended in N. Zangwill, Music 
and Aesthetic Reality. Formalism and the Limits of Description..., op. cit. with no reference to the author of La 
musique et les heures. For a critical discussion and new typology of ineffabilist theses on music see: J. 
Czarnecki, Ineffable w filozofii muzyki. Zangwill wobec Jankélévitcha, „Res Facta Nova”, 2015, t.16 (25), pp. 
53–73. For radical criticism of Zangwill’s reading of E. Hanslick, Vom Musikalisch-Schönen. Ein Beitrag zur 
Revision der Aesthetik der Tonkunst, Weigel, Leipzig 1858. see K. Guczalski, Emocje w muzyce. Hanslick i 
jego fałszywy zwolennik, „Res Facta Nova”, 2015, t.16 (25), pp. 35–52. 
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this book in order to (re-)listen to, say, the Ninth Quartet of Beethoven”64. Sève’s 
preliminary standpoint is well articulated: his philosophy must derive from the pre-
existent musical facts and artworks and rely on their actual sensitive perception. For 
“for the art philosopher [...] the artistic object is always in the first place”65: 
La philosophie de l’art est toujours seconde par rapport aux 
inventions des artistes. Si les artistes n’avaient inventé ni formes ni 
objets, le philosophe de l’art n’aurait rien à penser. Les questions du 
philosophe de l’art proviennent de différentes sources ; certaines son 
issues d’une interrogation philosophique générale, ensuite appliquée 
aux objets et formes artistiques ; d’autres sont au contraire suscitées par 
ces formes et ces objets inventés par les artistes, formes et objets qui 
peuvent parfois sembler aussi surprenants et énigmatiques qu’un 
phénomène naturel, comme une éclipse […]66 
To sum up: philosophers of music “after the turn” reject speculation and (1) 
what they want to understand is the actual music67. They privilege (2) the 
aesthetic experience thereof, which they assume to be essentially aural68. 
These two points, however, are correlated, but not equivalent. 
 Silent music 
Now I shall consider one capital case – the case of silent music69 – that makes 
their interrelation challenging, because it responds to the first point, while escaping 
                                               
64 B. Sève, L’Altération musicale. Ou ce que la musique apprend au philosophe..., op. cit., p. 17. Not 
surprisingly, at the very end, the reader will be once more reminded that the “beyond the book [le hors-livre], 
for this book, it’s music” and, once more, invited to “return [...] to the live experience of music: to sing, to 
listen, to play” Ibid., p. 330. 
65 Ibid., p. II.; the same in B. Sève, L’instrument de musique. Une étude philosophique, Seuil, Paris 2013. + 
Berger devo sentire la m. prima di pensarla Gotk. P.111. 
66 Ibid., pp. 18–19. The image of eclipse is a clear reference to Arist. in Metaph., Analit. Post. et al. (passim). 
67 Frequent criticism of the New Musicology from these positions can be seen as a symptom, cf. P. Kivy, 
Sounding Off. Eleven Essays in the Philosophy of Music, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012. 
68 „I was interested […] in listening to music as a sensuous experience that engages the man as a whole” A. 
Chęćka-Gotkowcz, Ucho i umysł, słowo/obraz terytoria, Gdańsk 2012, p. 27. 
69 The other, apparently similar, but in fact completely different, would be that of organised sound structures 
made of inaudible frequencies. 
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the second. Silent music is something composed by acknowledged composers like 
Erwin Schulhoff, John Cage, Sir Malcolm Arnold or György Ligeti and performed 
by musicians in modern concert halls but, apparently, cannot be “heard” and is not 
made of sounds70.  
Silence in music 
In fact, silence is not only a crucial element of any music but it is also its 
external condition71. This truth, perhaps obvious to any reflexive music-lover, may 
yet seem paradoxical: if we define music as humanly organized sound72, how can 
we admit as its constitutive element the radical opposite of sound – silence? Well, 
one may respond in Hegelian terms, interpreting silence as the Limit (die Grenze), 
the contradictory point where music is and is not at once, which constitutes its 
boundaries and thus is its necessary modal condition. Music, as organized sound, 
presupposes silence (negation of sound) and noise (negation of sonic organization).  
I would like to emphasize that musical silence is (1) a matter of intentional 
hearing rather than physical absence of soundwaves; and if we concentrate on it 
separately (2) we can tell its peculiar aurally perceivable quality (depending on 
the acoustic space, presence or absence of the audience, background sounds and so 
forth). Furthermore (3) the musical signs that abstractly signify it – the rests – 
strictly speaking indicate the voice in question not to resound, which may result in 
silence as well as in harmonies produced thanks to the reverberation73.  
                                               
70 Think also of some electronic and electroacoustic music using soundwaves out of the hearing spectrum. It is 
a different considerable case: non-audible humanly organised sound. This does not mean that this sound does 
not engage our sensorium; to the contrary: it is purposefully used in such a way as to elicit bodily reactions and 
perhaps thereby also emotional reactions (as in the case of very low frequencies inducing anxiety through the 
effect they have on our bodily tissues). 
71 Cf. A. Chęćka-Gotkowcz, Ucho i umysł..., op. cit.. Splendid first chapter „Wymiary ciszy” pp.29-60. „Sounds 
tend to silence” – Barenboim to Edward Said. Silence is a „structural principle” of all actual musics - J. 
Levinson, „The concept of music”, op. cit. 
72 For who does not define it so – the present argumentation may be well superfluous, for she understands music 
as unthinkable without silence. 
73 On the same basis medieval Church music is not rightly considered linear; in fact, linearly produced sounds 
created complex consonances in virtue of the default considerable reverberation. 
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As Pascal Quignard74 underlines eloquently, the audiences’ silence, the 
intense sonic vacuum preceding the first chord to be played, is the performers’ prey. 
Anna Chęćka-Gotkowicz dedicates most significantly the first chapter of her 
excellent book on experiencing music (The Ear and the Mind75) to silence. She 
reflects with grand finesse (along with D. Barenboim, Gisèle Brelet76 and others77) 
not only on the musicological and aesthetic aspects of musical silence, but also on 
its existential and metaphysical dimensions (in the broader prospective of the 
musical experience as a vanitative meditatio temporis radicated in the natural 
evanescence of musical sounds78). 
Not only thinkers emphasize the indispensable character of silence for music. 
We mentioned already Barenboim’s reflection on the sound’s Sein zur Stille, to 
paraphrase it with the musically transposed famous Heideggerian formula: sounds 
tend to silence and it is only the musician’s effort that maintains them in their 
ephemeral existence. This musical mirroring of existential questions is further 
developed according to the line of comparison between the semelfactive, 
irreversible constitution of a concert and of a human life. The celloist Mario 
Brunello consecrated a whole little book to the musical meditation of silence, the 
“amniotic liquid of music” as he likes to call it79. He says: 
                                               
74 P. Quignard, „La Haine de la musique”, op. cit., p. 269. 
75 A. Chęćka-Gotkowcz, Ucho i umysł..., op. cit. 
76 „Music is born, develops and consummates in silence. The musical work, as all sounding things, extends 
between two sorts of silence, the silence of its birth and the silence of its accomplishement” G. Brelet, Musique 
et Silence, „Revue Musicale”, 1946, no 200, p. 169. And further on: (p. 181) “the sounds have to die to give 
birth to the work of music”. 
77 V. Jankélévitch, P. Quignard, B. Sève, S. Davies, J. Levinson, K. Lipka, R. Ingarden. 
78 Note that it’s not by accident that the organ is the church instrument par excellence: its sound is continuous, 
potentially prolongeable ad infinitum, supported by flow of air coming from the bellows. The full biblical 
symbolism of wind and breath is at work here. And musically speaking this capacity of the organ is in continuity 
with purely vocal a cappella liturgical music of the Eastern Church. Think of the bourdon voice in church 
monody and the „continuous quality” of the psalmody with metaphysical space opening in the great pauses in 
the middle of the psalm verse. 
79 M. Brunello, Silenzio, Il Mulino, Bologna 2014. I say “musical meditation of silence” and not “meditation 
of musical silence” most consciously. Brunello’s text is designed to make us ruminate musically (in the musical 
way) on silence, both musical and extra-musical. Brunello’s book, at least in its explicit program expressed in 
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La musica fa ascoltare il silenzio, oltre che essere ascoltata in 
silenzio. 
[Music makes you listen to the silence, apart from being listened 
to in silence]. 
Brunello argues that music, among other human truths80 intimately related to 
silence, is the modality which results the most successful of all in “organizing 
silence” (p.13). Even more importantly for our present argument, he affirms: 
La musica addirittura del silenzio ne fa materia prima. Il 
silenzio che precede la prima nota e il silenzio dopo l’ultima sono 
indispensabili affinché la musica si riveli ed esista. […] la musica degli 
uomini81 usa il silenzio, lo manipola, lo elabora, lo posiziona e ne 
decide la precisa durata. Il silenzio diventa una materia, o meglio 
un materiale, come la creta nelle mani dello scultore […] oppure […] 
come un colore nella tavolozza del pittore […]. Ma questa materia è 
silenzio. Non lo si può  toccare o vedere e talvolta neanche sentire82. 
[Music makes of silence its materia prima. The silence 
preceding the first note and the silence following the last one are 
indispensable for music to manifest itself and exist. […] the music of 
humans uses silence, manipulates it, elaborates it, positions it and 
decides its precise length. Silence becomes a matter, or better, a 
material, like clay in the sculptor’s hands […] or […] a color on the 
painter’s palette […]. But this matter is silence. You cannot touch it, 
nor see it, nor even, at times, even hear it]. 
 
                                               
its Premise tends itself to the condition of musica textualis: “Ho immaginato di offrire un momento di «ascolto» 
piu che una lettura. Una serie di riflessioni «lente» che, come la musica, hanno bisogno di tempo. Il libro è 
suddiviso in quattro movimenti, de «ascoltare» come una Sonata : il primo movimento in forma sonata nella 
sua tipica struttura di esposizione, sviluppo, ripresa e coda, il secondo in forma di Lied, il terzo uno Scherzo, e 
un Finale con Tema e Variazioni. Come dire « il silenzio non si legge, si «ascolta» (p. 11).  
80 This is the exact term he uses: verità. 
81 Brunello repeats this epithet – music of the humans – with striking consistency, as if he had in mind some 
other musics, of which, though, he remains silent. 
82 Ibid., pp. 14–15. 
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This passage seems a résumé of our considerations on silence up to this point, 
touching both on what I called the internal principle and external condition of 
music. I quote it therefore not because of its originality, but to show that these are 
not abstract constructions, but something essential to the practitioners of music: the 
author, like Barenboim, is a musician, not a philosopher, and it is his musical 
practice that he follows in his reflections. 
Considering silence in the performed music Judkins83 distinguishes correctly 
the measured (noted as rests and breaths) from the unmeasured silences. The latter 
category comprises of silences (a) internal to a piece (such us the general rest, 
fermata, caesura, expressive un-noted silences and silences between the movements 
of larger forms) and those which (b) frame it. She underlines the articulating and 
framing function of the unmeasured silence (especially in Western classical music) 
and its eminent role in live performances. From a very different methodological 
perspective, she arrives at conclusions strikingly similar to Gisèle Brelet’s, when 
she acknowledges the role of musical silences in “actually enlarging our sense of 
time (echoing Christian Accaoui’s élargissement du present) and our own 
existence”84. Roman Ingarden85 recognizes the crucial role of rests in the aesthetic 
experience of music and perhaps would agree with Brelet86 that it is in the dense 
moment of silence following the last chord that music is most fully present in the 
                                               
83 J. Judkins, Silence, sound, noise, and music, [in:] The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music, ed 
by. T. Gracyk and A. Kania, Routledge, New York 2011, pp. 14–23. 
84 „Sometimes a lack of sensory information – she writes most significantly – actually enhances our 
awareness of the passage or directedness of time, and even without sensory change or variation we still 
experience its passage (a phenomenon certainly crucial to appreciation of the repetitive, minimalist works of 
Steve Reich and Philip Glass). Music may be one of the only ways in which we truly engage the present, 
especially when musical time is crystallized in musical silence. [...] Consider the quality of the silences between 
verses of a carol or madrigal, or after the magnificent opening of the Bach D-minor organ toccata. These 
silences are musical silences, not ordinary silences, whose character is determined by the musical materials 
around them, their edges”. Ibid., p. 22. 
85 R. Ingarden, Utwór muzyczny i sprawa jego tożsamości, [in:] Studia z estetyki, Państwowe Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe, Warszawa 1966, vol. II; R. Ingarden, The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity, University 
of California Press 1986, pp. 123–135. 
86 G. Brelet, Musique et Silence..., op. cit., p. 181 apud Chęćka-Gotkowicz, p.47. 
 41 
 
act of synthetic recollection. We may conclude that silence, by no means less, and 
in some respects – more than sound, is a necessary musical element, and a 
standard ingredient in every composer’s palette.  
But, suppose the composer chooses to limit himself only to this ingredient of 
his palette? Can there be a purely silent piece of music? What underlies this 
question is the conviction that, even if we accept silence as a full-blown ingredient 
of music, we do so only considering its interrelation with musical sounds. The 
problem is: what sort of interrelation? Do the musical sounds in question have to 
appear in the temporal arch of the performance or can they be suggested in other 
ways? 
One possible solution is that of Andrew Kania87, concentrating not on the 
material sensitive input, but on the intentional calibration88 of aural attention we 
pay to it. If it is of the musical kind, broadly speaking, even complete silence will 
do as music: silence intended to be perceived as music. Now this is a crucial point 
to the whole edifice of our argumentation. If art in general often plays with 
metaphoric substitutions and transfers, making typically one perceivable form stand 
for some other entity, music embodies this paradigm in the purest form, as it is the 
art of substitution and equivalence of the non-identic. Repetition and variation 
(which equals repetition plus modification of the repeated) are the most rudimentary 
                                               
87 A. Kania, Silent Music, „The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism”, 2010, t.68, no 4, pp. 343–353. 
88 By calibration I mean shaping of the subject’s intentionality in order to make it perceive / experience so-and-
so and such-and-such intentional objects. Intentional calibrators can be internal or external to the work, 
individual or over-individual, intended or implicit in underlying structures (contexts, languages, cultures). An 
art theory recurring to this concept analyses the works with respect to what do they make the subject perceive, 
how are they designed with regards to this function, how external factor influence its workings. This thought is 
obviously present in many works of criticism and scholarship, even if the term is not used explicitly. The theory 
of the Great Divide in music, for instance, is a theory which shows how the rise of the institution of the public 
concert hall changed perceptive paradigms (changed the poetics of reception), giving issue not only to new 
ways of appreciating music, but as well the rise of new musical forms and respective forms of understanding. 
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elements of music, which – to be sure, frequent also within other artforms – in music 
can well be the unique device of alteration89. 
There are a number of candidates for a silent piece of music. The most 
notorious is, of course, John Cage’s 4’33”, even if philosophers such as Davies and 
Kania tend not to regard it as a piece of music90. Take, though, a more evident 
example: In futurum by Erwin Schulhoff (1919)91. It is the middle piece of a set 
of five piano miniatures entitled Fünf Pittoresken92, dedicated to the Dadaist painter 
George Groß (sic!) and preceded by a full quote from his 1914 text published in 
Neue Jugend in 191793. This severe social-satiric explosive intertext provides 
guidance for the interpretation of Schulhoff composition and its tone. Socio-
political critical engagement, harshly attacking the bourgeois values and religion 
(cf. the blasphemous conclusive line of Grosz’s text) is combined with energetic 
unconventional, witty and caustically direct style. If the four surrounding pieces are 
stylizations of bourgeois dances (Tempos: I – Foxtrott, II – Ragtime, III – Zeitlos 
                                               
89 I consciously construe a cluster of henerogenous ideas – that of Shklovsky and that of Sève –  to point out to 
an untrivial affinity between them. 
90 S. Davies, John Cage’s 4’33": Is it Music?, [in:] Themes in the Philosophy of Music, Oxford University 
Press, New York 2003. and A. Kania, Silent Music..., op. cit., p. 348. The latter argues that Cage did intend 
“the sounds audible at its performances not to be listened under traditional musical concepts”. 
91 Consider some other problematic examples: Marche funèbre composée pour les funérailles d'un grand 
homme sourd, Alphonse Allais (1897); In futurum, Erwin Schulhoff (1919); Symphonie Monoton Silence, Yves 
Klein (1949); 4′33″, John Cage (1952); Chiroptera op. 75 Nr 6, Malcolm Arnold (1960); Three Bagatelles for 
David Tudor, György Ligeti (1961); 4'33" No. 2, John Cage (1962). 
92 E. Schulhoff, Fünf Pittoresken, Ries & Erler, Berlin 1991, pp. 61–77. See reproduction on the next page. 
93 G. Grosz, Aus den Gesängen, „Neue Jugend. Eine Zeitschrift für moderne Kunst und jungen Geis”, Berlin 
1917. 
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[No Time], IV – One Step , V – Maxixe) – the middle silent one’s title (wordlessly) 
speaks for itself with quite merciless eloquence. 
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In sum: silence is not only a (1) necessary condition of music (2) its full-
blooded ingredient but also (3) may be the unique element used in a number of 
non-identical compositions94. And this all was said of concert-performed music as 
it appears in its audition.  
Now, obviously, musical works have a range of non-audible formal properties 
(in the architectonic sense), describable in musicological analytical terms95. More 
interestingly, some composers throughout the history of music formed their 
compositions intentionally in vision of these aspects. Consider the „Netherland 
tricks” such as to be found in Ockeghem’s music: question marks instead of musical 
key, chess-like or spiral canon notation, melodic palindromes, note-anagrams and 
ciphers for the composers’ or patron’s names (soggetto cavato in Josquin des Prez 
Missa Hercules Dux Ferrariae, B-A-C-H96, F-E♭-C-B for Schubert, D-E♭-C-
B♭for Shostakovich etc. and… H-E-A-E-Es / B-E-A-E- E♭). 
The non-audible is inherent to music both as (a) performance and as (b) 
composed structure.  
Having in mind the results of this discussion of silent music in the ear-
centered context, I find it insightful and refreshing to rethink music in terms that 
situate it in a relation to sound more subtle than mere physical conditio sine qua 
non. If it is true that music universally is associated with the art of sounds 
(Tonkunst), it is also true that depending on this as a simple definitional feature is 
                                               
94 This identity is guaranteed by the different aesthetic and artistic properties of the works – Leibniz’s law – 
and could be questioned at best on extreme formalist grounds. 
95 Levinson, following Gurney, insists that the actual attentive perception of music-quasi hearing - covers 
several seconds and is sufficient to the basic musical understanding J. Levinson, Music in the moment, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca and London 1997, p. 70. This means that these properties are not audible, at least not 
necessarily audible, in the proper experience of music. 
96 Among many other examples of the use of this motif, including a number of Bach’s own compositions, such 
as, most famously, the last unfinished contrapunctus of Die Kunst Der Fuge BWV 1080 and hundreds of other 
composers’ works, such as Liszt’s Prelude and Fugue on the name of Bach, Schumann’s Six Preludes and 
Fugues on the name of Bach or Schnittke’s Sonata quasi una fantasia – there is also bar 7 of my most humble 
arrangement of Joyce’s text (La ci darem la mano in FW) to be found in the Appendix to Chapter 5 – see for 
score and a recording p. 143 below. 
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not very illuminating. “The sounding” and “the audible” in music is only one part 
of the story. One that delights us frequently, one which modally conditions the 
aesthetics of music, certainly. But the other part of the story is also worth of being 
told and appreciated. My intentions are not secretly neo-Platonic; I do not want to 
promote anti-corporeal and anti-sensual prejudices against music which have a rich 
and colorful tradition (Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, the Middle Ages; Jankélévitch: 
rancune contre la musique, black magic, Sirens, temptation, illicit maneuvers, anti-
intellectual powers; Quignard: haine de musique; Brelet: angelism and moralism). 
Neither do I want to stand for metaphysical speculations on music in the Jena style. 
What I want, instead, is to explore the potential of the elements of the musical 
machinery that are collocated beyond the reach of the physical ear. I want to 
examine whether and on what conditions could they perform on their own, outside 
of the audible, embedded in some other material than sounds. And in this striving, 
surprisingly, I find an ally in Kania, as his definition relies no more on the physical 
presence of sounds but on the way they are intentionally heard97. Most surprisingly, 
in the last section of his essay this distinguished philosopher advances a little 
marvelous piece of musica textualis. Let us cite the complete score of Kania’s 
Composition 2009 #3, as printed in his article: „Indicate a length of silence, using 
the usual cues with which you would signal the beginning & end of a single 
movement, song, etc. (The content of this work is the silence you frame, not any 
ambient noise)”98. 
This verbal score99 is a very simple one, much simpler than, say, Virginia 
Woolf’s 1921 String Quartet100, but also a highly determined one: it indicates 
exhaustively the musical features of the piece of music in question. Now, this score, 
fitting perfectly the contemporary critical concept of music, is also an exquisite 
example of musica textualis, namely, a verbal piece of music. 
                                               
97 Even though, in order to advance in the reasoning, one would substitute ‘hear’ with ‘perceive’, ‘attend to’ or 
some other broader qualification that wouldn’t presuppose the ear as the actual organ physically involved. 
98 A. Kania, Silent Music..., op. cit., p. 351. 
99 Cf. S.P. Scher, Thomas Mann’s ‘Verbal Score’: Adrian Leverkühn’s Symbolic Confession..., op. cit.  
100 V. Woolf, Monday or Tuesday, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York 1921. 
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Consider one legitimate objection: yes, it is a verbal determination of a piece 
of music, but it is so in virtue of being a performative instruction: the actions 
described are to be realized on stage as to produce a musical event. Only in virtue 
of this relation to a projected performance it is a true piece of music. Words used 
are a non-standard, but nonetheless perfectly adequate, equivalent of a musical 
score composed of what Ingarden dubbed the “imperative” symbols101. Standard 
cases of musica textualis, however, involve no such relation to a musical 
performance; therefore, they are no real music. 
Now, one way to address this point is to say, following Peter Kivy102, that 
reading (some) prose is a one-person, silent performance. The object of the 
aesthetic experience is constituted in literature by the “inner-ear” act of reading; 
and this act is an execution of the text, intended as a long performance instruction 
(recipe). Now – if we share Scruton’s view that “Music belongs uniquely to the 
intentional sphere, and not to the material realm”103, then we have no reason not to 
follow a text’s suggestion that it is to be interpreted more musico, that it commands 
the reader to perform it in his “inner ear” as music, just as in the standard cases it 
commands audible performances involving producing actual sounds. How this 
suggestion is to be realized, is a matter of systematic intermedial study and 
interpretation. The philosopher’s task is to recognize it as a condition for the real 
presence of music in a text.  
 Conclusion 
In the previous parts of our reasoning we were forced to exclude some of the 
traditionally pre-determined materials of music, such as tone, sound and even 
silence from its enumerative definition. We agreed that it is rather the character of 
the perception involved that determines an experience of music as such; 
                                               
101 R. Ingarden, The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity..., op. cit., pp. 38–39. Orig. R. Ingarden, 
„Utwór muzyczny i sprawa jego tożsamości”, op. cit., p. 200. 
102 P. Kivy, The Performance of Reading. An Essay in the Philosophy of Literature, Blackwell Publishing 2006. 
103 R. Scruton, Understanding Music, [in:] The Aesthetic Understanding. Essays in the Philosophy of Art and 
Culture, St. Augustine’s Press, South Bend, Indiana 1998, pp. 88–115. 
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furthermore, following Ingarden, Scruton, Levinson, Sève and Kania104, we 
escaped the trap of subjectivism by the introduction of the intentional clause105. 
And now, I believe, we have no grounds to refuse the status of music to texts 
that function as instructions for musical experiences, even if silent ones and even 
if dealing with another artistic medium. Therefore, we allow to emerge in 
literature a concept symmetrical to program music and vocal music. Just as 
some musical sound structures are arranged as narrations and are intended to be 
performed and understood as such, some texts of prose are meant to be experienced 
as music and this feature is crucial to their interpretation as literature. They appear 
as compound, mixed forms, that combine music and literature in a way less 
evident than song or drama, but by no means: less real. We may quarrel on the 
precise nature of the interrelation of the heterogeneous elements involved, but as a 
starting point we should agree that the musical element in such cases of intermodal 
prose is not a mere representation: it is real, if silent, music. 
 
* 
 
Just as with program music, serious doubts on its workings and true nature 
are permissible106; the status of particular musical works is usually oscillating 
between pure and program music, or between different programs associated with 
the same sound structure. This instability within program music, corresponding to 
the common baroque practice of setting different texts to the same music, is also 
typical of musica textualis. At times, it is explicitly present as a direct suggestion 
(Quarles’s musicalization of fiction in Huxley, Mann’s Exaktheit realized within the 
ostensive union of music and life, of musical matter and narrative matter in Doktor 
                                               
104 Ibid., J. Levinson, „The concept of music”, op. cit., B. Sève, L’Altération musicale. Ou ce que la musique 
apprend au philosophe..., op. cit. and A. Kania, Silent Music..., op. cit. 
105 The question of musical intentionality is further discussed in the next chapter. 
106 The extreme formalist will, for instance, disregard any program suggestions, even if explicitly given by the 
composer, following his general views on musical beauty and the perceptive attitudes it normatively demands. 
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Faustus, Iwaszkiewicz’s this short story of mine has a certain musical form – on 
his Martwa Pasieka…). These suggestions remain however sometimes unfulfilled, 
as ambiguous artistic mystifications, sometimes – as perhaps in the case of Martwa 
Pasieka – motivated in part politically. On other occasions no direct authorial 
suggestion, nor even a documentable intention are at stake; it is the text’s internal 
formation that gives rise to musical interpretations. Every time it happens it depends 
on the interpreter, on how convincing his reading is. Music history provides 
abundant examples of programs which come and go (withdrawn or restituted by the 
composers themselves), making every single candidate for program music a puzzle 
to solve in cautious interpretation. However, this instability and dubiousness does 
not harm at all the clarity of the concept of program music itself: it is perfectly 
understandable, even if never obviously and problemlessly applicable. The same 
can be stated of musica textualis, music knowledgeably perceivable in artistically 
arranged word structures alone. 
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Chapter 2. Musica textualis. Remarks on Aesthetic 
Experience of Music in Prose 
Let me start with a quote from Jacobus of Liège (Jacques de Liège, 13-14th 
C.) 
 Non est enim musica generaliter sumpta de numero sonorum vel de sonis 
numeratis invicem comparatis solum, sed de numero rerum quarumcumque 
simul collatarum, prout inter illas attendi potest quaedam habitudo cuiusdam 
proportionis, concordiae, ordinis vel connexionis, ut per harmonicam 
modulationem generaliter sumptam intelligatur habitudo sumpta, ut dictum est.  
Et secundum hoc, musica ad omnia extendere se videtur107. 
1. Two levels of intentionality foregrounding music 
Musica textualis is music made of linguistic primary material. Like other 
musics, it organizes its material more musico and it requires a musical 
interpretation108. It fits well some of the celebrated historical definitions of music 
(ars bene movendi, ars bene modulandi, excercitium arithmeticae vel metaphysicae 
occultum se numerare nescientis animi, l’art du temps par excellence etc.) with the 
only exclusion of those requiring necessarily that its primary material be the 
physical sound and its necessary mode of perception – actual hearing. This 
condition is typical of the most recent philosophy of music “after the turn”109 or of 
earlier approaches regarding cantus, cantilena but not musica. In contrast to these 
accounts, as Roger Scruton powerfully sustains: “Music belongs uniquely to the 
                                               
107 Jacobi Leodiensis Speculum musicae, ed. Roger Bragard, Corpus scriptorum de musica, vol. 3/1 ([Rome]: 
American Institute of Musicology, 1955), 3-142. http://boethius.music.indiana.edu/tml/14th/JACSP1A. Quote: 
“Robertus in libro De Ortu Scientiarum: Musica est scientialis animae perfectio, quoad cognitionem armonicae 
modulationis rerum quarumcumque aliqua modulatione invicem coaptarum”. 
108 At least in terms of performance (even if limited to the act of reading for oneself) and appreciacion. Critical 
interpretation naturally complements this set. 
109 This can be supported by Goehr’s remarks here, for instance: L. Goehr, Review of: The Idea of Music: An 
Introduction to Musical Aesthetics in Antiquity and the Middle Ages by Herbert M. Schueller, „The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism”, 1989, t.47, no 2, pp. 188–190. For some recent def. of m. – cf. Appendix. 
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intentional sphere, and not to the material realm”110. He doesn’t mean to 
exclude sound from the reflection on music, but he emphasizes that all musical 
functions and values, if grounded in sounds, are of intentional nature. One may 
distinguish two levels of intentionality here: (1) the spontaneous structuring of 
sensations in larger shapes (aspect hearing111) and (2) intentionality bound by the 
musical system of reference (for example: tonal devices governed by tensions and 
resolutions within a temporal span). Any higher levels of making sense musically 
necessarily presuppose at least these two levels of intentionality as a base. No music 
can be aesthetically experienced outside of this framework, even if sometimes our 
ear can be literally tricked into hearing music in purely verbal input, as relatively 
recent empirical research has shown112.  
We are all used to music that draws on air-vibrations within the hearing range 
of the human ear which we perceive as rhythmic, tonal, melodious, harmonic, 
legato, staccato, andante, vivace and so on. We are all used to music whose typical 
                                               
110 R. Scruton, „Understanding Music”, op. cit.. See also: P. Kivy, Authorial intention and the pure musical 
parameters, [in:] Sounding Off, 2012, pp. 191–209.. 
111 Cf. the notions of Geastalt-Psychologie, Wittgenstein’s aspect perception, and experimental psychology of 
aural perception. The “speech to song illusion” discovered by Diana Deutsch in 1995 has been corroborated in 
empirical tests, and shows that subjects perceive a spoken phrase as sung, when it is repeated several times. 
What all the subjects tested heard in the end of the phrase: “The sounds as they appear to you are not only 
different from those that are really present, but they sometimes behave so strangely as to seem quite impossible” 
was, after it was presented in a recording loop, this: . 
The spoken phrase appeared to be sung. The researchers summarize their discovery saying that it is a 
“perceptual transformation effect, in which a spoken phrase comes to be heard as sung rather than spoken, 
simply as a result of repetition. This effect is not just one of interpretation, since listeners upon hearing several 
repetitions of the phrase sing it back with the pitches distorted so as to give rise to a well-formed melody” D. 
Deutsch, T. Henthorn, and R. Lapidis, Illusory transformation from speech to song, „The Journal of the 
Acoustical Society of America”, 2011, t.129, no 4, pp. 2245–2252, emphasis mine - J.C. Originally described 
by Deutsch in 1995 and 2003. By interpretation here the authors mean some active process, as contrasted with 
immediate perception-as, which is the case here. For the recorded audio material to this illusion, see: 
deutsch.ucsd.edu/psychology/pages.php?i=212. 
112 Cf. “this is no music to my ears” at a performance of Neumeyer-Ligeti’s Midsummer Night’s Dream. 
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examples – Beethoven’s symphonies and Schubert’s Lieder coexist here with more 
humble specimens such as Prince Ogiński’s Polonaises (some of which actually 
really grand) and even Andrew Lloyd Webber’s tunes, not to mention Lady Gaga – 
are all composed of these “intentional entities” such as modulations, developments 
and cadenzas to which people with amusia are famously deaf113. We conceive of 
the eternal forms creatively indicated by geniuses like Mozart – as of types intended 
to produce delightful tokens (just think of the last night’s performance of Die 
Zauberflöte) which charm our senses and challenge our skill, intelligence and 
erudition. These tokens, of course, are such only in virtue of the intentional (on both 
levels) acts of musical hearing-as and hearing-for114. Last, we all, presumably, are 
aware of the ways in which works of contemporary music such as Yves Klein’s 
Monotone-Silence Symphony (1949), Ligeti’s Atmospheres (1961) or Cage’s 
infamous Tacet 4’33 (1952) trouble us (un-)aesthetically and challenge our 
concepts. All these aspects support clearly the claim that musical objects and 
                                               
113 These perceptual effects described from the aesthetic point of view by the philosophers I quote above can 
be innate and can be absent in pathological cases caused by cerebral lesions leading to amusia, that is: lack of 
musical aspect-hearing which is not due to loss of auditory capacity, but to the lack of musical ordering of the 
perceived aural stimuli, cf. O. Sacks, Musicophilia : tales of music and the brain, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 
2007, 1st ed. This line of observations leads to hypotheses on musical culture-independent universals among 
which this “first level of intentionality” or aspect-ordering of stimuli seems to be well documented. This shows 
that music’s belonging to the intentional realm goes far beyond the conscious and will-dependent and is 
inscribed in the very mechanisms governing our sensorium, at a basic level. 
114 We all accept the compound structure of the musical life including scores, performances, improvisations, 
performers, audiences, critics, institutions and means of mechanical reproduction. Some of us who are 
musicians know best that music in the first place means practice, pain and patience and a whole range of 
everyday choices and actions that shape the musicians’ body and mind throughout the years – instrumentalizing 
it without mercy; all for the sake of these precious performative momenta where music has its inexhaustibly 
ephemeral epiphanies – in aeternum. Chapter 5 discusses Antoni Libera’s novella whose protagonist Professor 
Plater makes his pupils hear Schumann’s Toccata in C major as a piece about these aspects of the pianist’s life; 
it has vital consequences for their respective fates, in quite an unexpected way, as you will see. And Anna 
Chęćka-Gotkowicz, philosopher and pianist from Gdańsk, in her book Ear and the Mind reflects with great 
philosophical refinement on the practical-existential aspects of the performer’s life. In her reflection they 
become, and rightly so, an integral part of the consideration of music, and not merely collateral, contingent, 
pragmatic, psychological aspects of the purportedly essentially musical in se. Cf. A. Chęćka-Gotkowcz, Ucho 
i umysł..., op. cit. 
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properties are intentional entities. Even if for many analytic ontologists of music, 
such as Levinson, musical works are abstract structures (non-intentional in the 
sense that they have existence independent of anybody’s psychical acts towards 
them), still these abstract structures are by their very nature directed to producing 
musical performances (which instantiate them). We perceive these instantiations 
intentionally; therefore, intentionality cannot be eliminated even from abstract-
objectivist musical ontologies of this type. Only a true extreme Platonist or 
Pythagorean musical ontologist, happy to reject the idea of musical work’s 
creatbility and to see the „creative” process as an actual discovery of an eternal 
pattern or proportion, could do without intentional perception and intersubjective 
cognitive acts in his account of music115. 
Musical avant-gardes of the last century taught us to develop these musical 
intentionalities towards sound-, silence- and noise116-events which at that time were 
not musical at all. They belonged to the domain of the unmusical to the ears of the 
previous generations (exactly in the way sound combinations indicated by 
Beethoven sounded in the first place unmusical to the classically attuned critics117). 
Musicalized fiction seems to suggest a further and even more radical exploration of 
what can be the substratum of this sort of intentionality, of what becomes music in 
                                               
115 He would do also without any „actual” („performed”) music. 
116 The celebrated futurist inventor of a notation and of special instruments for ‘intonating noises’ (he called 
them intonarumori) was Luigi Russolo in his L’arte dei rumori (1913). Concrete and tape music expanded this 
palette of noises further by registered sounds of the till-then-extramusical-life, making its bits the alterated 
substratum of musical formation (musicalization). 
117 Support can be found in numerous quotes from the reviews. Let me quote a longer passage that appeared in 
a book by Oulibicheff in the thirties of the 19th C.: “Est-ce de la musique, oui ou non? Si l'on me répondait par 
l'affirmative, je dirais, comme M. Fétis le dit avec trop de sévérité, peut -être, des oeuvres d'un compositeur 
célèbre, que cela n'appartient point à l’art que j'ai l'habitude de considérer comme la musique” (p.209). The 
context of this severe judgment is the transition between third and fourth movements of Beethoven’s Fifth 
Symphony. Oulibicheff writes: “Il ne s'agit plus, comme dans les exemples qui précèdent, de quelques notes 
rapides qui vous égratignent en passant et laissent l’oreille dans le doute sur l’origine de la sensation désagréable 
qu'elle a éprouvée. Ici, vous avez un fragment de 44 mesures, où le compositeur a cru devoir suspendre 
I’Habeas  corpus  [emphasis in the original text – J.C.] de la musique, en la dépouillant de tout ce qui pourrait 
ressembler à de la mélodie, à de l’harmonie et à un rhythme quelconque” (p.207). Quoted from: A. Oulibicheff, 
Beethoven. Ses critiques et ses glossateurs, F. A. Brockhaus / Jules Gavelot, Leipzig / Paris 1837.  
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our aesthetic experience. By imitating musical devices, that is: ways of structuring 
the raw material within a work of a temporal art – these works are provocative, 
disturbing and unusual. They make us uncertain of where do they actually belong. 
2. Berio: a piece of music made of linguistic material 
Now let us turn to a borderline example of music made of linguistic primary 
material. This one, strangely enough, is not contained in a book, nor it could 
possibly be written down. Luciano Berio’s Thema (Omaggio a Joyce) (1958) 
[sound example118] is a piece of music for tape. What is special about it is that it is 
composed uniquely from linguistic material (musically rearranged and recorded). 
Berio writes that he “interpreted musically a reading of the text by Joyce, 
elaborating the polyphonic intent that characterizes the eleventh chapter of Ulysses, 
(entitled “The Sirens” and dedicated to music) […]”. Further on in his Composer’s 
Notice on the piece he says: “in this work I haven’t used electronically generated 
sounds: the sole sonic source consists of the recordings of Cathy Barberian’s voice 
reading the beginning of the chapter:  
Con esso ho cercato di interpretare musicalmente una lettura 
del testo di Joyce sviluppando l’intento polifonico che caratterizza 
l’undicesimo capitolo dell’Ulysses (intitolato «Sirens» e dedicato 
alla musica), la cui tecnica narrativa fu suggerita allo scrittore da una 
nota procedura della musica polifonica: fuga per canonem. In questo 
lavoro non ho utilizzato suoni prodotti elettronicamente: l’unica 
sorgente sonora consiste nelle registrazioni della voce di Cathy 
Berberian che legge l’inizio dell’undicesimo capitolo dell’Ulysses. Il 
testo viene letto non solo nella versione originale inglese, ma anche 
nella traduzione italiana (Montale) e in quella francese (Joyce e 
Larbaud)119.  
                                               
118 https://youtu.be/jV_76OZSsqo - more information here: A. Di Scipio, DA UN’ESPERIENZA IN ASCOLTO 
DI PHONE E LOGOS: Testo, suono e struttura in Thema (Omaggio a Joyce) di Berio, „Il Saggiatore musicale”, 
2000, t.7, no 2, pp. 325–359.. The piece originated from a collaboration with Umberto Eco in: Omaggio a 
Joyce. Documenti sulla qualità onomatopeica del linguaggio poetico (RAI, 1958). 
119 L. Berio, Thema (Omaggio a Joyce) – Nota dell’autore | Centro Studi Luciano Berio - Luciano Berio’s 
Official Website, 1958, http://www.lucianoberio.org/node/1502?1924498410=1. Emphasis added – J.C. 
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The key to this piece is “interpretare musicalmente” – which is much more 
than “set to music” (and even “mere” setting text to music usually is mistaken for 
something less intermedially and ontologically complicated and profound than it 
really is120). The ultimate scope of Berio’s “interpretation” is to make us 
experience Joyce’s text as music.  
Which devices does he use in order to achieve this artistic objective? For sure 
the basic input is verbal text read aloud, not the kind of sound produced by violins. 
It had to receive special treatment, refinement, in order to ascend to the status of 
musical material121, though not mode, nor tone, nor pitch, nor harmonic function. 
Still, it remains the sole sound-source throughout the whole piece. And it was not 
deformed to the extent to become in all moments completely illegible in its 
linguistic, connotational aspect, nor, clearly, cut off from its literary matrix.  
Berio is an established contemporary composer, he uses an established 
musical technique (that of magnetic tape and electroacoustically elaborated 
recorded material – the voice of Cathy Barberian reading Joyce) and the resulting 
phenomenon is sonorous. These features make his piece an acceptable and 
relatively uncontroversial specimen of the musical art in its present-day form, even 
though it is composed of linguistic material and not of tones or chords. Berio sees 
the importance of the “experience of electronic music […] not in the discovery of 
new sounds, but in the possibility that such an experience offers to the composer to 
extend the field of sonic phenomena and to integrate them with the musical thought; 
to overcome, thus, the dualistic conception of musical material” 122. 
                                               
120 Cf. J. Czarnecki, O chybionym tekście w pieśni, „Ruch muzyczny”, 2014, no 3, pp. 23–24; A. Ridley, Song 
Got Wrong, „Richmond Journal of Philosophy”, 2002, t.1, no 1, pp. 37–41. 
121 Bernard Sève would call this process altération.  
122 Transl. mine – J.C., cf. the original quote in broader context:  
Se l’esperienza della musica elettronica è importante, come credo, il suo significato non risiede tanto nella 
scoperta di nuovi suoni quanto nella possibilità che tale esperienza offre al compositore di estendere il campo 
dei fenomeni sonori e di integrarli al pensiero musicale; di superare, quindi, la concezione dualistica del 
materiale musicale. Così come il linguaggio non è scindibile in parole e concetti, ma è in realtà un sistema di 
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I take ‘sonic’ here to refer the “musical sound”, equivalent of “tone” within 
the earlier musical paradigms; this is because speech in itself obviously is a sonic 
phenomenon already, without any need for the “field of sonic phenomena” to be 
extended in order to include it. There is, however, an alternative reading, in which 
this would mean “merely sonic” phenomena, as opposed to sounds as the material 
support of the signifiant, semiotically speaking. This would amount to saying: by 
the operation performed by Berio, he draws back the attention from these sounds 
regarded as candidates for linguistic apprehension and ascribes them to the field of 
the sonic for its own sake. Music, according to this second reading, would be a 
device that repristinates this immediate sonic value of sounds that became the 
matter of signs of something else (that is: they became phonemes and words). Both 
readings are valuable for our reasonings, the first pointing directly to a possibility 
of a transformative performance of a literary text, which transcarnates its original 
“linguistic body” into a “musical body”. 
In the case of musical novels or musicalized fictions the situation is different. 
The thought that they could, in part, be genuine instantiations of the musical art is 
so at odds with common sense that it is consistently dismissed by the very people 
who constantly provide evidence in favor of it in their studies. Word and music 
scholars following the influential writings of Scher and Brown see it as a menace 
to scientific rigor of their emerging discipline. This is why after having 
convincingly shown how musical technique can be imitated in a piece of prose, and 
how genuinely musical elements are brought to the text123 in order to emerge as 
such within the reading experience intended by them as constitutive for the 
                                               
simboli arbitrari, attraverso il quale noi diamo una forma determinata al nostro modo di essere nel mondo, 
anche la musica non è fatta solo di note e di relazioni convenzionali tra le note, ma si identifica piuttosto con il 
nostro modo di scegliere, dare forma e mettere in relazione tra loro certi aspetti del continuum sonoro. Versi, 
prosodia, rime non sono più assicurazione di poesia di quanto le note scritte siano assicurazione di 
musica. Spesso si trova più poesia nella prosa che nella poesia stessa e più musica nel linguaggio parlato 
e nel rumore che nei suoni musicali convenzionali. 
123 E. Petermann, The Musical Novel. Imitation of Musical Structure, Performance, and Reception in 
Contemporary Fiction..., op. cit., for instance, says that the musical novel “contains a musical presence not 
primarily on the level of content, but rather on that of form”, p.3 – italics J.C. 
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musicalization to function… they feel obliged to sustain that the works displaying 
these features “clearly do not become music”124. The “quasi-material” impossibility 
of novels being, in part, music is re-affirmed on every occasion125. Now the aim of 
the present thesis to convince its Reader that this is all but self-evident and that 
these declarations should not discourage us from taking the idea of music really 
being made within prose as a live hypothesis in William James’s terms126. 
What really repels us from accepting such a possibility is that novels 
(purportedly) lack sound regarded primarily as sound (1), which would be a 
necessary ingredient of all genuine music (2) and that they are taken not to be 
performative (3) nor musically-hearable (4). When these obstacles are overcome, 
which I have tried to achieve in the argument from silent music presented in the 
Chapter Music Beyond the Senses, we are left with a mere methodological axiom. 
It may be reasonable to keep it as such for pragmatic methodological reasons, but 
it would be illegitimate to extend its scope beyond what it is: a purely nominalist 
and arbitrary assumption.  
Going back to Berio’s example I want to ask whether the same artistic 
objective he realized with his piece (namely: to make us experience “linguistic raw 
material” “musically arranged” as “music”) could ever be achieved with means 
different from the ones he used. In our particular case: with the means the novelist 
disposes of. This question is perfectly parallel to the one emerging in the previous 
chapter, regarding musical silence. The pianist’s gestures on stage, the opening and 
closing of the instrument’s lid, the presence of the audience – they suffice to make 
music in silence, if we agree that Cage’s silent compositions are music and not 
metamusical performance127. Can this be achieved with other gestures, or with a 
                                               
124 Ibid. 
125 The author on most occasions is at best established as a writer, not a composer (with some exceptions, such 
as Anthony Burgess). They claim, at times, that they use established musical techniques in order to compose 
their pieces, but these programmatic statements are taken with extreme caution. On the other hand, though, 
these practices are studied in detail with increasing precision. 
126 W. James, The Will to Believe, [in:] The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, 1979. 
127 We are not necessarily bound to accept Cage’s explanations to the effect that it is not silence, but the 
audience-generated sounds which constitute the musical sound of the piece. 
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text? Joseph M. Ortiz has recently convincingly showed, how this is done in 
Shakespeare, how “At certain, intriguing moments he [Shakespeare – J.C.] 
experiments by subjecting poetic verse to the structures of musical time, effectively 
prompting his audience to hear silence as both scripted and intentional”128. In these 
passages of Shakespearian verse, we not only read about rests, but experience the 
silence they make within a compound sign-structure of partly iconic character. 
I believe that a work that would make us experience itself or its parts as fugal 
polyphony or sonata-form development or, even better, that would generate some 
new musical form, perhaps previously unheard of within the “official” history of 
music, would thereby succeed in being music in the strongest sense available. This 
is the ultimate meter of Sèvres we have at our disposal here simply because 
alterating (to say it again with Sève129) the raw material and musicalizing it is 
nothing less than making music. Musicalization is not exclusive to literature; it 
is the essential and indispensable mechanism of all music, from the most 
elementary instantiations of it such as tribal drumming, where by repetition crude 
percussive sounds are being patterned and thus become music. 
3. Intermedial Imitation Theory as Part of a Historical 
Dialectics 
Werner Wolf130 and, more recently, Emily Petermann131 have insisted on a 
well-articulated analysis of music in literature phenomena within prose-fiction in 
                                               
128 He exposed his findings in a fascinating paper Marking Time: “Theories of Musical Silence from Aristotle 
to Shakespeare” read at the 6th Conference of the Royal Musical Association Music and Philosophy Study 
Group at King’s College, London, 13th-14th July 2017. The quote is taken from the paper’s abstract published 
in the Conference’s Programme Book. His reading sheds new light on Hamlet’s last words (Act 5, last scene, 
343). 
129 « La première altération est celle de l’écoute du son selon un certain mode intentionnel » B. Sève, 
L’Altération musicale. Ou ce que la musique apprend au philosophe..., op. cit., p. 171. 
130 The Musicalization of Fiction: A Study in the Theory and History of Intermediality, Rodopi, Amsterdam 
1999. 
131 The Musical Novel. Imitation of Musical Structure, Performance, and Reception in Contemporary Fiction..., 
op. cit. 
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terms of intermediality. This theory emerges on the grounds of semiotics and 
intertextuality. It is, therefore, profoundly indebted with the 20th Century systematic 
reflections on language and literature (and art and culture) as sign-systems and the 
general linguistic and philosophical accounts of signification advanced by Charles 
Sanders Peirce and Ferdinand de Saussure. Semiotics and semiology as theoretical 
approaches to literature (Roland Barthes, Umberto Eco, Julia Kristeva) coexist in 
the rich constellation of Literary Theories, notably that of Russian formalism 
(Viktor Shklovsky132, Boris Eichenbaum, Jurij Tynianow133), structuralism (de 
Saussure, Vladimir Propp, Jan Mukařovský, Roman Jakobson, Jurij Lotman) and 
post-structuralism (Barthes again, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Kristeva, 
François Lyotard). They all shaped not only critical discourses and literary studies 
of our times (remodeling thus the condition of the humanities in general) but are 
equally responsible for some deeply rooted individual lector’s attitudes, which 
many of us share. In this way our basic, immediate, original experience of reading 
is (at least to some significant extent) flavoured and conditioned by this immense 
conceptual background and formative context. I have always felt reluctant to 
generalizations typical of humanistic syntheses (and, in particular, within the 
history of ideas), for the simple reason that the everyday radical differentiation of 
attitudes among living people seemed to disprove all attempt at any unifying 
subsumptions and categorizations. And yet… Let me indulge for a while in such a 
dubious activity. 
The overall condition of the humanities underlying Wolf’s and Petermann’s 
model of intermediality can be seen as a paradoxical mélange of contrasting traits I 
would be tempted to sketch as a spiral of dialectic movements springing from the 
great 19th Century opposition of Positivism and Romanticism, which foregrounded 
the further development of Parnassism and Symbolism. If Positivism advanced the 
scientific (empirical), genetic and historical method, embracing classical logic and 
                                               
132 1919 – (V. Shklovsky and A. Berlina, Art, as Device, „Poetics Today”, 2015, t.36, no 3, pp. 151–174.) 
133 The best, most intelligently written and comprehensive manual of 20th C. Literary Theory I know is without 
any doubt A. Burzyńska and M.P. Markowski, Teorie literatury XX wieku. Podręcznik, Znak, Kraków 2007. 
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definition of truth, biographism, intentionalism, contextualism, ‘Life and Works’ 
study paradigm and social progress – Romanticism emphasized elements of 
irrationalism, individualism, inspired creationism, spiritualism, departing from 
classical forms and (in epistemology): proclaiming preference for the invisible, 
mysterious, intuitive “truth of the heart”, superior to the banal evidence at 
disposition of the scientist134.  
Now this aggregation of opposite or contrasting tendencies, models and 
world-views was redistributed throughout the 20th Century into new dynamic 
constellations. In a thorough approximation, we could sketch its contrasting 
elements in the following points: 
1. On the one hand: theoretical speculation on deep structure and mechanisms 
of language in general offering universal interpretative paradigms for the 
study of language artforms and other forms of art and communication in 
culture. Expansion of the linguistic (and literary) paradigm into non-verbal 
aspects of human activity and creativity: research of common grounds or of 
assimilation of non-verbal sign-systems to the linguistic paradigm and 
expansion of the semiotic analysis outside of the linguistic realm 
(structuralism, post-structuralism, semiotics, Theory). 
2. On the other hand: philosophy of ordinary language based on common sense 
and analysis of actual ways of using words giving raise to the speech act 
theory (Austin, Searle, Grice, Wierzbicka); in a way a mirroring reply to 
interpreting prima facie non-linguistic situations through a theoretical 
subsumption under the linguistic models of investigation, characteristic of (1) 
above, by showing that many linguistic situations are themselves actions 
operated through utterances and within cultural conventions, rather than 
instances of expressing logical judgments, connotations and denoting objects. 
                                               
134 Within the context of Polish Romanticism a programmatic text, a poem interpreted often as an implicit 
manifesto of this spiritual-aesthetic formation is Mickiewicz’s ballad Romantyczność: “Czucie i wiara silniej 
mówi do mnie / Niż mędrca szkiełko i oko. […] Miej serce i patrzaj w serce!” A. Mickiewicz, Romantyczność, 
Vilnius 1822. 
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3. Harsh opposition within the Philosophy of Music against assimilating music 
to language135  (a commonplace from Rousseau and the 18-19th C. 
Tonsprache136) also as a reaction to this expansion; the corresponding debate 
on the musical meaning and the meaning of music137; theoretical grounding 
of the traditional romantic affirmations of the musically ineffable138 and the 
development of formalist variants of musical ineffabilism. 
4. Skepticism on the auctorial intentions’ determining role for the meaning of 
an artwork139 coming together with (a) or extreme désintéressement in its 
social, economic, political etc. context and content, as irrelevant for the art’s 
nature (b) or, on the other extreme, reducing all specifically artistic values, 
including the very idea of formalism, to an expression of historico-political 
dynamics, whose one of the many ways of sedimentation are artistic meanings 
and values, which they foreground. (Ironically enough the first option, 
stemming from Russian formalism, was largely defended within the so called 
New Criticism in literature, whereas New Musicology incarnates the second.  
                                               
135 It reflects, in new terms, the old debate dating from the Antiquity: the disagreement on the theory of ethos, 
in which Damon and Plato and the Stoics ascribed to nomoi moral characters and according paidaetic impact, 
contrasted by Philodemus of Gadara who claimed that music was alogos and neither represented moral 
characters, nor had the power to shape them in the auditorium. 
136 Its practical workings within Baroque music as a (lost for us) way of communicating meanings through 
sound figures (within the framework of the Affektenlehre) are well illustrated in an approachable, divulgative 
way by N. Harnoncourt, Musik als Klangrede: Wege zu einem neuen Musikverständnis., Bärenreiter, Kassel 
2014, 7. Aufl. 
137 In the introductive remarks I already mentioned some most valuable studies of these problems: K. Guczalski, 
Znaczenie muzyki. Znaczenia w muzyce..., op. cit.. For a more concise argument against theorizing music as 
language, see: K. Guczalski, „O niejęzykowym charakterze muzyki”, op. cit.  
138 Wittgenstein, Jankélévitch, Zangwill. But the notion of the ineffable in this context – as the quality of 
aesthetic ideas, which “no language can fully reach and make understandable” is to be found in Kant, as well: 
“Nun behaupte ich, dieses Prinzip sei nichts anders, als das Vermögen der Darstellung ästhetischer Ideen; unter 
einer ästhetischen Idee aber verstehe ich diejenige Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft, die viel zu denken 
veranlaßt, ohne daß ihr doch irgend ein bestimmter Gedanke, d.i. Begriff adäquat sein kann, die folglich keine 
Sprache völlig erreicht und verständlich machen kann” I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, ed by. G. Lehmann, 
Reclam, Stuttgart 2004, p. 249 §49. 
139 Cf. the famous essay on the Intentional fallacy W.K. Wimsatt and M.C. Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy, 
„The Sewanee Review”, 1945, t.54, no 3, pp. 468–488.. 
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Even from this very general and institutional point of view it is hard not to 
see in this last point a striking expression of that dialectical movement which always 
paints as more attractive the less obvious, or natural option – it is always the 
otherness that attracts; and so for literary criticism it was more rewarding to tend 
into the direction of the pure form where blatantly contents are to dealt with on 
virtually every level, whence theorists of the allegedly pure formal art found it 
challenging to re-interpret it politically, sexually, economically and in all possible 
narrative and dramatic directions escaping the traditional formalist Schenkerian 
analysis. Both poles, if regarded from some distance, seem historical incarnations 
in terms of our age and our intellectual fashions of the constant and epoch-
independent factor characterizing art: the tension between form and matter; 
universal and particular; eternal and temporal; circular and linear; recurrent and 
semelfactive. This tension, articulated along the lines of these elementary pairs of 
oppositions provides a tempting way to conceive of all art (in general) and to 
conduce fruitful analyses of its works (in particular). Art, in this picture, is an ever 
lasting, and ever recreated striving to annihilate these antitheses without reducing 
one of the coupled elements to the other. A last couple of anthitetic elements to be 
mentioned here is the following: 
5.  Distrust of all systematic truth when it comes to interpreting literature’s 
nature, its essential mechanisms and values as a commonplace. More in 
general: distrust of any form of essentialism. Deconstruction of essences in 
terms of showing them as structures exercising politico-institutional 
disciplining power. A model which becomes itself a new dogmatic ground to 
which any possible otherness can be, at times forcedly, reduced140. 
6. The deconstruction of this very reduction as (1) politically motivated and 
politically powerful itself, and as (2) essentiallist itself. Saying that, for 
instance, Absolute music is just an expression and enforcement of a certain 
socioeconomical formation, and that talk of “pure musical beauty” only 
                                               
140 Cf. philosopher’s favorite prey: Susan McClary’s “sexual politics in classical music” in her interpretation 
of the Brandenburg Concertos BWV 1046-1051. 
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conserves this oppressive formation is just as essentialist, as any aesthetic 
essentialism. It’s just power, sex and politics which become the new arché. 
Such a paradigm is as well a totalizing structure, excercising no less violence, 
than the previous paradigms it denounces as oppresive. 
7. A possible synthetic solution, admitting polyphony of discourses, a 
complimentarity of explanations. What emerges as historical, extramusically 
determined and determinating, can also be analyzed and lived for the new 
genuine essences it gives issue to. Antiessentialism, according to this 
position, ceases to be a genuine anthithesis of essentialism. Both paradigms 
provide insights and increase knowledge, but do not invalidate one another141. 
The reflexion on intertextuality developed by Julia Kristeva, Mikhail Bachtin, 
Roland Barthes and Gérard Genette grounds the intermedial typology in the form 
proposed by Wolf and recently restated by Petermann, with some adjustments (her 
new model of intermediality, instead of overt/covert intermediality she prefers to 
speak, respectively, of multimediality and intermediality proper). I recognize their 
substantial methodological achievement, as the distinctions and terms they propose 
have a number of advantages: (1) they are logically coherent (unlike some dubious 
distinctions made by other authors on earlier stages of the Word and Music quest 
for typology); (2) they are both: (a) easily and usefully applicable to analyses of 
various musicalized texts and (b) provide an “open-source” amendable framework 
for more general considerations and therefore can ground philosophical reflections. 
Self- and meta- referentiality, manifest in some of the intermedial phenomena 
discussed, gets elucidated by the more general relations observable between the 
idealized types of media relations their theories describe. This clarity, coherence 
and both pragmatic and theoretical adjustability of their framework has to be 
acknowledged and praised in the first place. Two further merits are: first – the 
heuristic and non-normative imposition of their research. Namely: even if they 
                                               
141 Analogusly to the possible coexistence of scientific naturalism and religious spiritualism; both paradigms 
offer tools of reduction to explain „the other side” but can be seen as complimentary and mutually enriching, 
giving access to distinct ways of experiencing the world. 
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invest a great deal of energy in theorizing, as especially Wolf does, they tend not to 
impose their framework as the only one justified or absolute. Instead, they conceive 
of it as of a toolbox of handy devices, which aim at clarity of thought, without any 
need to do violence to the very often ambiguous, non-conclusive and utterly unclear 
status of the works they typically deal with; this  helps to eliminate confusion and 
equivocation in exposition, without imposing any sort of constraints on the complex 
reality they apply to. The second merit is that their model of intermediality 
integrates the broader framework of multi- inter- and intra-medial relations, 
covering the earlier reflexions on intertextuality. It is, though, articulated in 
semiotic terms and focused on what Petermann calls quite inelegantly ‘media-
products’. This is, of course one more theoretic duel, as precisely intertextuality has 
the same potential of assimilating word and music interrelations through the 
semiotic definition of text142. 
 
4. Musicalization in fiction 
Let us now briefly examine the sorts of experiences some musicalized 
literature could elicit. For the purpose of the present consideration I let aside Wolf-
Petermann’s typology in the respect that it classifies musicalization (or literary 
imitation of musical elements) as a case of covert intermediality (or intermediality 
proper) excluding thereby cases of what they call multimediality. This makes sense 
from their perspective concentrated on the poietic aspect (and still, I believe, is 
ultimately untenable). We are now concerned with the aesthetic aspect, our question 
                                               
142 It is a converse methodological option: instead of making intertextuality a subspecies of intermediality 
(namely: intramediality within the textual medium), some authors extend intertextuality to cover the field 
defined by Wolf-Petermann and others as intermediality, by applying a broad notion of text, appliable outside 
linguistic production, to the so called „texts of culture”. This is the strategy of Riffatterre and others, in Poland 
applied, for instance, by Violetta Kostka. In her studies she analyses examples of thus intended „intertextuality” 
in the compositions of Paweł Szymański. The object of her research are no text-music relations, but music-
music interrelations (musical quotations, allusions, variations, pastiches etc.) as a key feature of this composer’s 
style.  
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is: how do we actually (and could potentially!) experience these texts while reading 
them for their beauty, rather than any other values they may be bearers of. 
Take Libera’s Toccata (See Chapter 4). If seen as a multimedial score – this 
novella in order to be appreciated to the full would require the reader to hear the 
notated motives from Schumann’s Toccata op. 7 where they are introduced, 
repeated and transformed (not always using musical notation, as my analyses show) 
and as such are decisive for the most salient quality of the overall reading 
experience. There are more texts including intersemiotic quotes as their constitutive 
elements (Kuncewiczowa143, Kundera, Joyce…). If most can be reasonably taken 
to require some sort of internal vocalisation for the Varesian “inner ear”, it is open 
to debate what other roles can they assume. This sort of experiences would be 
closest to what Berio had done on tape – the difference is that the musical sounds 
would occur and enter with the words in a refined interplay in our musical 
imagination. 
But music, at least before the advent of la musique concrete, was not only 
conceptually linked to the cosmic and metaphysical harmonious structures, but was 
seen as a rigorous order for temporal experience. It traditionally developed in the 
                                               
143 Kuncewiczowa’s 1936 novel Cudzoziemka [The Foreigner, English transl. published under the title Stranger 
New York City, 1945] is an absolute masterpiece of musico-literary advanced aesthetic entwinement in pre-
war Polish prose. The two main recurrent musical intertexts are Schumann’s Lied Ich grolle nicht, which in its 
last musical return on the novel’s charts produces something akin to an emotional breakdown in the reader; and 
the final rondo of Brahms’ Violin Concerto. This extatic piece, in the several notes of the main motive, is key 
to the protagonist’s tormented biography. The first four bars of are reported in moments of extreme tension, in 
musical notation integrating verbal text. This novel would without any doubt merit an entire chapter in this 
dissertation; let me limit here just to the observation, that she introduces an innovative device of musicalization, 
namely, apart from numerous and far from banal, standarized descriptions of musical practice and performance, 
music possesses violently Róża’s imagination. The most powerful verbal music passage of the novel is an 
imaginary performance, heard in the violinist’s inner ear and experienced with passion. It is presented from the 
performer’s perspective, Róża is the soloist dialoguing with the tutti of the „Moonlight orchestra directed by 
Brahms” (p. 118), which continues to play after she failed, exhausted by the final Allegro ma non troppo, and 
drew down her violin. The whole imaginary fervent performance is extinguished in desintegrating silence, 
which is directly present within the lines of Kuncewiczowa’s prose. This silence is a genuinely musical silence. 
Her unloved husband unexpectidly enters. A silent secene of sexual violence immediately follows. M. 
Kuncewiczowa, Cudzoziemka, [1936], Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa 1995. 
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word-music realm of vocality, gradually achieving a major degree of medial 
“purity” typical of Western Tonkunst around 1800. If the word part could have got 
eliminated by instrumental substitutions of vocal voices gradually gaining 
independence from their origin, why would it be impossible to conceive of such a 
combinatorics machina musicae applied to unsung texts? At least a vast array of 
values traditionally appreciated in artistic music could possibly emerge on the 
surface of the pitch-deprived worded solo voice of the aoid or maybe a Bachtinian 
polyphony of voices staged within the comprehensive reading act. Many formal 
textual devices could be experienced in this musical fashion, with no actual sound 
imagination or only with a hint of it144. 
I would like us to reflect upon the sort of experiences musicalized prose can 
lead to, with a special emphasis on their aesthetic moments. This shift of attention 
towards the aesthetic experience is not by itself incompatible with what Wolf and 
Petermann focus on. Quite the contrary, they both emphasize and cherish the role 
of the interpretation and its subject – the (‘musical’) reader. Signification, the basic 
mechanism studied by all semiotics, has always to do with an act of interpretation, 
by the receiver, within a context. (Cf. Jakobson’s famous model of communication). 
It is in this act that all signification takes place and whereby ultimately all musical 
fiction is given. Seemingly a lot can be said on the text from a third-person 
“objective” perspective, that is, whether, for instance, the layer of signifiers 
contains or not the typical symbols of a foreign medium, satisfying Wolf’s 
definitions of overt and covert intermediality or Petermann’s definition of 
multimediality “in which the typical signifiers of more than one medium are 
physically present”145. This position seems to me a categorial mistake: allographic 
arts (Cf. N. Goodman, even if I do not endorse the whole theory146) cannot be 
                                               
144 Just like a string quartet attended to as to pure music rather than as a conversation of four voices including 
imagining the points of the quarrel. 
145 E. Petermann, The Musical Novel. Imitation of Musical Structure, Performance, and Reception in 
Contemporary Fiction..., op. cit., p. 12n. 
146 N. Goodman, Languages of art. An approach to a theory of symbols, Hackett, Indianapolis 1988, Sixth Ed., 
pp. 113–116. 
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“materially present” because their presence is not “material” unless actualized in an 
act of interpretation of their “score”; the same seems to apply to the semiotic way 
of putting it, as there are no “signifiers in nature”. The example Petermann makes 
is even more striking: “Similarly placed, but with rather different implications, 
Gabriel Josipovici’s Goldberg: Variations employs a stylized musical stave, 
although without musical notes, to mark the beginning of each chapter in the novel. 
By using musical signs rather than textual means, these examples illustrate the 
phenomenon of multimediality, in which the typical signifiers of more than one 
medium are physically present”147. This approach has to be criticized as naïve and 
superficial. The very phrase “typical signifiers” as “materially present” is deeply 
flawed, because it implies that signifiers (Saussurean signifiants) are material 
concrete objects that can be placed in a work; this is false. Petermann is not unaware 
of the abstract nature of Saussurean signifiers (cf. her own remark that “The 
signifier is not material or concrete, does not consist of the actual acoustic properties 
of a spoken word”148). One cannot, therefore, determine whether a certain quantity 
of ink on a page shaped as a musical stave is a genuine musical signifier or not, 
without determining the code within which it is used and its context. The thesis that 
the mere occurence of some typically musical characters in print can alone 
determine it as a case of multimediality is therefore arbitrary. Everything depends 
on the way these characters are to be interpreted, by whom and on what basis; only 
in such a framework can one decide, whether multimediality has been achieved or 
not. These remarks are valid for the allographic arts. When it comes to autographic 
arts both the juxtaposition of two (music-sculpture installation) or an inclusion of a 
reproduction in a score of an allographic art (photos incrusting a novel) are 
sufficient conditions for multimediality. Now, in particular, whether musical staves 
in text are a case of multimediality should depend on whether they are intended to 
be musically significant (performed, for example, imaginatively in order to 
integrate the reading experience) or as a vague generic symbol (as a pars pro toto) 
                                               
147 E. Petermann, The Musical Novel. Imitation of Musical Structure, Performance, and Reception in 
Contemporary Fiction..., op. cit., p. 12n. 
148 Ibid., p. 28. 
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or even an embellishment or a cryptic element not meant to be professionally 
understood (musically read) by the reader. Furthermore, a work may be thus 
designed as to be readable on both levels, and such lecture may be a source of 
artistic effects and tensions. One would expect both elements not to be in 
contradiction. But they might be! Imagine an expressive description of solemn 
religious music in Palestrina’s style illustrated by staves of some obscene-texted 
frivolous motets. Only the musically knowledgeable reader will appreciate this 
while reading; the musically illiterate will perceive these staves as incorporating the 
Palestrinian solemnity and this precisely might be the effect envisaged by the author 
for such a reader. I am not aware of any case of this sort of intermedial interplay, 
but there is a low-profile parallel in the famous scene from the Schindler’s List 
where the SS-Mann plays Bach and according to one of the German soldiers it’s 
“Not Bach, it’s Mozart”149. Nevertheless – it is the act of performative 
interpretation150 (resp. reading) that constitutes the telos of writing books and scores 
down, it is in this act only that (word- and tone-) art comes to be appreciated as 
such. Texts wouldn’t be texts at all if not as somehow potentially “readable”151. 
Now what I would like to suggest is that some of the core devices of making 
music with  the words function as intentional calibrators of our experiences 
taking the work and its elements as their object; they indicate that our 
performance of reading be musical and they provide further hints in what 
ways; they function as score indications leading the silent performer in his hard 
work of making music, music of a peculiar kind here, as it is mostly (1) silent [takes 
no physical sounds as the basis of its over-organization] and (2) performed for one-
self. Just as in all standard cases of music – its performative interpretation requires 
                                               
149 This scene is quoted by P. Kivy, Musical Morality..., op. cit.; P. Kivy, Antithetical Arts, Oxford University 
Press, New York 2009, p. 216. 
150 P. Kivy, The Performance of Reading. An Essay in the Philosophy of Literature..., op. cit. D. Davies, Art as 
Performance, Blackwell Publishing, Malden MA 2004. argue for a performative theory of literature, and art, 
resp. 
151 This is one of the reasons why J. L. Borges’s Babel Library strikes our imagination and undermines 
intuitions on what texts are. Cf. Eco’s remarks on “producing a text” by reading in U. Eco, The role of the 
reader : explorations in the semiotics of texts, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1984.. 
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some natural talent and first and foremost – thorough training, skill and knowledge 
that one normally acquires through long years of study. This is a universal aspect 
of all artistic music, be it in Europe or in Persia. No one becomes a virtuoso at 
heights of its most technically demanding compositions (nor even an interpret 
capable of performing standard repertoire) without years of musical education and 
practice152. This is why it is easy to reply to an eventual objection, that musica 
textualis is a figment, because no one perceives it, apart from the self-proclaimed 
Pythagoras, advancing this insolent claim153, and the few authors he quotes to back 
it, who actually couldn’t have meant it literally, being writers and not musicians154. 
5. Conclusion 
No doubt: literature can deal with musical experiences not only in the mode 
of ‘telling’ but also that of showing; it can elicit them to some extent155. This 
capacity will be now our point of interest. We will trace it in three very different 
realizations selected from the vast panorama of musicoliterary examples in Polish 
literature.  
                                               
152 It belongs to the standard setting of the genius’s myth (as analysed by Kivy in his Mozart’s Skull = Czaszka 
Mozarta) to claim that some geniuses were born so, with no musical training at all, which is obviously false, 
however some of the great composers indeed were very talented pupils and in little time were capable to grasp 
and learn what for the few is a matter of decades of discipline and rigorous training, for the most: is just 
impossible to achieve. 
153 Pythagoras had the reputation of being able to hear the music of the spheres. 
154 Well, if a great deal of the Word and Music Scholars analyzing these phenomena as interart excursions still 
firmly anchored in literature are at best musical amateurs (with some significant exceptions, such as Shockley, 
who is a composer and displays far less methodological fearfulness with regard to calling musical devices in 
these texts with their proper name), the authors of the analyzed works often had intimate knowledge of music, 
both theoretical and deriving from their musical practice (Proust, Joyce, Burgess, Huxley, Kuncewiczowa, 
Iwaszkiewicz, Libera). The case of Mann’s lack of formal musical education has to be seen together with the 
fact that he actually lacked any accomplished formal education (no success even at obtaining an Abitur, cf.). 
155 This is shockingly ironic, but even Tadeusz Szulc admitted that “Literature is, on occasions, capable of 
eliciting specifically musical impressions”. 
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Introduction 
The music of Homer’s epics is lost now, as is, with some exceptions, the 
music of Greek lyrics and dramas, but as is never enough to underline when dealing 
with musicoliterary questions, music and literature were one inseparatable art in the 
archaic era156. The same can be said, mutatis mutandis, of Polish artistic literature. 
It starts with Bogurodzica, an archaic, formally sophisticated solemn hymn 
addressing the Mother of God. The oldest manuscripts reporting this first known 
Polish lyric (whose composition predates them by at least one century) come from 
around 1400 and contain the neumatic notation of its hieratic, refined music157. 
The selection of examples discussed in this part needs a word of introduction 
and justification. All three chapters of this part are devoted to Polish authors active 
in the course of the last decades (Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz, Antoni Libera, Krzysztof 
Bartnicki) whose work is interpreted as displaying three radically different modes 
of musica textualis. This choice, by no means exhaustive, is intended to illustrate 
the introduced concept at work in dissimilar cases, sharing though one property: all 
                                               
156 This fundamental historico-aesthetical truth is still often neglected, even in serious scholarship, which results 
in terminological errors and general absence of a deeper reflection on the role of music in what we study as 
Greek literature. This historical awareness is, however, fundamental for the perspective of the present study (as 
it was, as well, for the father of Word and Music Studies, S. P. Scher, cf. his remarks for instance in Literature 
and Music in: S.P. Scher, Word and Music Studies 5: Essays on Literature and Music (1967 – 2004) by Steven 
Paul Scher, ed by. W. Bernhart and W. Wolf, Rodopi, Amsterdam - New York 2004.). We cannot „compare” 
music and literature in any fruitful way, nor study intermedial imitations, if we forget that they are made 
possible only within a long historical process, which only recently, and maybe not for a long time (if compared 
with the whole span of history) separated sharply music from literature and made them become, to say it with 
the title of P. Kivy’s book –  Antithetical Arts..., op. cit. A. Shockley’s book Music in the Words: Musical Form 
and Counterpoint in the Twentieth-Century Novel..., op. cit. has the great merit of emphasising this point and 
rendering it powerfully eloquent through the use of both of the Homeric invocations and that of the Aeneid. In 
all three epic is sung: the poet (Virgil) sings, and in Homer the Muse is implored to sing (both The Iliad and 
The Odyssey). For more information on Greek music and its neglected ties with literature, see M.L. West, 
Ancient Greek Music, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1992. 
157 Its transliteration and apparatus can be found in W. Wydra and W.R. Rzepka, eds., Chrestomatia 
staropolska. Teksty do roku 1543, Ossolineum, Wrocław - Warszawa - Kraków 2004. 
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have been paid little or no attention by the international musico-literary scholarship 
(not to mention the philosophers of music). 
This choice – limiting the focus to contemporary Polish works – may be 
criticized as limiting the accessibility of my analyses to the non-Polish-speaking 
readership: my corpus being not only relatively unknown or new would in addition 
appear as beyond the reach of many of my readers, and thus its suitability as a 
material for exemplification of my theses at work would be seriously challenged. 
This point is valid: when advancing a new interpretive tool or when defending 
counterintuitive theses in philosophy it is reasonable to explain them on widely 
known and easily accessible examples. Otherwise the theoretical difficulty of the 
exposed position risks only to accrue, because of the difficulty of the material 
studied. This is a fair point.  
Still I decided not to change this choice. References I do passim to the canon 
of the Western musicoliterary acheivments permit the Reader to envisage the 
workings of musica textualis as applied to the texts she knows well. In order to say 
responsibly something new on my beloved works, such as Mann’s shorter and 
longer prose, I would have to give up the project of analysing the following Polish 
works, which without doubt merit theoretical attention. 
Thomas Mann’s  Doktor Faustus, if not analysed extensively in the present 
work, is to be considered as the compendium and opus magnum, the true Kunst der 
Textuellen Musik, to say it with the paraphrased title of Bach’s eternal Kunst der 
Fuge. How is textual music made in Faustus? First of all: preparation of the ground. 
The Musical square, which is not to be heard, together with the lecture Eye and 
Music, are part of Mann’s « mistification ». The reader is being convinced by 
traditional persuasive propositional means (by Kretschmar, by Leverhühn, by 
Zeitblom…) that actual music aspires to the inaudible. Then he is being seduced by 
the musica textualis formal techniques. Thanks to this seduction this music becomes 
intentionally real (and this is the only sort of reality any music can have).
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One additional point of justification is that, as the Reader will notice, the third 
of the discussed groups of works requires no understanding of Polish whatsoever. 
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Chapter 3. Musical Form and Texture in Jarosław 
Iwaszkiewicz’s Prose 
 
 
Quamvis dici possit quod Pythagoras audivit huiusmodi sonum non per sensum auditus, sed 
cognoscendo proportiones ex quibus illa harmonia constituitur. 
S. Thomae Aquinatis Comm. De Caelo 425 in fine 
…nur mit seines Geistes Ohr, beim Lesen… 
Mann, Doktor Faustus, p. 623 
Introduction 
“A prose work that actually approaches music fails as narrative; it cannot do 
otherwise” – claims the composer and scholar Alan Shockley158. In this chapter, I 
challenge this claim. Sometimes the word-composer is doomed to fail as a 
novelist159, to be sure. This, however, by no means is the case with the first 
protagonist of this part of the dissertation: Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz (1894-1980). 
Poet, novelist, musician and musical critic, man of theatre and playwright, 
diplomat, politician, Righteus among the nations and communist figure of power. 
Iwaszkiewicz’s fiction, apart from being profoundly musical in many ways160 is 
first and foremost appreciated as literature. His talent shines particularly in the 
shorter narrative forms, distinguished by their very sober, elegant style in 
approaching this world’s terrible and exhilarating mystery. Works such as the 
                                               
158 A. Shockley, Music in the Words: Musical Form and Counterpoint in the Twentieth-Century Novel..., op. 
cit., p. 17. 
159 Cf. remarks on Anthony Burgess in Ibid., p. 43. or more general remarks by Wolf: a perfectly musicalized 
narrative would cease to be narrative, so they claim. The present interpretation or provides a counterexample 
to this thesis or is not convincing in what it claims on the musical second nature of this verbal piece. 
160 As shown in a number of Polish studies, including a valuable monograph on music in Jarosław 
Iwaszkiewicz’s fiction: G. Piotrowski, Fortepian ze Sławska. Muzyka w prozie fabularnej Jarosława 
Iwaszkiewicza, Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2010. 
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novels Sława i chwała [Fame and Glory]161, Czerwone tarcze [Red Shields] 162, or 
numerous short stories, such as “Noc czerwcowa” [June Night], “Panny z Wilka” 
(“The Wilko Girls”)163 and “Brzezina” (“The Birch Grove”)164, if often acutely 
oriented within historical and social complex realities of Europe, are however 
intimately universal, touching the depths of the human condition. Iwaszkiewicz’s 
opus is a constant melancholy meditation of beauty, of love, of ephemeral charm 
and of their sister death: of the irreversible passing no thing, no place and no person 
is immune to. And yet it remains a vitalistic praise of energy and natural force of 
the ordinary, combining thus masterfully the erotic and the thanatotic impulses 
within this Iwaszkiewiczian world. 
For several reasons Iwaszkiewicz recalls within the Polish context the 
immense figure of Thomas Mann, 18 years his senior: both were born in late 
                                               
161 J. Iwaszkiewicz, Sława i chwała, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa 1965, vol. I–III. It contains 
important musical motives, such as the concert scenes from the life of the ficticious singer Elżbieta Szyller, 
sister to the fictitious composer Edgar Szyller (clearly modelled on the writer’s cousin Szymanowski) and their 
friend and pupil Ola Gołąbkowa, who sings Edgar’s songs, as well as those by Wolf or Duparc. Professional 
musical terminology is used in precise musical reflections, criticism and ekphraseis to be found in the novel, as 
for instance in the composer’s musings on his own Szeherezada: „Gdy przyszła druga pieśń, Edgar pomyślał, 
że pewnie nigdy nie znajdzie się taki badacz jego dzieł, który spostrzeże, że to, co teraz grają wiolonczele, jest 
augmentacją i odwróceniem fletowego »tematu śmierci« z pierwszej pieśni. Tak wielu muzyków zamyka na 
stronach swoich partytur im jedynie znajome aluzje, cytaty, żarty, o których słuchacz nigdy nie wie, badacz zaś 
wie tylko czasami” (Vol. II, p. 30). Many other protagonists of this monumental narration are amateur 
musicians (Andrzej, Ola) or devoted music lovers, like Janusz Myszyński. His father, Count Myszyński, has 
the morbid passion for mechanical music, and plays it on a pianola in his decadent manor: „domu mam ojca, – 
pisze Janusz do Ariadny Tarło – dziwaka rozkochanego w muzyce martwej: mechanicznej. Godzinami wycina 
nuty do pianoli i potem gra na tym instrumencie, gniewając się, że mu to nie wychodzi tak jak żywą ręką. 
Chopin, Beethoven, Strauss, Szyller – wszystko na pianoli. Czasem w nocy ciemnej, jesiennej, kiedy dęby 
szeleszczą nie opadłymi liśćmi nad domem, budzi mnie martwe brzmienie wirtuozowskich pasaży. Na wiosnę, 
kiedy jest tak pięknie i wiatr wieje porywający, martwy instrument staje się piekielnym grzechotem” (Vol. I, 
p. 43). 
162 J. Iwaszkiewicz, Czerwone tarcze, Czytelnik, Warszawa 1976. 
163 J. Iwaszkiewicz, Panny z Wilka, Brzezina, Róża, Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa 1979. English ed. J. 
Iwaszkiewicz, The birch grove and other stories, trans by. A. Lloyd-Jones, Central European University Press, 
Budapest 2002. 
164 Ibid. 
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nineteenth Century and both transmitted into their post-first-world-war prose a 
sense of loss of that world, both became writers-institutions (Mann received his 
Nobel Prize for Buddenbrooks when Jarosław was 10), both recurred to music as 
the highest and most mysterious form of art, source of inspiration for their writing, 
and, most importantly, source of formal devices introduced by both on the pre-war 
stage of their literary careers165. Iwaszkiewicz, just like Mann, openly admitted that 
his own works were often musically composed, that his texts exhibited “a certain 
musical form” – and just like Mann used such direct suggestions as means of 
musicalization. For both the primary matter of their writing was real life, non-
fiction material collaged into fiction and transformed into highest achievements of 
literary art by formal work and mastery of style. It is hard to state anything 
conclusive on this je ne sais quoi of spiritual kinship I perceive in their works, in 
spite of all the obvious differences separating their figures. One such difference is 
that – contrary to Mann –  Iwaszkiewicz was a true musician, played well the piano, 
had a substantial knowledge of musical theory, even sketched some actual musical 
compositions and had an impressive musical erudition (vide infra). 
Despite its importance in Polish 20th C. culture – Iwaszkiewicz’s impressive 
work remains foreign to the English-speaking world. This translator of Gide and 
Kierkegaard, whose ambition was a Nobel Prize in literature, received instead a 
Lenin Prize and was translated into Russian and many East European languages. 
His high rank in communist literary hierarchies assicured him numerous re-editions 
within the Soviet Union and nearly none on the other side of the Iron Curtain. If not 
through Karol Szymanowski’s King Roger with a libretto co-authored by the 
composer and his young cousin Iwaszkiewicz, if not through a number of musical 
settings of his poems and poetic translations from James Joyce (Szymanowski’s 
Seven Songs op. 54166) – it is only thanks to the film adaptations by Andrzej 
                                               
165 The interested Reader will notice further Werwandenheiten between the two writers’ biographies. 
166 K. Szymanowski, Seven Songs to James Joyce’s Poems op. 54 Nos. 1-7, PWM, Kraków 1949. 
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Wajda167, Jerzy Kawalerowicz168 and Agnieszka Holland169 that Iwaszkiewicz may 
be somehow familiar to the English reader. English translations of only several 
short stories and the play on Chopin The Summer at Nohant have been published 
throughout the years and they are hardly available170.  
The main theoretical interest of the present chapter lays in a detailed analysis 
of Iwaszkiewicz’s late musical short story – The Fourth Symphony – interpreted as 
a polyphonic (two-part) sonata movement171. In the central section of the chapter I 
show how this work establishes a dynamic imitative interplay between the musical 
texture (1) and musical form (2) on one hand and the communication model (1’) 
characteristic of the main protagonist and his autobiography (2’) on the other. 
Before I get to these crucial investigations I need to explore Iwaszkiewicz’s earlier 
literary attempts at imitating music in prose in a broader context of his complicated 
biography. 
 Modernist Triune Chorea in Kalnik, Elisavietgrad 
and Kijev 
                                               
167 1970 Brzezina [The Birch Wood], 1979 Panny z Wilka [The Maids of Wilko, Academy Awards Nomination 
in 1980], 2009 Tatarak [The Sweet Rush] starring K. Janda, as well as a Teatr Telewizji production, Noc 
czerwcowa, Warszawa, premiere 25.03.2002 color, 69'. 
168 1961 Matka Joanna od Aniołów [Mother Joan of the Angels], Special Jury Prize, Cannes Film Festival, 
1961. 
169 1975 Wieczór u Abdona. 
170 The only translation of his short stories I found in the Library of Congress Catalog on 19.10.2016 was J. 
Iwaszkiewicz, The birch grove and other stories..., op. cit. containing “A New Love,” “The Wilko Girls,” “The 
Birch Grove,” and “The Mill on the River Utrata,”. The Summer at Nohant: A Play in Three Acts, [1936] 
translated by Celina Wieniewska, London: Minerva Press, 1942. This play, arguably, is not an important 
acheivement in Iwaszkiewicz’s vast and, at times, uneven oeuvre. Additional research showed that a translation 
of the short story Tatarak was published as Sweet Rush in: M. Kuncewiczowa, The modern Polish mind: an 
anthology., Little  Brown, Boston 1962, [1st ed. ]. 
171 More on realizing distinct or even historically incompatible musical features in textual music below. 
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dawno temu 
właściwie od zarania życia 
[…] uległ  
zwodniczym urokom muzyki 
 
przez bory niemowlęctwa 
niósł go śpiewny głos matki 
 
ukraińskie niańki 
nuciły mu do snu rozlewną jak Dniepr 
kołysankę 
 
rósł 
jakby przynaglany dźwiękami 
w akordach 
dysonansach 
zawrotnym crescendo 
 
 
 
long ago 
actually since the dawn of his life 
[…] surrendered 
to the tantalizing spell of music 
 
he was carried through the forests of infancy 
by his mother’s melodious voice 
 
Ukrainian nurses 
hummed him to sleep a lullaby spread wide 
as the Dnieper 
 
he grew 
as if urged on by sounds 
in chords 
dissonances 
vertiginous crescendos 
ZBIGNIEW HERBERT 
 
These initial verses of Zbigniew Herbert’s poem The Adventures of Mr. Cogito with 
Music portray a formative experience of Herbert’s favourite lyric persona, but they reflect 
equally well Iwaszkiewicz’s musical infancy. As mature poets Iwaszkiewicz and Herbert 
will choose different paths – Herbert, just as his porte-parole, will be “condemned to stony 
speech / grating syllables (…) so when the hour comes / he can consent without a murmur 
/ to the trial of truth and falsehood / to the trial of fire and water”172, giving moral testimony 
above all (Mr. Cogito’s Envoy), whereas Iwaszkiewicz will never turn away from music, 
with its dyonisian and demonic aspects (Mephisto-Waltz), with its “groves beyond good 
and evil” (Martwa Pasieka) and “volatile light-mindedness” (Psyche from the Musical 
Short Stories). 
 
 
 
                                               
172 All quotes from the English translation: Z. Herbert, The Adventures of Mr. Cogito with Music, „Cross Currents”, 1989, 
no 8, pp. 33–37. The translator is not indicated. A more recent translation is to be found in:  
 78 
 
Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz was born in 1894 in Kalnik, a village in the Russian 
Empire which annexed these territories of Poland in 1795. He was brought up in 
the cultured atmosphere of Polish destitute provincial nobility, where music was of 
vital importance, permeating young Jarosław’s aesthetic sensibility and 
determining his first performative and creative steps as pianist, composer, music 
teacher, critic, poet and actor. His later non-fiction musical writings include books 
on Bach173, Chopin and Szymanowski, and a considerable amount of musical 
criticism. Together with his wife Anna he translated Gide’s Les faux-monnayeurs 
into Polish. Thanks to his peculiar paideia and early musical collaboration with his 
beloved elder cousin Szymanowski his intermedial modernism is something, so 
to speak, innate and organic. 
 The Fourth Symphony 
The Fourth Symphony is a late short story, published in the 1971 volume of 
Musical Short Stories, five of which were written in the sixties and the seventies, 
preceded by the early homoerotic Friends, written in 1929 and kept by the author 
unpublished for over forty years. In some ways my present analysis shows aspects 
of Iwaszkiewicz’s art traceable in many earlier texts, and problems characteristic of 
his creative world.  
The Fourth Symphony is an explicitly musical and implicitly sexual work, 
which puts both elements in an intricate interplay, full of dynamic tensions used 
consequently to transmute form into content and vice versa. It is a fictional 
autobiography of a young provincial composer, Pietia, living his unfortunate 
passion for a young petersburgian aristocrat and – after a spectacular 
breakdown – ending up back in his little hometown to find there an ambiguous 
peace and reconciliation with his fate. This love and music creative vita of 
sublimation and ambiguity is set in Russia in the last two decades before the 
Revolution. My project was to explore what exceeds the level of mere thematization 
of music as (fictional and actual) works, performances, institutions, creative process 
                                               
173 J. Iwaszkiewicz, Jan Sebastian Bach, PWM, Kraków 1963. 
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and social phenomenon. All these aspects are naturally present in this text as a 
composer’s fictional autobiography. What I found, though, goes far beyond my 
expectations. 
A Word on The Plot and Literary Composition 
A brief outline of the plot is necessary for the further discussion to be anyhow 
intellegible to my Anglophone Reader174, even though it obviously does injustice 
to the charms of this narrative jewel and risks making it seem banal and 
sentimentally flat. 2 August 1902. Pietia, a provintial music teacher in the little town 
of R. some 180 km West from Moskow writes down the story of his youth, the early 
years in R. and an intense period of musical studies at St. Petersburg Conservatoire, 
which ended it up abruptly in a scandalous way, deciding his later fate. There are 
thus two spatio-temporal planes, that of Erzählzeit in R. and that of the Ehrzälte 
Zeit past in St. Petersburg, with elements in R. before and after, near to the “now”, 
which is directly present in the first and last phrase of the narration, giving it the 
form of a frame (“at the moment when I am writing these words, p. 225, and “And 
by the lake I go never more”, p. 285). The story Pietia has to tell is flavoured by the 
overall misty climate of resigned peaceful serenity, expressed in the conclusive 
phrase of the first paragraph, and recurrent in many details accentuating this mood 
throught the whole. This mood remains in striking emotional contrast to the vivid 
enthusiasm, anxiety, longing, doubt, passion and hope characterizing the 
Petersburgian period, together with the intense culmination of hurt feelings and 
uncontrollable fury, which brought this whole epoch to a calamitous end during the 
spectacular quarrell at the ball chez la duchesse Wolkonskaya.  
In Petersburg Pietia lives in a very humble wooden house in the suburbs, 
together with his mother and their servant Dunia. Pietia’s compositions gain him 
some esteem in the Conservatoire circles, but he has no real friends. Sometimes he 
dreams o “meeting some young person [young man], whom [he] could confess all 
                                               
174 Remarks from the „Digressive remark on the Interest of the Plot as a Landmark of Narrativity” from Chapter 
5 below apply. 
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[his] composer’s projects, [his] doubts, [his] enthusiasms, for instance – for 
Mozart’s music, [his] longings and [his] desires” (p. 227). He is also ambiguously 
impressed by the distant and foreign grandeur of petersburgian haute societé, which 
he can observe during concerts in the great halls. One day, when as usual he is 
assisting his distant cousine Zula in her visit to her distant relative countess 
Woroncowa – the countess pays attention to him. When in a short conversation in 
French she gathers that he is a composer, she gets instantly a little concert arranged 
for him. It is during this performance of his songs to the words of Tiutchev, several 
days later, where he accompanies his young little friend Wiera on the piano – that 
an apparition happens. In the midst of their execution (rendered in a sober musical 
ekphrasis) he realizes that someone is standing there by the piano; a „tall and young 
officer, wearing the shiny uniform of the guards. He seemed beautiful to me” (p. 
231). This is how their inense friendship starts. The young officer, knyaz Witalij 
Bielosielskij-Bielozierskij, comes every day to the little wooden house in the 
suburbs, to discuss passionately with his new friend, to play excerpts from Wagner, 
to read the Russian poets (Tiutchev, Fet, Nadson, p. 232). Witalij speaks of 
Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, in ways that would cause frequent quarrels between 
the friends (p. 245). “He didn’t have much of a culture – notes Pietia. What do you 
want, a youngster prince, who would have to pay ten visits daily, every two days 
would get drunk with the officers. He would then come to me, very embarrassed, 
and confess these sins, the Gypsy women, the orgies in the officer’s club, all these 
tricks and entertainments I had no idea of and, while reading “War and Peace”, of 
which I thought they belonged entirely to the past times” (pp. 232-233). Questions 
of “life”, “art” (“creation”) and “love” constitute the axis of their “evening 
disputations”, even though Pietia most significantly acknowledeges that for both 
friends these key-words have an essentially different meaning, undermined by 
radically different life experiences and social status. But Pietia does not mind. All 
what counts is to be with Talia, to “keep him by my side for all costs” (p. 238). It is 
in these discussions that Pietia’s own creative process is thematized, according to 
the romantic line, where Chopin’s Larghetto from the F minor Concerto would be 
Gładkowska’s portrait (cf. Chopin’s own words from the letter to his close friend 
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Tytus Woyciechowski175), and the third movement (Romance) of Pietia’s Third 
Symphony would portray Wiera (and, in accordance with the diegetic line, it would 
remain unfinished, p. 242). With Wiera they speak of music176, an “inexhaustable 
topic” for them. Sometimes they meet all together, but Talia (this is how he called 
the knyaz with affect) never achieves one thing: to make them join his worldly 
pleasures, dinners, banquets and feasts of le grand monde. But one day an 
irrefutable invitation comes and after weeks of preparations the grand ball at the 
Princes Wolkonski palace takes place. Pietia instantly grasps the attraction between 
Talia and Wiera and overhears their conversation, where they speak of love and 
marriage. In fury, he offends his beloved friend, cursing and accusing him of falsity: 
“(…) What sort of a friend are you! You want to marry my fiancée, you deceive 
girls, you play with them only to abandon them!” (p. 267). After this scandalous 
evening and a terrible pneumonia, he is relegated back to the little town of R. by 
the Tscharo Lake. There he leads his peaceful resigned life of a provintial music 
teacher, who abandoned dreams of fame and success and leaves peacefully in the 
metaphysical soundscape ruled by the church bells. They eternally resound over the 
waters of the lake in which “all the twenty-nine domes of the five churches 
embraced by the walls of the local kremlin reflect” (p. 269). It is at this lake that 
one day Pietia sees Wasia – the banya-keeper – swimming. A parallell triangle is 
built, with Wasia substituting Talia and Zula substituting Wiera. All the princly 
grandeur of St. Petersburg is substituted by the serene provinciality of R., where the 
story ends, with a truly ambiguous happy end. 
 
                                               
175  I quote from Chopin’s original: „[…]bo ja już może na nieszczęście mam mój ideał, któremu wiernie, nie 
mówiąc z nim już pół roku, służę, który mi się śni, na którego pamiątkę stanęło adagio od mojego koncertu”, 
letter sent from Warsaw on 3rd Oct. [1]829 r. to Tytus Woyciechowski in Poturzyn, cf. F. Chopin et al., 
Korespondencja Fryderyka Chopina, Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2009. 
176 Gładkowska was a singer, as well; they did not, however, talk a lot with Chopin („I have not spoken to her 
since half a year”, in the quote above). 
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 Thesis (I, II) 
My interpretive hypothesis is this: there is a formal-aesthetic parallelism 
between music and homosexuality with respect to their textual rendition in 
Iwaszkiewicz’s fiction. Namely: a closer reading of the story uncovers a layer of 
musicalization which I want to call semantic-contextual polyphony (I), which is 
both an effect and means of expression of the homosexual reading of the text. In 
the second place – I claim that the work re-interprets the sonata form (II) and its 
traditional gendered interpretation. 
I. Semantic-Contextual Polyphony 
 The familiar distinction between thematization and imitation, mutatis 
mutandis, can be fruitfully applied to the question of representing homosexuality in 
literature. Music (its essence, experience, meaning) has been often qualified as 
ineffable – as it is impossible to translate it into words, even artistically configured, 
in a musically satisfying, or semantically adequate way. This impossibility of 
translation between the immanent senses and values of music and the propositional 
language is the challenge for all sorts of melopoetic transgressions, as well as a 
theoretical challenge for who aspires to study these intermedial phenomena.  
Now we need to appreciate that homosexuality in the early 20th Century, 
similarly faces the impossibility of expression and realization, if in different 
ways. First – intrinsically, in the given social context of Pietia’s autobiography – as 
a striving for something that cannot be fulfilled, nor even properly aknowledged by 
the protagonist himself. It is a variant of the topos of the impossible love: impossible 
both to be lived and admitted to (as no emancipated categories of identification are 
at hand). Second – aesthetically, conserving this status of taboo, it can be exploited 
to the stylistic benefit of fiction, a benefit which would evaporate in the very 
moment of neutralization through emancipation177.  
                                               
177 German Ritz emphasizes rightly that if homosexual tensions are omnipresent in Iwaszkiewicz’s works, yet 
hardly ever in the „emancipation” modality; in most of the cases it is the „sublimation” modality that reigns. 
He uses the phrase “absent presence”. G. Ritz, Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz : pogranicza nowoczesności, Universitas, 
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The non-emancipated homosexual-self (Pietia) is characterized by the 
doubleness of his world-experience (cf. Ritz) and typically assumes double-sense 
communicative strategies. This feature – being implicitly present in the narrated 
situations and dialogues – functions as a poetic model of the whole: the two-
voiced polyphonic texture, which we appreciate within a musical reception 
paradigm. The autobiographic narrator, at times, is in counterpoint with himself, 
contradicting auctorially his own words as protagonist and alternating both streams: 
Właściwie mówiąc, kłamałem Zuli. Kłamałem świadomie, bo 
chciałem sobie samemu wmówić, że symfonia siedzi mi w głowie. 
Wcale nie siedziała, kiedy myślałem o niej, odczuwałem zupełną 
pustkę. […] Tymczasem miałem pustkę w głowie i kłamałem Zuli. 
Powtarzałem też sobie: kochałem Wierę. 
Frankly speaking, I lied to Zula. I lied consciously, because I 
wanted to persuade myself, that the symphony is right there in my 
head. It wasn’t there at all, when I thought of it I felt a complete blank. 
[…] And so my mind was a blank and I lied to Zula. And I repeated 
myself: I loved Wiera. 
These auctorial remarks follow immediately the incriminated dialogue with 
Zula. What is characteristic here is the shadow they cast on the analogous repeated 
self-assertions on Pietia’s hurt love for Wiera (and not for Talia, for that matter). 
This is contextual sense-making through mere juxtaposition of otherwise logically 
unrelated statements, akin to relational sense-making in music. These words 
oscillate in the ear of the reader, creating a sense of doubleness and insistent 
pulsation: “Frankly” – “I lied” – “I lied” – “I wanted to persuade” – “I felt” – 
“blank” – “blank” – “I lied” – “I repeated” – “I loved”. Also situational ambiguities 
contribute to the overall effect of two concurring narrative voices that co-act on the 
reader.  
                                               
Kraków 1999, p. 12.. He also reflects on the “unutterable desire and the poetics of narration” in G. Ritz, 
Niewypowiadalne pożądanie a poetyka narracji, „Teksty Drugie”, 1997, t.3, no 3, pp. 43–60. The present 
analysis shows the way these stylistic („literary”) features are used as means of musicalization here. 
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The structural-ideal axis of the whole composition moves from the triad of 
problems emerging in Pietia’s discussions with Talia: „life”, „art” and „love”, 
where both friends give completely different meanings to the three terms, engaging 
therefore in two parallel monologues rather than in an authentic dialogue, 
symbolizing the incompatibility of their mutual engagement. Pietia is fascinated by 
this, as he puts it, “interplay of ambiguities”, and explicitly downplays the 
importance of what is actually being said: “I loved my friend so much, that after all 
it was all the same to me, what did he say or think. […my only concern was to] 
Keep him with me at all costs, because without him I couldn’t imagine my life in 
Petersburg” (p. 238). Clearly, these interactions are appreciated not for the 
discursive “content” of both conflicting positions, but for the mere pleasure of their 
interplay (linking thus by a structural analogy the experience of love with the 
formalistically intended pleasures of music). 
This fundamental triad of ideas (together with its essential bi-vocality) is 
reflected in the plot by the two specular love triangles: Talia, Wiera, and Pietia 
(parts 1-2), and Wasia, Zula, and Pietia in the final part. Both triangles have their 
dynamic heterosexual and homosexual interpretations, which are equally grounded 
in the text and presented simultaneously, without losing their logical 
incompatibility. This harmonious co-presence of two distinct voices – a typical 
landmark of music as opposed to discourse – is natural in the context of Pietia’s 
autobiography, reflecting faithfully his own double-minded perceptive and 
expressive attitudes. 
II. Sonata Form 
In a second step, I want to hear this interplay of two incompatible sense-
streams as realizing the sonata form. I have not come across such a reading, striking 
as it is, once advanced.  
 Iwaszkiewicz divided his text in four numbered sections, but the 
autobiographic spacio-temporal frame is distinctly tripartite, with the repetition of 
the first space-setting in the third part: (A) first sixteen years in the provincial town 
of R. 180 km West from Moscow, then (B) in St. Petersburg till 1894 and (A’) again 
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in R. till 1902, which coincides with the Erzählzeit (the time of the narration). I take 
the two contrasting spatial settings, together with their expressive and symbolic 
load, as embodying here the tonal duality constitutive of the sonata form. Let me 
characterize briefly first both thematic groups and, second, their interaction 
throughout the whole. 
(A) First Theme group in R minor (“Autobiography and Love”)  
The key is R because of the space-determination (the town of R) which is 
explicitly stated when the first Theme is presented: in the opening of the exposition 
(I) and in the opening of the recapitulation (IV). It is minor because of 1) the sweet 
melancholy, serene resignation mood it prevalently expresses; 2) the fact R. is 
literally a small (minor) town in all possible senses of the word, if compared with 
its major parallel, St. Petersburg. The thematic material includes the first-person 
melancholy autobiographical recollection by the composer, Pietia and his 
concise informative narration set in the little town of R. This theme is subjective, 
introvert and self-reflexive, moving in the constant tension towards the foreign 
material of the contrasting Second theme. 
(B) Second Theme in P major (B – “Object of Love and Inspiration”) 
The vigorous, vitalistic, uncontrollable masculine-objective (third 
person) presentation of Witalij178 in the exposition and its specular version in 
the recapitulation (in the person of the beautiful peasant Wasia) determines 
the main characteristic traits of the second theme. In the exposition, it is stated 
in the parallel key: P major. This key reflects the grand settings of the aristocratic 
high life in Petersburg, constantly contrasted with the modesty of Pietia’s little 
wooden house in the suburbs (which locally re-sets the R minor key). Pietia 
continuously underlines how “foreign” and even “hostile” these spheres are for him. 
He desires Talia but finds himself in an inevitable conflict with the young prince’s 
socially determined way of being: vain, mundane occupations matching with his 
                                               
178 In tender, intimate diminutive becomes Talia, assuming the feminine grammatical paradigm and similarity 
to the loving Pietia’s name) „Talia to the loved ones” – “Najbliżsi nazywali go “Talia””, J. Iwaszkiewicz, 
Opowiadania muzyczne, Czytelnik, Warszawa 1971, p. 232. 
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cynic, nihilistic views and superficial, if passionate, delectation in the charms of 
music.  
A brilliant transition connects both themes in the exposition (I, pp. 230-
232): it is the private little concert at Woroncowa’s palace, with Wiera singing 
Pietia’s songs and where Pietia sees the young Knyaz Biełosielskij-Biełozierskij for 
the first time: in the curve of the piano. His beautiful and energetic figure contrasts 
highly with Wiera, who “wasn’t beautiful, only when she started singing her face 
would change, gain expressiveness…” (p. 231). The lunar character of her beauty 
reflects her function of a medium (of music here, and in general: of Pietia’s love 
for the Prince). The two female figures (Zula and Wiera) can be said to act as 
Dominants, as they mediate and lead to the beloved Tonic (Talia in P, Wasia in R).  
The interaction of both themes builds up the tension in the first part of the 
Development (invitation – quarrel – “compromising letter”– fur-coat – Talia’s kiss 
– first occurrence of the fanfares-motive) and brings it to a spectacular culmination 
during the fatal ball when drunken Pietia overhears Talia’s declaration of love for 
Wiera. They fight and ultimately fall all the way down the impressive staircase. 
This literal cadenza with the immediately following fugal retransition to R minor 
double-close the exposition.  
We are back in the little town of R. and the first theme is restated, opening 
the Recapitulation. Then comes the second theme, in the local R minor key, now 
embodied by Wasia, the banya-keeper. It is immediately preceded by a direct 
remark that the life in St Petersburg was “not harmonious”, whereas in R. is 
“harmonious” – its identification as the non-modulating transition of the 
recapitulation is evident within the sonata-form interpretive framework. Wasia’s 
physical (beauty, muscular body, vitality, charm combined with “foreignness” 
determined by the social distance) and vocal characteristics (“his voice resembled 
so much Talia’s voice, and a beautiful, somewhat Volodymirian accent, just like 
Talia he “bent” the “o” and pronounced just as you write it”, p. 282) strictly repeat 
that of Witalij, with the only significant difference being the transposition from the 
princely grandeur (major mode) to the minor mode of a local peasant. This results 
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in a new harmony between the themes achieved on the common ground of the 
original minor key. As Pietia falls ill, he is lovingly looked after by Wasia and the 
women, including Zula. In the midst of the typhoid fever he takes Wasia for Talia, 
which most eloquently confirms the identity of the second theme across the modes. 
The final scene takes place in the banya, where Wasia tells Pietia his secret: “Zula 
loves you so much. Marry her” and kisses him on the mouth “according to the 
custom” (p. 285). The dynamics of the scene is both erotic and musical, as when 
the sensuous pleasure of this intimate encounter between the two men grows, Pietia 
hears his Fourth symphony complete in his inner ear. The erotic climax coincides 
with the musical climax (fanfares triumphantly repeated in the symphony’s finale) 
and the resolution of the plot (Wasia’s “matrimonial” secret). The final cadenza – 
through the anaphoric ‘[i]’ in its short, decisive statements – closes the whole form 
in R minor, now resplendent with serenity and sweet resignation from the utterly 
rejected P major: 
I ożeniłem się z Zulą, i jestem bardzo szczęśliwy. „Czwartą 
symfonię” spisałem i posłałem do Petersburga. Wykonano ją z wielkim 
powodzeniem, ale ja na koncert nie pojechałem.  
I nad jezioro też już nigdy nie chodzę. 
[And so I married Zula, and so I am most happy. I wrote the 
Fourth Symphony down and I sent it to St. Petersburg. It was performed 
with great success, but I didn’t go to the concert. And to the lake so do 
I go no more]. 
The traditional gendered exegesis of the relation between the themes (A. B. 
Marx, 1845) is inverted here, as is the corresponding sexual attraction setting. It 
offers thus a perfect match between the “feminine/passive”, subjective first theme 
and the contrasting “masculine objectivity” and uncontrollable beauty of the second 
theme.  
* 
The prince’s visits in Pietia’s little wooden house in Petersburg were 
consequently announced by the leitmotif of the little sleigh bells and the recurring 
“pull on the rusty wire of the door-bell”. This motif – signal of the physical 
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presence of the loves’ object that leaves Pietia with “nothing but regret” – in the 
recapitulation is transformed into the magnificent music of the orthodox church 
bells echoing in the lake. This objectless, universal, “inhuman” music reflects the 
serenely resigned harmony of R minor, “a world philosophically resolved”, and yet 
void and creatively sterile until the second theme (Wasia) comes back and 
completes its perfect harmony (love) with the lacking human, “objective” 
dimension, necessary for life and for art.  
Conclusion 
What strikes as a profound similarity between the musical and the 
homosexual text intended as distinctive poietic categories (and not merely as 
subject-labels) is that they both imply a contradictory condition internally 
determined by its fundamental impossibility of realisation, resulting in opaque 
communication strategies. This constitutive impossibility is due to the switch in 
medial (semiotic) and sexual identity, which makes of the object of love or 
musicalization something it cannot ever be. By consequence: neither of the 
poetics can support “fulfilment” – because it would jeopardize their contradictory 
transgressive core. The beautiful kniaź Talia will never become Pietia’s lover, and 
a literary text will never become music. And yet – in Iwaszkiewicz’s Fourth 
Symphony – both paradoxically happen, one mediated and sense-invested by the 
other. 
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Chapter 4. Antoni Libera’s Toccata in C Major 
Introduction 
Antoni Libera’s latest book of fiction, Niech się panu darzy179, is composed of 
three pieces of short prose. In this chapter, I will focus on the third novella of the 
triptych, Toccata C-dur [Toccata in C major], named so after Robert Schumann’s 
op. 7, its prominent musical para- and archi-text in Genettian terms applied across 
the media180. After having briefly delineated the context of the work, the figure of 
its author and its Polish and Italian reception, I will proceed with a close analysis 
of its peculiar intermedial collocation between music and literature. In this case this 
interrelation will appear as particularly complex and striking, because of the 
intersemiotic musical quotations comprised in the main text of the work. As a result, 
we will see it as an eloquent case of musica textualis. In order to achieve this 
conclusion, I will localise and describe levels of the text’s interrelation with music, 
showing that it is best interpreted as a score for a musico-literary individual (silent) 
performance. It will be, therefore, a two-step procedure: the broader description of 
the text’s links to music, deploying tools provided by Petermann181 will ground the 
more specific interpretation in terms of musica textualis. 
 Text, Author and Context 
As mentioned above, the Polish editor presents the whole book as a 
homogenous triptych of prose. The Italian editor, Sellerio Editore Napoli, publishes 
the translation as a little independent novella within their exquisite Il divano 
series182. I shall treat it as an independent work, however taking into account the 
immediate context of the original Polish edition. In particular, the second novella 
of the triptich, Widok z góry i z dołu, is illustrated with photographs of places and 
                                               
179 A. Libera, Niech się panu darzy i dwie inne nowele, Biblioteka ‘Więzi’, Warszawa 2013. 
180 Cf. G. Genette, Palimpsestes. La littérature au second degré, Seuil, Paris 1982, pp. 7–16.  
181 E. Petermann, The Musical Novel. Imitation of Musical Structure, Performance, and Reception in 
Contemporary Fiction..., op. cit. 
182 A. Libera, La toccata in do maggiore, trans by. V. Verdiani, Sellerio, Palermo 2015. 
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architectonic details described in it, offering thereby an interesting pendant of the 
musical excerpts in the Toccata and a good starting point for a comparative 
discussion of their status within the text. 
The author was born in Warsaw four years after the War ended and four years 
lacking to Stalin’s death, in 1949, in a family of Jewish-Polish intellectuals called 
Libin, saved from the Ghetto; a miracle commemorated in their afterwar surname. 
He is Poland’s most eminent translator of Kavafy, Hölderlin, Racine, Sophocles 
and critic183 of Samuel Beckett as well as an established stage director of his 
plays184. His translations into Polish include all of Beckett’s dramatic works and 
most of his prose. Libera’s own novel, Madame185, a true bestseller, has been 
granted numerous literary awards and has been translated into twenty languages, 
including English, French, Slovenian, Swedish, Catalan, Dutch, Czech, Italian, 
Hebrew, Russian and Lithuanian. It also involves some significant formal interplay 
with musical composition techniques. 
Beckett’s Prophet 
Samuel Beckett considered Libera a friend and, with a typical note of irony, his 
“deputy to Eastern Europe”186. Libera described his lifelong personal fascination 
with Beckett in his autobiographical prose Godot i jego cień187 [Godot’s Shadow]. 
This work provides an important context for my interpretive enterprise here both 
                                               
183 PhD Thesis on Beckett at the Polish Academy of Sciences. 
184 His realisations include: Krapp's Last Tape, Catastrophe Haymarket Theatre, Leicester/Riverside Studios, 
London 1989/1990, Endgame The Gate Theatre, Dublin 1991/1999; Lincoln Center, New York 1996; 
Melbourne Festival, 1997; Barbican Center, London 1999; Krapp's Last Tape Victory Garden Theatre, Chicago 
2003 (I quote the ones relized outside Poland, cf. antoni-libera.pl, last accessed: 15.05.2017). 
185 A. Libera, Madame, Znak, Kraków 2000., English translation: A. Libera, Madame, Canongate, Edinburgh 
2004. 
186 Cf. Antoni Libera - Ecrivain aux Éditions Noir sur Blanc, n.d., http://www.leseditionsnoirsurblanc.fr/fiche-
auteur1954/antoni-libera, 15.05.2017. 
187 A. Libera, Godot i jego cień, Znak, Kraków 2009., French translation: A. Libera, Godot et son ombre, trans 
by. V. Patte, Noir sur Blanc 2012. 
 91 
 
on the level of what is said there on the margins of Beckett and how the text unites 
heterogeneous elements. First – a word on the how. 
How: intermedial collage, literary staging, text as performance, real presence 
The book is incrusted with graphic material such as reproductions of cards and 
letters received form the author of Lessness, photographs of great beckettian stage 
creations (Magee as Hamm and as the Listener, MacGowran as Clov, Billie 
Whitelaw as May, Warillow in the Depeupleur etc.), covers of French, American, 
and Polish editions of Beckett’s works, issues of literary magazines, invitations etc. 
The text is enrichened by schemes illustrating scenic movement in Pas188 or 
numeric structures governing Sans. The book is qualified as “autobiographical 
prose” rather than, simply, “autobiography” because it is consecrated to Beckett’s 
literature at least as much as to the events in Libera’s life, or, rather, the latter are 
presented as functions of Libera’s great encounter with this oeuvre; furthermore, it 
is a piece of literary fiction, if based on non-fiction autobiographical motives. 
Technically the narration contains and is entwined with a series of substantial 
interpretations of Beckett’s texts and extensive bits of translation. This digressive 
technique unites in one narrative flow the simple sequences of practical events with 
most sophisticated divagations on the translator’s dilemmas and with actual 
translations from Beckett. From meditations on May walking to and fro in the little 
Church along His poor arm189 we are transported to Kafkaesque adventures with 
the communist authorities of People’s Poland refusing the author a passport, when 
Beckett invites him à titre personnel to his own staging of That Time and Footfalls 
in Berlin’s Schiller-Theater. Beckett’s work is somehow present in Libera’s 
prose, in a way different from the usual distance that is supposed to separate 
criticism and literature. The practice of including thought streams proper to some 
other text in this narration is not limited to Beckett. The reader will be acquainted 
with the resumed content of Libera’s paper at a Beckettian conference in NYC, as 
                                               
188 S. Beckett, Kroki, [in:] No właśnie co, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa 2010, pp. 235–241. 
189 Ibid. 
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well as with the outline of a series of invited lectures on Polish Romantic Drama in 
New York City. The outcome it is a highly intertextual, intergenre and intermedial 
work producing an effect of extraordinary closeness of the literature it engages with. 
It obviously is an interpretation of the texts in question, but an interpretation that 
uses literary powers in order to exceed what we normally take to be criticism and 
become also a performative interpretation, a literary staging. 
Roots of Textual Intermediality in Polish Romantic Drama 
If this view is correct – Libera’s intermedial practice could be collocated within 
the more familiar tradition of Polish Romanticism190, disclosing a deeper sense of 
Libera’s digressions on the content of his NY lectures. Adam Mickiewicz’s Dziady 
[Forefathers’ Eve]191 is a romantic drama, a drama which is not primarily or 
necessarily written to be staged192. Rather, it deploys the technical literary devices 
which normally serve the playwright to design the verbal and corporeal interaction 
of actors on stage, such as roles, text division into acts and scenes, didascalia etc. 
in a reverse direction, namely to represent before the “mind’s eye”193 some 
                                               
190 It is both ironic and most eloquent, that it was precisely against the Romantic aesthetics and corresponding 
predilection to intermedial vocabulary in literary criticism, that Tadeusz Szulc stood in his 1937 philippics 
Muzyka w dziele literackim. It is striking, that he himself operates with the term „musical directives within the 
literary artwork”, but he simply denies such a possibility and denounces Romanticism as responsible for this 
illusion: W muzycznej wrażliwości, opartej o romantyczne ujęcie świata i sztuki tkwi geneza złudzeń, jakoby 
istniały w dziele literackim muzyczne dyrektywy quoted in: A. Hejmej, Muzyczność dzieła literackiego..., op. 
cit.. Eng. transl. (J.C.): The origin of the illusion that the literary artwork contains musical directives lays in 
the musical sensibility, based on the romantic worldview. 
191 I refer to the so called Dziady wileńsko-kowieńskie (published in 1823). Cf. Libera’s own words: „Teraz, w 
wieku dojrzałym, podniósł do rangi pieśni materię własnego losu i wpisał ją w dawną formę. Dziady wileńsko-
kowieńskie to mit starego świata, zapis obrządku wspólnoty o charakterze plemiennym”. A. Libera, Godot i 
jego cień..., op. cit., p. 271.”. 
192 My remarks here touch upon an immense and highly complex study field within Polish philology. What I 
present here is necessarily an over-simplified picture, functional for my purposes here, but otherwise utterly 
insufficient. 
193 The already mentioned Mickiewiczian ballad Romantyczność written in 1821, starts with a quote from 
Shakespeare: „Methinks, I see... Where? - In my mind's eyes”. (Hamlet, Penguin, London 2001. Act I, scene 2, 
184-6; in orig. in sg. „mind’s eye”).  
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performative action. The work’s homonymous subject, dziady, are dramatically 
mimetized as a structured chthonic ritual performed by the traditional community 
during the Night of the Forefathers. Mickiewicz masterfully frames it by a suitable 
pseudo-ethnographic historical introduction which enforces this reading, making 
thus the dramatic notation serve as a performative stenograme from the fieldwork. 
Let me show the points of comparison between classical drama and its romantic 
transformation crucial for our argument in a simplified table: 
Classical drama Romantic drama (Dziady, Part II) 
 
The text commands a staging, is 
structured in function of what will 
happen on stage and uses the 
drama-specific score convention in 
order to achieve it. 
 
 
 
 
It imitates “real life” action through 
real (physical) action on stage. 
 
 
 
 
Its primary instantiation is a 
performative one, on stage.  
 
(But it can be also appreciated in 
silent, imaginative reading). 
 
The text uses the dramatic 
convention in order to “note down 
on paper” what happens in a 
collective performance of the 
traditional semi-pagan community. 
Appealing to the reader’s familiarity 
with such a notation used in 
classical drama it creates an 
intermedial form of poetry. 
It imitates “performative”, “ritual” 
action through fictional (imagined) 
action concretized in the act of 
reading as if realizing stage 
indications. 
 
Its primary instantiation is an 
imaginary performative one, 
“before the mind’s eye”. 
(But it can be also appreciated on 
stage, in an adaptation). 
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I used the example of Mickiewicz’s Dziady, as it offers something closest to 
what we encounter in Libera with respect to Beckett’s works, namely: a literary 
staging of something that is a performance itself. It is a textual work, precisely: a 
poem stylized as a drama, which interprets textually something that is a “ritual 
action”. This ritual action is not simply described or narrated. It appeals to the 
reader’s dramatic imagination and calls for an imagined performative interpretation 
through the use of standard dramatic notation conventions. Its aesthetic 
concretisation in the act of reading borrows thus means from another medium 
(theatre, as the standard realisation of drama). In this way, the work is designed to 
elicit special intermedial effects. As such it is both drama and something else than 
drama, namely, lyric poetry. Other examples of Polish romantic drama, such as 
Juliusz Słowacki’s Kordian, or Zygmunt Krasiński’s Nie-Boska Komedia [Un-
Divine Comedy], to quote just the most eminent, share this intermedial expansion 
of poetry into drama, even if their respective objects of representation are not 
performative themselves. 
What: Libera on Beckett, Performativity and Music 
According to Libera, Beckett’s art is almost always staging a voice. 
Therefore, even shorter forms of prose are generally to be interpreted as 
monologues: his “narrators are almost always creators: subjects who, “live”, so to 
speak – in front of the reader or of the potential listener – compose what they tell, 
they make up entire stories or worlds adding up new details while they talk. Their 
speech is formally an improvisation, an act of creation in statu nascendi. This 
improvised creation with words is the main… the o n ly action”194. He emphasizes 
that “speaking, creating fiction live is [for Beckett] an important eve nt , perhaps 
the most important one. Because everything that the man creates is invented by him: 
the whole human culture is all a “tale”, as the narrator of Compagne says at the end 
of the story”195. This is why he encourages stagings and loud readings not only of 
                                               
194 A. Libera, Od tłumacza, [in:] No właśnie co, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa 2010, p. 6. 
195 Ibid. 
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Beckett’s dramas but also of Beckettian pieces of prose (interpreted on stage as 
monologues). Furthermore, he argues that “these texts have a distinctive musical 
value: melody and rhythmics”196, emphasizing thus that the oral-performative 
character of these texts requires from their performers an ability to understand the 
way they determine also musical parameters of the voice operation. Beckett, we 
may add, uses different means to achieve this precision in prescribing the 
“distinctive musical value” of his texts. In Watt he includes auctorial musical 
notation (four-part rhytmical score for the Threne, and a soprano melodic score for 
it197, a practice to be found much earlier in Polish literature, for instance in a 
musically notated “polyphony of quarrel” in Karol Hubert Rostworowski’s 1913 
drama Judasz z Kariothu198). 
Apart from this particular care for the musical parameters of the staged voice, 
Libera stresses a second aspect of Beckett’s work affinity to music seen as mathesis 
universalis: “Beckett’s taste for numbers and the fact that he cultivated them in 
literature has several sources. One of them is the general aesthetic assumption that 
all art, whatever might it mimetize or express, even the utmost chaos, it must be 
ruled by the rules of order”. Beckett “compared his writing to composing music, 
which is based on a rigorous system as well”199. 
                                               
196 Ibid. 
197 What is important, this music is auctorial, not an intersemiotic quote, and is clearly intended as a 
performative directive, thus being stricto sensu part of the work in question. The scores in Watt and other 
aspects of Beckett’s engagement with music are discussed in E. Prieto, Listening in : music, mind, and the 
modernist narrative..., op. cit., pp. 155–252. 
198 K.H. Rostworowski, Judasz z Kariothu..., op. cit. For a detailed analysis, see: A. Hejmej, Muzyczność dzieła 
literackiego..., op. cit. 
199 Original quote (bold corresponds to the fragments translated above, J.C.): “Upodobanie Becketta do liczb i 
kultywowanie ich w literaturze ma kilka źródeł. Jedno z nich to pewne ogólne założenie estetyczne, że wszelka 
sztuka, cokolwiek by miała odwzorowywać czy wyrażać, choćby największy chaos, musi rządzić się 
regułami porządku. Porządek dla ograniczonego ludzkiego umysłu z natury rzeczy też musi być ograniczony: 
taki, nad którym umysł, przynajmniej w pewnej mierze, panuje. Jest to podejście z ducha kartezjańskie. […] 
[cyt. z Rozprawy o metodzie Kartezjusza]. Beckett, sumienny czytelnik Kartezujsza w młodości, doskonale to 
zdanie znał i nieraz je przywoływał. A swoje pisarstwo porównywał do komponowania muzyki, która 
również opiera się na ścisłym systemie”. S. Duda and A. Libera, Ziemia to czyściec czy piekło? z Antonim 
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Beckett, like Dante200 with his symbolism of threes and tens, says Libera, and, 
we shall add, like the medieval universalistic artes based on symbolic proportions: 
ars rhetorica, ars praedicandi, ars musica etc. – used the numbers symbolically – 
if in a radically opposed philosophical and theological context. Beckett’s key 
numbers are 12, 24, 60 – symbolising Time201. Music as reflecting the numeral and 
proportionate order of the Universe (or at least of Time) and the musical work as 
mathematical ordering in time of the most irregular, ephemeral, unruly (in the 
classical philosophy of music – emotions, in the case of Beckett – “the utmost 
chaos”) becomes a sister art to Beckett’s writing. 
* 
We have to keep in mind this “collage” (both multi-, inter-, and intra-medial) 
technique used in Godot i jego cień when interpreting the novella. These features, 
alongside with Libera’s understanding of Beckett, may guide us in interpreting 
Libera’s auctorial intentions and horizons while composing his own literary toccata. 
From the material discussed below it seems plausible to conclude, that Libera 
treated the musical material similarly in his own work and that he developed his 
own original musicoliterary devices, combining them with devices familiar from 
Kuncewiczowa’s Cudzoziemka [1936] or Mann’s Doktor Faustus. I show how his 
Toccata in C major includes and modulates the presence of music, insinuating it 
into the very narrative tissue of fiction. Thus, the label “fiction” here deserves a 
further qualification, no less than his “autobiographical fiction” in the case of Godot 
and His Shadow. Here it is “musical fiction”. The musical elements of the collage 
include: Schumann’s toccata op.7 [real], in its various and distinctive 
interpretations by the novella’s protagonists [fictional] and by Sviatoslav Richter 
[real, recorded], alongside with the sing along voices which interpret it (both in the 
performative and exegetic sense). The result is a compound work of musical 
                                               
Liberą rozmawia Sebastian Duda, [in:] No właśnie co, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa 2010, pp. 
413–414.  
200 Quoted by Mann, from the Inferno, as the motto of Doktor Faustus. 
201 Ibid., p. 414. 
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fiction202 notated with (1) standard characters of Polish, sometimes used 
emphatically in a way that departures from the rules of orthography in order to 
suggest musical elements; (2) special typographic devices (such as bold, italics, 
hyphens – all used to convey musical information); (3) musical notation in the 
double position of (a) illustration (as an external medium, incrustation in the sense 
of the above discussed collage technique) (b) the piece’s musical text proper 
entwined with its verbal text.  
This is not to suggest that Libera attempted to emulate his literary guru and 
mythologised master. The novella, as we will see, has very little in common with 
Beckett’s style. If it overcomes narration as the primary logos of fiction, it does so 
without eliminating clearly traditional and simple forms of narrativity within the 
text. Stylistically it is conservatively elegant, with proficiently introduced elements 
of music school jargon, professorial style, and technical terms of music (Polish and 
Italian), most natural and suitable in the narrative context. 
                                               
202 Inspired, to be sure, autobiographically: by the Author’s juvenile initiation into music as a pupil of Warsaw’s 
renown Krasiński Music School; even Prof. Plater and his interpretation constitute a cryptoportrait of his 
professor of musical literature, Mr. Jerzy Kolasiński. [This information was most kindly provided by Mr. Libera 
himself, in a private conversation in Warsaw]. And the whole piece is dedicated to the memory of Roman 
Jasiński (1900-1987), pianist, piano pedagogue, musical crtitic, diarist and man of radio, the writer’s father-in-
law. 
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 Music as Dramatis Persona, or The Intermedial 
Mythos 
The task of arguing that something which beyond any reasonable doubt is a 
novella, a piece of shorter fiction, is, in fact, also music, is not an easy one, to say 
the least. Apparently, it gets way easier when one opens the book and finds this: 
 
Figure 1 Plater’s “crazy Lieder” (pp.86-87) 
 “Aha! There we go! All right then, this is words and this is music. Fair enough! 
It is a strange word-and-music compound, it reads music as well as text. This must 
be some avant-garde hybrid artefact203”.  
                                               
203 Or, in the case of a blasé intellectual well familiar with such musical quotes in a literary text – “oh, again, 
that old hat!”. Other examples of musical notation quoted literary text include S. Barańczak, J. Iwaszkiewicz, 
M. Kuncewiczowa, R. Rolland, A. Schnitzler, M. Kundera, G. Compère, M. Roche cf. A. Hejmej, Music in 
Literature: Perspectives of Interdisciplinary Comparative Literature..., op. cit., p. 60. 
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Let us have a closer look on how this artefact is made and what exactly is it 
made of. 
I choose this particular ostensibly hybrid work (musical notation as shown 
above appears many times on these pages) in order to argue, thanks to some of its 
intrinsic features, that in its incorporating music it leads far beyond what a simple 
and (seemingly) unproblematic juxtaposition of two written media would amount 
to. (As if an artisitc juxtaposition of two written media could ever be “simple” and 
“unproblematic”). Moreover, in the course of the discussion, where I will apply the 
Wolf-Petermann model in the analytic part, I hope to show how it needs to be 
expanded and possibly revised, in the lights of Libera’s piece, at least for 
philosophical purposes. 
My first task is to provide a brief outline of the plot and how this is formally 
realized within the broad structure of this sixty-pages long text. This is inevitable 
for the sake of my analyses’ intelligibility. My second task will be to elucidate the 
ways in which music appears on the charts of the text, how they can be classified 
and related one to another. 
Digressive remark on the Interest of the Plot as a Landmark of Narrativity 
One last remark before I start: serious literary critics are never quite concerned 
that in discussing the details of the plot they might “spoil” it to the readers. But the 
popular culture and online amateur criticism has developed some curious rules of 
netiquette which prevent this from happening. The online critic is required to warn 
the reader if the suite of his review is a “spoiler”. Now, apart from some obvious 
differences in convention between the two genres of literary (and film and TV series 
etc.) criticism, the substantial answer to the question on this asymmetry is perhaps 
this: the assumptions made, as to the readers’ presumed state of knowledge, in both 
cases differ. The reader of a serious piece of criticism is generally supposed to know 
already the literary text in question, or at least: to be aware that the whole plot might 
be disclosed during the text’s discussion. It is assumed that he reads maturely, 
knowing that it might spoil some of the charms of a “first reading”, naïve and 
adventurous. In contrast, the reader of quick blog reviews or other resources online 
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might be interested in getting to know what the plot’s setting is in order to know 
whether the whole thing might be worthwhile for her. This is why she wants to be 
warned whenever a passage of a review contains the “fruit of the Tree of 
Knowledge”, one that “thou shalt not eat from” (Genesis 2:17). 
Now my standpoint here is mixed. I have no reason to suppose that my English-
speaking reader knows already Libera’s Toccata. And yet, still, I believe, I can 
safely disclose the points of the plot crucial to my analyses, without spoiling 
anything. This, I think, is possible in virtue of the very musical second nature of the 
work in question. Quite obviously, you cannot produce a spoiler of a sonata by 
describing it in detail or by analysing its themes and the way they are worked out 
and recapitulated; nor even by playing its decisive fragments. If it does at all 
influence the subsequent appreciation of the piece, it does so only by enhancing it. 
Knowing the piece promotes its understanding and greatens the pleasures it can 
offer or it is irrelevant204. But it cannot spoil anything205. This, arguably, is not the 
                                               
204 This would be the point of contrast between architecturalism and concatenationism P. Kivy, Music in 
Memory and ‘Music in the Moment’, [in:] New Essays on Musical Understanding, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2001; J. Levinson, Music in the moment..., op. cit. resp. But none sustains that previous aural or 
intellectual acquaintance could spoil the music; on Levinson’s account, if architectural knowledge of the form 
has little influence on the basic musical understanding, it is essential to be aurally acquainted with the piece; 
on most occasions, in order to legitimately claim to know some piece of classical music, we must have attended 
to it more than once or twice; a single hearing results insufficient for a proper grasp of its musical meaning. 
And on Kivy’s account – the more one knows about the structure and provenance of a piece, the more one can 
grasp and appreciate when hearing it. 
205 Counterexamples come to mind, though. Take Haydn’s Paukenschlag Symphony, nicknamed in English, 
for a reason, The Surprise; and all other musical works which acted on their first audiences with effects of 
surprise, shock, unexpected innovation. These aesthetic effects can be neutralized by pre-acquaintance with the 
work. But the proponents of both theories, for different reasons, would advocate that still in typical cases of 
music, the gain tends to outweigh the (unquestionable) loss. On concatenationist account we lack the pleasure 
of getting surprised by such a device (and, even more, does the knowledge that it is there really annihilate the 
immediate effect during a performance? well, arguably not entirely, as the purely musical expectation there is, 
so to speak, deaf to reasons and knowledge; this effect, namely, of eternal surprise, would even constitute a 
further argument in favor of concatenationism), but we appreciate to the full all other musical devices, which 
cannot be so appreciated upon a first hearing. On the architecturalist account the pleasure of being surprised is 
substituted by even greater a pleasure of knowing that what we hear was devised to surprise the audience, and 
that, furthermore, it succeeded in producing this effect in its original context. 
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case when it comes to works playing with our curiosity of the suite and the 
resolution of the intrigue: once we know who murdered, the point of reading the 
remainder is questionable. This is of course a standard picture of a first grade (or 
naïve) approach to narrative fiction, where literary value, however distinct from the 
mere curiosity of the plot, is not completely autonomous from it. The pleasure of 
discovering “what happens next”, if, perhaps, conversely proportional (in its share 
in the sum of pleasures offered by the reading) to the literary artwork’s and the 
reader’s refinement, can still be considered a typical feature of most traditional 
narrative.  
Here the reader’s curiosity has a different vector: instead of being linear, i. e. 
concentrated on the progression and resolution of the plot, it develops inwards: how 
this formal game of layers and media with the plot will end up; the plot is, indeed, 
an element of this higher-level interplay, and as such it is not deprived of some 
proper “linear” interest. But, arguably, it is of lesser importance within the overall 
appeal of the piece. This is why I think that knowing the plot in advance by no 
means could spoil the reader’s pleasures of Libera’s Toccata. It works well within 
the interpretation that by its very nature as an object of enjoyment it has something 
non-narrative to it, in the way that the recounted mythos (plot) is not the main 
residue of interest or (alternatively) that the proper plot is some other series of 
events, different from than the one told206. 
                                               
206 Cf.: “If it were so that it ended, it wouldn’t be sufficiently interesting, and above all closed”. Why on earth, 
for a piece of fiction, being “closed” would be a value, one “above all” and in particular – above being 
interesting? Well, of course this passage emphasizes its formal “completeness”, which doesn’t necessarily yet 
point towards music. But in this repetition “after years and years” we recognize a structural imitation of 
Schumann’s Toccata. There is no obvious link between these two formal devices, for someone who never heard 
Platerian exegeses. But for us, who became his pupils as well for a while, just as for the two elderly men who 
met again, after nearly fifty years, at the dusk of their “parallel stories” – the sense of this repetition and of the 
closing it offers is so strikingly clear, that by the time we reach the last words: “A kiedy dojechał wreszcie do 
owego momentu, na którym profesor śpiewał: „Jak to przeminęło! Jak to przeminęło!… Jakby wczoraj się 
zaczęło!”, a do którego ja wcześniej odniosłem pamiętne słowa „on się tam jakby z czymś żegna”, 
spostrzegłem, że po policzku spływa mu wolno łza” the reader might advert that a tear is flowing down his own 
cheek as well. „I na tym właściwie się kończy ta młodzieńcza przygoda. Przygoda, lecz nie historia. Gdyby się 
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Having made these observations regarding musical and literary spoilers (and 
having thus warned her who does not trust this account), let us now freely proceed 
with no further delay. 
A Word on The Plot and First Remarks on Textual Music 
The plot, in a briefest outline is this. The protagonists are three: the narrator, a 
young adept of a Music High School (Liceum Muzyczne) somewhere in communist 
Poland, his talented colleague Slavek B.207 and their respectable piano teacher, 
                                               
na tym kończyła, nie byłaby dość ciekawa, a nade wszystko zamknięta. Gdyby to miało być wszystko, nie 
byłoby – mimo wszystko – warte opowiadania” (p.117) 
207 Is this a nomen omen? Possibly so, but there is no certainty here. Etymologically, Sławek recalls the Slavic 
root sław- meaning “to praise” and having as noun derivates “sława” – ‘glory’, ‘fame’. It would be bitterly 
ironic to read it in the light of the protagonist’s surname’s initial, B, which would suggest ‘fame of the B. 
category’, a second class fame, which would quite correspond to Sławek’s vain triumph at the diploma recital, 
the promising beginnings of his soloistic career and his eventual fate of a High School piano teacher. The 
conclusive phrase of the introductory paragraph, contains a splendid description (ekphrasis) of the usual 
cacophony of different instruments practicing one hears in the vicinity of a music school, and interpreting it as 
expressive of “ambition and the striving for mastery. This inexhaustible practicing was supposed to bear fruit: 
career, splendor, fame”. The last word is ‘sława’ (in accusative). Orig. “Marzenia o perfekcji, nadziei na 
uznanie. Bo w owych monologach każdego z instrumentów słyszało się ambicję i pragnienie mistrzostwa. 
To niestrudzone ćwiczenie miało przynieść owoce: karierę, splendor, sławę”, p. 88. Furthermore, his fate 
and his local, short-lasting fame, are built upon his imitation of his friend’s imitation of an interpretation by 
another pianist, also bearing a Slavonic name composed with the same root: Światosław (Swiatoslav Richter). 
This name could be read, through a (false, perhaps) etymological figure, as meaning ‘World Famous’ (‘świat’ 
means ‘world’). The contrast between both characters would then be striking and most illuminating. Consider 
their collocation within the complex constellation of intermedial imitations of and through interpretations 
constituted by Libera’s text. Both Slavek and Sviatoslav Richter are objects of literary imitation within the 
Novella, but just as one is a real pianist and the other a literary fiction, also within the fiction Richter is the real, 
world famous pianist, while Slavek manages only to assicure himself this B. class sort of local esteem, and 
even this thanks to the said imitation of imitation of Richter’s real concert interpretation of the title Toccata 
(you can listen to this LP yourself, if you please, this concert really took place in Warsaw in 1959). Such a 
complex specular structure would certainly reflect, on one hand, the very intermedial condition of the discussed 
work, and, on the other hand, its “surface subject”, namely the meditation of the young pianist’s fate, as 
consecrated to quite ceasless emulation of the masters, in the (statistically: vain) hope of becoming one day a 
world-famous soloist. Such two-level interpretability of an artistic structure, where the metareflection on the 
work’s internal constitution depends on the very same structures that reflect on its literary “subject” – is a most 
praiseworthy quality, typically indicative of high artistic value. 
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Professor Adam Plater. After the last summer holidays before the final year, at the 
end of their first lesson in September, the Professor decides to modify the 
programme of their diploma recital: instead of an impromptu by Schubert as the 
final piece, he tells them to read Schumann’s Toccata op. 7 (p.73). The recital will 
close their middle musical education and the outcome of the examination will 
determine their future: who gets an excellent grade has chances to continue the 
musical career at the Academy, who does not – will need to change life plans. Now 
the core of the first part of the Toccata are two lessons where two musical 
ekphraseis are introduced: first – in abstracto, when Schumann’s composition as 
such is briefly described by the narrator himself, with a stress on its technical 
difficulties208, second – in concreto, when Plater plays it to his pupils and reveals 
to them that the piece is a “pianistic novella on the art of piano”. He says: “It’s a 
singular piece. A novelette for piano on the art of piano. Music about a pianist. A 
sonic portrait of a musician. A portrait expressing his life and fate. Do you hear it? 
He starts his day. He wakes up, wears his morning gown and there he is by his 
instrument, there he plays, warms up his fingers: scales, arpeggios, finger 
excersises. Legato, staccato, smorzando. […] Finally, when his hands are quite 
warmed up, he concedes himself bashfully a short moment of release and he mutters 
himself the melody of his life, the monogram of his fate – the fate of a pianist, a 
musician. There,… here, this leitmotiv here… this sequence of ten notes 
                                               
208 But even in this first apparently technical description, where the narrator presents it as a difficult study, the 
future programmatic grain is introduced in the form of a genologic reflection. For the narrator it’s more of a 
piano study, than a pièce à choix libre, according to its place at the end of the standard diploma program where 
it substitutes the impromptu. This makes him reproach the Professor during the following lesson: “you added 
us, Sir, one more study; and a monstrously difficult one!”. The narrator provides an imaginative simile when 
he says: it is “like a model warm up: a piece imitating the exemplary training of the pianist”. It makes the reader 
think of Camille Saint-Saëns’s Le carnaval des animaux, which in the middle of this veritable zoo places a 
clear parody of the everyday pianistic warm-up with school-style scales and arpeggios and comic effects of 
anger at committing errors. Orig.: “W całości jest to jakby modelowa rozgrzewka: utwór imitujący 
wzorcowy trening pianisty, zawierający w sobie podstawowe zadania techniczne i rytmiczne […] Dodał nam 
pan profesor jeszcze jedną etiudę – powiedziałem z wyrzutem na wstępie kolejnej lekcji – i to potwornie trudną” 
(pp.73-74) 
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accentuated iambically: ta ta ta-ta ta-ta ta-ta ta-ta” (p.80, all translations mine – 
J.C.). 
  Transported completely by his pedagogical furore, Plater sings along bizarre 
words to the four-bar main motif floating over the motoric semiquavers: 
 
 When the great day comes, Slavek gets an excellent grade and the narrator who 
plays right after him, after having performed brilliantly through the whole 
programme (two studies by Chopin, Bach’s prelude and fugue and a Bethoveenian 
sonata) – fails in the final Toccata. What actually happens there and makes him 
interrupt the performance is a very ambiguous matter, having to do with Plater’s 
crazy Lieder209. 
                                               
209 I coined this phrase as equivalent to the Narrator’s preoccupied “wariackie śpiewy” (p.82, 99), rendering 
‘śpiewy’ (singing) through ‘Lieder’ in order to emphasize the intersemiotic character of the operation, converse 
to Mendelssohn’s Lieder ohne Wörter. The same adjective is used “wariacka opowieść”, “crazy tale” describing 
Plater’s programmatic “revelation”, “sermon”(p.89). 
Figure 2 “Playy-ing the tone – I’ll never be alone!” 
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 During the performance, he gets increasingly distracted by some voice which 
seemingly sings along to the echoing “prologue” of the “leitmotif”: 
“Doon’t be deceived…  
doon’t be decived…” 
and then, accelerando, as in a refrain: 
“doon’t be… doon’t be… […]” (p.112) 
This distraction becomes obsessive, “Who  o n ea r t h  is  mo v ing  t he ir  
l ip s  t he r e !” (p.113) to the point when the narrator “like Orpheus in Hades” turns 
his head towards the jury (p.114) to notice that nobody is making any faces nor 
moving lips, as he suspected. Only the Professor nodded with disappointment at 
what he took for a bravoure gesture of his over-self-confident pupil.  
 
Figure 3 “Don’t be deceived…” - textual… 
 
…and then, precisely on the leitmotive-prologue bars and the six 
times repeated echo of the last notes, on that downward fourth which 
sounded to my ears with the words “doon’t be… doon’t be…” 
don’t be… don’t be … don’t be … don’t! 
my train crashed210. 
                                               
210 A. Libera, Toccata C-dur, [in:] Niech się panu darzy, Biblioteka WIĘZI, Warszawa 2013, p. 114. All 
translations, including the lyrics of the „crazy Lieder” are mine – J.C. 
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The narrator decides to give up piano and, “like the Schumann le reveur”, starts 
studying law (p.115). Slavek makes it to the Academy. The epilogue comes “nearly 
fifty years” later (p.117), after decades spent abroad, on the western side of the Iron 
Curtain, resumed only very briefly211. The narrator says yes to an invitation for a 
                                               
211 The leap, most significantly, is introduced by the remark: “… I didn’t realize that from then on I were not 
to hear this piece for many, many years” (p.117). An Italian reviewer of Libera’s Toccata in do maggiore, has 
strongly criticized this leap: “A quel punto come la composizione si arresta e involontariamente (?) scoppia 
la bolla di candore e prosa coinvolgente che finora Libera è stato in grado di tirare fuori. La storia subisce 
il classico passo in avanti di anni [...] E il romanzo si chiude su di loro, sui racconti delle rispettive vite, con 
una frettolosità che dispiace e che chiude la storia con l’ennesima esecuzione da parte di Slavek della 
Toccata in do maggiore. In sintesi, La Toccata in do maggiore non è onestamente un romanzo indimenticabile 
e Libera dimostra uno iato piuttosto curioso tra la sua apprezzata capacità di interpretare Beckett e 
quella, di cui è quasi del tutto privo, di osservare il presente e dare alla sua narrativa lo spessore che certi 
spaccati storico-culturali meriterebbero” Greco, Salvatore. 2015. „‘La Toccata in do maggiore’ di Antoni 
Libera.” PoloniCult. Un blog italiano di cultura polacca. http://polonicult.com/la-toccata-in-do-maggiore-di-
antoni-libera/. This criticism is entirely misplaced, as it ignores completely the formal motivation of this formal 
development and its textual bases within the text itself. The second motive was quoted above – simply if the 
protagonist of the narration is the Toccata itself, then there is no point in narrating years when it didn’t resound. 
But the first and most important one is to be found in Plater’s exegesis of the Toccata. (The Pedagogue explains 
“as if in a transe”:) “Ta repetycja to chwyt na zmianę skali czasu: z wyrywkowej na pełną, z „dniowej” na 
Figure 4 … and Liederised. 
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school reunion, comes back to Poland and finds his old colleague there. Plater has 
died thirty years ago: now Slavek teaches piano. In the final scene, in his office, he 
plays the Toccata once more. During this last performance, the narrator reflects 
ambiguously on both biographies. At first, his own success, money, family, travels, 
career abroad – strike him in contrast with Slavek’s humble teaching position in the 
sad communist reality, unfulfilled ambitions of great soloist career and a lonely life 
devoted to pupils in a mediocre institution. But then, in response to the repetition 
of the first part of the Toccata (in lights of its Platerian exegesis), he realises in this 
life consecrated to every day piano practice “something more than just the trait of 
unfulfilment and vain routine – something touchingly sublime: a sense of self-
sufficiency, a sense of « raw happiness »” (p.126). He is struck by the vanity of all 
these decades of his own mundane occupations when compared to Slavek’s music. 
The last chord of Libera’s piece is unresolved vanitas and nostalghia touching both 
perspectives.  
 Musical Appearances: n Ways in Which Music Makes 
it Into the Text 
Libera masterfully combines extreme narrative density with simplicity of 
plain, familiar music-school style, great renditions of particular rituals and 
linguistic habits typical of this musical milieu212. In one short piece (the reader has 
                                               
„całożyciową”. To tak jak w opowieści narrator czasem przechodzi od długiego opisu jakiegoś ciągu zdarzeń 
do krótkiego streszczenia jakiejś całej epoki. „I tak toczyły się dni… I tak mu od tej pory potoczyło się życie…” 
212 The role of this „perpheral”, „institutional” musicality should by no means be downplayed. These contextual 
settings frame and set the musicalisation of the text proper, just as the socio-institutional aspects of musical life 
frame and condition our experience of music in the real life. Here recent philosophy of music comes as an 
important aid, as it points convincingly to how these institutional „external” aspects regulating musical life 
actually shape music itself. The paradigmatic change in musical aesthetics of perception after 1800 was 
analysed as a result of the rise of public concerts and concert halls, cf. L. Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of 
Musical Works, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1992. Also Kivy advocated the idea of the „Great divide” in 
music, which was criticised by Young. Cf. J.O. Young, The ‘Great Divide’ in Music, „British Journal of 
Aesthetics”, 2005, t.45, no 2, pp. 175–184; P. Kivy, Sounding Off. Eleven Essays in the Philosophy of Music..., 
op. cit. Memorable ekphraseis of concerts and especially of operatic performances, such as in Mann’s 
Walsüngenblut or of the Nazi-organized spectacles in the Zoppot Waldoper in the thirties in Huelle’s Śpiewaj 
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the impression that every word and phrase is somehow necessary where it is, as if 
dependent from some non-referential order rules) Libera combines canonical 
strategies of musical mystification as means of musicalization with some innovative 
techniques. In the Buddenbrooks music kills Hanno, purporting the “fall of the 
Family”: an ambiguous tragedy. And in Doktor Faustus, apart from music playing 
a similar decisive role, Kretzschmar’s lectures prepare and corroborate Zeitblom’s 
intermedial maneuvers and muscobiographical equations, just like Plater’s 
theatrical and inspired lessons anticipate and – in a way – cause the recital’s 
breakdown. His crazy Lieder result literally fatal for his pupils. The spectacular 
element of intersemiotic quotations comes together with straightforward yet 
innovative parallel strategies of typographic rendition of the musical elements to 
the extent that even a reader with no score reading skill will get some rhythmic idea 
of how Schumann’s toccata sounds like. Plater’s “Liederisation” of pure music as 
response to programmatic “instrumental lyric” creates a vindictive demon (voice) 
which is responsible for the catastrophe during the recital. Richter’s interpretation, 
first “borrowed” by the Narrator and then “stolen” by Slavek gains its plasticity as 
an autonomous work of musical interpretation. These procedures cannot remain 
unnoticed by the attentive reader, as they are overtly thematized in the dialogues. 
Richter’s interpretation, itself being a rendition of Schumann’s op. 7, can be 
analyzed as a multiple imitation: played by himself -> (1) recorded and played back 
from the LP -> (2) “parodied” by the Narrator -> (3) “borrowed” and subsequently 
“stolen” by Slavek. This process is visible to the agent and dividable in distinct 
imitatable elements. As such, in its complex imitative nature, it plays a decisive role 
in the tragic peripatheia.  
                                               
ogrody or even the relatively „innocent” lenghthy descriptions of Venetian operatic life from Sand’s Consuelo 
– they all gain strictly musical importance thanks to this theoretical understanding provided by philosophy. 
They can be regarded as something aesthetically more functional, than a mere „scene from the opera house”, if 
combined with other musicalization techniques (arguably: it is the case of Mann and of Huelle, to much a lesser 
extent traceable in Sand). See: T. Mann, Frühe Erzählungen 1893-1912 [Wälsungenblut; Der Tod in Venedig; 
Tristan; Tonio Kröger et al.], S. Fischer 2002; P. Huelle, Śpiewaj ogrody, Znak, Kraków 2014. 
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Fictionalizing music emerges here once more as a crucial element of 
musicalizing fiction (– in a lens it shows what happened on larger scale: consider 
the role of Wagnerian Leitmotiv technique in the new opportunities it created for 
the writers imitating music). This is obviously a manipulative petitio principii: first 
you show music as it were literature, you convince your reader and seduce him into 
this fiction and second – you imitate this literary element ascribed to music, duping 
your prey into a splendid intermedial illusion. But if a mystification, this 
mechanism works on the level of intentional calibration – and thus entices 
perception more musico in the spirit ascribed discursively to the music itself. The 
use of this “innocent” technical trick does not oblige musicalized fiction to take 
anti-formalist stances. Quite the opposite: the formalist paradigm is precious and 
often voiced, as it offers high rewards to literature capable of imitating it. 
Libera’s Toccata analyzed through Petermann’s New Model of 
Intermediality (Expanded and Discussed) 
 
 Let us use the new model of intermediality proposed, examined and defended 
by Petermann to see which elements of textual imitation of music can we observe 
through its lens. The advantage her approach has over the models it is based on 
(Wolf, Rajewsky) is that instead of nuancing the various types of intermediality, it 
offers a flexible analytic tool that can be used to figure out which features that it 
maps in general are effectively present in a particular case. I take it for granted that 
this model, however developed within her work on musical novels, can be applied 
with no systematic modification to novellas and other forms of shorter fiction. The 
purpose of applying the model here is twofold: on one hand, it has a heuristic value, 
for it leads to a systematic identification of parameters that interest us; on the other 
hand it can be tested in action and confronted with the elements salient in Libera’s 
novella but not fitting in the categories it proposes.  
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It is most helpful to distinguish sharply textual IMITATION from 
THEMATIZATION of musical features213. For Aristotle both showing, imitating in 
gesture or tone of voice, acting, telling and describing were all species of μίμησις, 
proper to different τεχναί (arts). It is however useful to keep the two apart – like 
Plato, who distinguished mimesis from diegesis, the latter corresponding roughly 
to the sphere of thematization. This enables to focus on fiction made more musico, 
imitating music in the way it is made, it is performed and it is attended to - rather 
than just treating musical subjects (falling as well in these categories) in narration. 
Having this in mind we must however emphasize that both procedures often go 
together and cases of imitation with no element of thematization are rare and 
theoretically problematic (the other way round it is not quite the case). This 
aesthetic focus of Petermann’s study, in contrast with earlier, more sign- and 
communication-oriented typologies of intermediality, harmonizes with our own 
approach. 
In her exploration of the musical novel, Petermann deals with two types of 
textual imitations of music: novels imitating features of a whole musical genre, in 
her case: jazz and blues, the second: consecrated to novels “based on a particular 
piece of music”, which in her study case are J. S. Bach’s Goldberg Variations BWV 
988. The key concept of her analyses is imitation, taking as object “musical 
structure, performance, and reception”. Depending on the context it is treated as a 
derivative/generative structural model, where it consists of mimetising some 
structural features of a musical work, for instance, the form of an air and thirty 
variations on its harmonic pattern followed by a final repetition da capo of the air. 
When it comes to performance, literary imitation is at most times co-present with 
thematization: describing performances, making them a part of the plot or even 
setting the whole narration “to them”, as it is the case in Nancy Huston’s Goldberg 
                                               
213 Categories theorized by W. Wolf, The Musicalization of Fiction: A Study in the Theory and History of 
Intermediality..., op. cit.; E. Petermann, The Musical Novel. Imitation of Musical Structure, Performance, and 
Reception in Contemporary Fiction..., op. cit.. 
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Variations214. In this novel the whole narration can be interpreted as a thought 
stream “upon the piece”, “upon” literally in the sense that it is performed 
simultaneously with the music, just as in BWV 988 the new musical material of 
subsequent variations is simultaneously presented with the constant reiteration of 
the harmonic progression. 
The following detailed analysys takes the form hierarchic table, adapted from 
Petermann’s model; I hope it is still the clearest way of organizing the material. 
Tabula 
 Intersemiotic Relations within A. Libera's Toccata in C Major 
A. Intramediality (verbal text / verbal text) 
1. [Thematization*] Schumann's Biography read by Slavek 
2. [Imitation**] Use of musicalization techniques present in other 
literary texts - Mann215 
a) Plater -> Kretzschmar 
b) Music as an agent: Hanno's Death 
B. Intermediality (literature / music) 
1. Thematization 
a) Homonymous Title with a musical work 
This homonymy introduces paratextual ambiguity: does the title designate 
Schumann’s eponymous op. 7 only as its subject, resp. heroine, or is it to be 
intended architextually (namely: that the work published under this title is a toccata 
itself, just as Schumann’s op. 7.). This ambiguity is a part of the musicalization 
game. The title is perfectly justified in terms of the first answer, and the second is 
geologically problematic, for we are immediately faced with the question of its 
                                               
214 The novel comes in two linguistic versions authored by the bilingual Huston; I read the earlier French text: 
N. Huston, Les Variations Goldberg, Actes Sud, Arles 1997, Babel. 
215 This, being, in Wolf’s terms, a covert feature, emerges in my interpretation here and is not overtly indicated 
in the novella, nor, for that matter, in any other texts by Libera. 
*, ** Asterisks designate a division imposed here by the nature of the analysed text, but absent from the Wolf-
Petermann model. For them Thematization and Imitation are cases of intermediality only. 
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relevance for the form actually displayed by the piece, as understood in musical 
terms. I turn to this in the conclusion. 
b) Description of the work and its 
interpretation216 (I) - Objects  
(1) Toccata op. 7 [real - passim] 
(a) Execution 
(i) Plater's (+sing along) 
(ii) Narrator's (exercise, lesson, 
diploma) 
(iii) Slavek's (lesson, diploma) 
(b) Verbal interpretation (and meta-
interpretation*) 
(i) Plater's (positive217) 
(ii) Narrator's (negative) 
(iii) Slavek's (formalist) 
(c) Recordings: Richter's interpretation 
thematized and „acting” on the level of mythos. 
(i) Autonomous „interpretative 
work” – confirmation of Plater’s 
sermon’s revelation (p.89 + other pieces 
on the cd mentioned) – imitated by: 
(a) The Narrator (lesson, 
pp.103-104) [Plater: “parody”] 
(b) Slavek (diploma) 
(ii) Other interpreters mentioned and 
qualified with epithets (Cziffra, 
Horovitz, p.104) 
                                               
216 Both: (a) performative – execution; (b) discursive – explanation of its sense in programmatic terms. Plater’s 
“crazy Lieder” are a performative setting of (b), transmuting its originary discursiveness (expressed 
linguistically as an argument) into a hybrid hic et nunc (“Lied”). This Frankenstein lives his own life and 
performs his role of an agent within the narrated plot. A reverse process is described in Slavek’s fate, as 
recapitulated in the last scene, under the impression of Slavek’s last execution of the Toccata: “A ja ujrzałem 
go nagle, jak przez te wszystkie lata siedzi przy klawiaturze i niestrudzenie ćwiczy. Ćwiczy, ćwiczy i ćwiczy, 
wciąż na coś licząc i marząc. O recitalach, koncertach, o światowych tournées. A potem już nie marząc, tylko 
patrząc przed siebie. I jedynie słuchając, co wystukują palce” (p.126). Gradually his dreams (on the life of a 
famous pianist) accompanig his insistent practicing fade out and he is left with the music (“what his fingers 
tap”) alone. 
217 Plater’s verbal interpretation is in itself intermedial. Precisely: it is a narrativization, a fictionalization of 
music. And this not only on the diegetic correspondence level (music as symbolizing the young pianist’s fate) 
but also on the structural, technical level (repetition in music explained through its role in construing narration). 
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(2) Chopin – 3 Studies: 
(a)  C major and E major op. 10  
Slavek’s execution during the second lesson, 
narratorial verbal interpretation including 
programme clichés traditionally ascribed to 
these pieces, e.g. “the paroxysm of cough” 
in the famous chromatic cascade scored by 
Chopin ‘con bravura’p.102), 
(b) G-flat minor (in a simile to the Toccata, 
p.104) 
(3) Bach’s Prelude and Fugue 
(4) Beethoven’s Sonata 
(5) Schubert’s Impromptu 
(6) Schumann: Variations on the „Abegg” Theme, 
Studies on a Theme from Paganini, Papillons, Karnaval, 
Phantasienstücke, Kinderszenen, Kreisleriana218, Piano 
Concerto in A minor, Konzertstück, Noveletta in F 
major219 
c) Description of the work and its interpretation 
(II) - Means  
(1) Use of technical musical terms (articulation, 
agogics, dynamics etc.)  – very dense.  
 
Its categorization under the label of thematization is problematic, as these 
score qualifiers are technically parts of musical notation and the borderline between 
“use” and “mention” is hard (or impossible) to draw. 
Special case: “leitmotiv” used in a manipulated way (appropriate only on the 
grounds of Plater’s programmatic interpretation; a self-fulfilling curse reflected in: 
“don’t think you’ll pass…” rationalized later on as an “illusion, a projection of 
one’s own lack of faith” 220 (p.124), which, though, through its action, came out to 
be providential). 
                                               
218 Quoted by the Narrator in the discussion on the interpretation – as examples of the “programmes, legendary 
little plots, that Schumann used to invent for his compositions” (p. 78). 
219 These pieces, according to the booklet of the LP, constituted the program (inclusive of the encores) of 
Swiatoslav Richter’s recital in the Warsaw Philharmonic Hall in the late Fifties. A CD released in 1996 by 
Deutsche Grammophon No 0289 447 4402 6 containing a 1959 recording is available. 
220 Orig.: „iluzja, projekcja własnej niewiary”. 
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(2) Specular use of technical terms of poetics applied 
to musical elements (p. 80): 
 
“Iambic” in order to describe the accentuation of the 10 notes of the 
“leitmotiv”. Inversion of the usual direction of terminological transfer; terms from 
the vocabulary of poetics applied literally to describe an element of music (rhythmic 
accent). 
2. Imitation 
a) Of music as a technique 
(1) Repetitio simplex (shared – on the level of 
situations, places, but also “Homeric epithets” for 
musical elements form the Toccata) and  
(2) variatio (shared mutatis mutandis): 
Example of verbal repetition-variation (the material is a 
verbal interpretation of the Toccata): 
 
– „Że chociaż jest on w C-dur” – wyrecytował Sławek – „i brzmi zasadniczo 
pogodnie, czy wręcz krzykliwie radośnie, jest on w istocie smutny, przerażająco 
smutny” (p.123, a seeming verbatim repetition of narrator’s words, underlined by 
the locutory verb “recited”, and enforced by the enthusiastic “you remember” that 
followed, but actually a changed and more pessimistic version of the original, cf. 
p.79). 
(3) Musical imitation: 3 "voices" stating the 
"subject" repeatedly - fugal technique 
b) Of the toccata 
(1) As musical material (quotes) 
(2) Onomatopoeic and typographic transcription of 
musical features such as metric accent and rhythmic 
relations (e.g. “ta ta ta-ta”): 
 
This technique of sillabic rendition of musical rhythm has its predecessor for 
example in Jerzy Andrzejewski’s 1947/1948 novel Ashes and Diamonds. This 
work, politically engaged on the communist side, critical of the Polish Resistance 
(Armia Krajowa) and very far from any emotional or aesthetic exaltation is 
nontheless full of musical references of different sorts. There is a scene, masterfully 
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reinterpreted in Andrzej Wajda’s 1958 film Ashes and Diamonds, where at dawn, 
at the end of a party in a hotel bar, the majordomo Kotowicz has the insane idea of 
making the band play Chopin’s Polonaise A major op. 53. The piece is quoted (in 
a dialogue between Kotowicz and the band’s pianist) thus:  
„Tam-ta-tam. Ta-ra-tata-tata-tatam…” 
No doubt, the reader is supposed to hear the opening motive of the famous 
piece in these sillables. Indeed, it would be really hard not to221. 
(3) As interpreted verbally (two fates – two readings) 
(4) As "voice" ascribed to its melodic material 
(through the process of “Liederisation”: it becomes a 
decisive agent in mythos - like in Hanno's death in the 
Buddenbrooks)  
(5) Repetition "50 years later" (based on the 
interpretation of its sense in music “leap” – p.81) 
One more execution of the Toccata. 
 
Points 3-5 realize the Mannian postulate of “perfect unity of material” 
between the angelic and the infernal, achieved in Leverkühn’s compositions. 
C. Multimediality  
1. Use of musical notation 
a) Toccata op. 7 [real] 
b) Crazy Lieder [?] 
2. Use of solmization  
a) Toccata op. 7 , octave motive in chromatic 
progression 
                                               
221 J. Andrzejewski, Popiół i diament, [1947;1948 revised version], 1964, 12th. Edit. 
 116 
 
II. Meta-intermediality* 
1. The absolute-program music question raised explicitly 
2. Formalism (Slavek) vs. subtle and philosophically nuanced 
anti-formalism (maybe Langerian symbolism? Plater) 
3. Equations between musical and narrative devices (explicit) 
Note on the categorial addition 
Thematization not of music as such, but of intermedial phenomena and 
practices in general should be considered separately. It needs to be singled out in 
the analytic tree, as it has a special musicalizing function, namely, by discussing 
these problems explicitly, it prepares the reader for their better perception within 
the work. The evaluative ‘better’ here is measured primarily with respect to 
aesthetic axiology (if it manages to have this attention-callibrating effect on the 
reader) and not necessarily to scholarly accuracy or factual truth. This means that 
these effects could be achieved also through inaccurate or misleading 
considerations of the intermedial phenomena. They may be performed both by the 
narrator and by the charcacters.  
Miscellaneous points (Analysys) 
Homeric epithets / musical labels: 
a. potwornie trudna etiuda – potworna kaskada akordów – 
potworna toccata (p.123) 
b. [KA]222 – potworna / straszna / finalna kaskada akordów 
c. piekielna toccata (pp.76, 92, 97) 
                                               
222 [KA], [CM] and [L]: These are concrete musical units from Schumann’s Toccata, represented by the listed 
epithets and recognizable immediately as such in the ear of the reader through the “education” it receives within 
the text. 
 117 
 
d. [CM] – cudowna melodia / melodyjka [w środkowej części 
toccaty – bars 117-132 in Schumann] (p.77,110) 
i. kiedy mniej więcej w środku brzmiała przez chwilę 
stacatto – najpierw w moll, potem w dur – urzekająca 
fraza: jedyna pełna melodia w tym ćwiczebnym 
utworze (p.77). 
ii. Na fali tego nastroju… o, tego espressivo… wykwita 
niespodzianie cud muzyki: melodia, urzekająco 
prosta, oparta na trzech tonach w chromatycznej 
progresji (p.83). 
iii. cudowne syrenie głosy (p.111), [these wonders are 
ambiguous, their wonderful charm may result – as it 
actually does in the novella – syrenic deviative call of 
the abyss] 
e. [L] – czterotaktowy lejtmotyw (p.77) / wracający motyw 
(p.77) / [ten / ów / wiadomy / Φ ] lejtmotyw (p.80, 81, 87 – 
Plater’s exegesis; 104, 105; 107 – deal scene; 110 – Slavek’s 
diploma recital, narrator overhearing through the door of the 
school Concert Hall; 112, 112, 113, 114, 114 – narrator’s own 
recital; 124 – discursive reminiscence, in the final dialogue; 
126 – Slavek’s final execution in the cabinet) / [ów / wiadomy 
/ ów] refren (pp.82,85,99) 
i. „Muzyki czar to jest niebiański dar” (p.82) [heavenly 
content of the little motif at the heart (‘divine 
apogeum’, p.82) of the ‘infernal’ and ‘monstruous’, 
‘terrible’ toccata] 
ii. […] lejtmotyw. Doprawdy słychać w nim było głos 
szczęśliwej pokory i „surowego szczęścia” (p.110). 
iii. nucąc sobie swoją piosnkę-modlitwę (p.82) 
iv. niezrażony, nuci sobie swój hymn, swoje życiowe credo – 
(p.85) 
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i. Ale przed pierwszą woltą – w miejscu, gdzie kilka razy 
powtarza się jak echo sam prolog lejtmotywu (to skoczne 
„ta ta ta-ta”) 
Plater in the Kretzchmar function 
In pages 69-70 we find the first characterization of Plater: (1) the gift of 
elocution, characterized elsewhere (p. 79) as “his magical language”; (2) apart from 
being a pianist, he taught the “musical literature” classes. This is a standard class in 
all lower grade music schools in Poland; but in the intermedial context of the 
novella Plater’s double identity (professor of piano and of musical literature) is 
most telling. (3) Further intermedial clue corroborating our working hypothesis 
linking Libera’s technique with drama: “he had something of an actor. Lessons with 
him – it was theater”: 
posiadał też rzadką wiedzę z zakresu historii muzyki i 
biografistyki, a przy tym dar wymowy. Potrafił bardzo ciekawie i 
barwnie opowiadać, głównie o sławnych artystach – o wielkich 
kompozytorach, o ich wyczynach twórczych i życiowych dziwactwach 
– lecz i o innych sprawach, niekiedy abstrakcyjnych, związanych z 
formą utworów, harmonią i kontrapunktem. Stąd też jego zajęcia z 
literatury muzycznej cieszyły się niezmiennie ogromnym 
powodzeniem. Słuchano go z podziwem, nieledwie uwielbieniem. Miał 
w sobie coś z aktora. Lekcje z nim to był teatr223. 
Lessons with Plater are described as spectacles, with some je ne sais quoi 
d’ineffable to it: 
Przedziwny to był spektakl. Niby pokaz rzemiosła, a jednak 
nie tylko to, bo było w tym coś jeszcze, choć trudno powiedzieć co. 
Coś z innego porządku, który wymyka się słowom. Dawało się to 
odczuć zwłaszcza w finale utworu, a w pełni dotarło do nas, kiedy 
profesor skończywszy, ni stąd, ni zowąd zapytał: 
                                               
223 A. Libera, „Toccata C-dur”, op. cit., p. 70. 
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– No, zrozumieliście? 
This is an utmost paradox: the musical je ne sais quoi d’ineffable is elicited 
by the Professor’s programmatic (i.e. “literary”) interpretation of the toccata. 
Precisely in this moment the unexpected question comes: “So, did you get it”? The 
startled Slavek replies, after a while of silence: “What, Sir?”:  
Zapadła chwila ciszy, po czym strapiony Sławek odezwał się 
niepewnie: 
– Co, panie profesorze? 
– No, jak to co? – profesor uśmiechnął się pobłażliwie. – O czym 
jest ten kawałek. O co właściwie w nim chodzi. 
“What is this piece about. What is it actually about”. This is the introduction 
to a discussion, where Slavek opposes such programmatic suggestions, quoting the 
professor himself.  
Conclusion 
Libera’s novella is a piece of prose which contains genuine musical elements, 
namely: melodic material taken from Schumann that resounds in the reader’s inner 
ear alongside with Professor Plater’s insane little Lieder, repeted over and over 
again. These Lieder led the protagonist towards the irresistible catastrophe that 
decided his fate. The necessity of such an andamento is both tragic and musical: 
marked by the irrefutable iron consequence of counterpoint and destiny – 
essentially irreversible224. Libera’s achievement should not be diminished by its 
multimedial dimension being overt. Musical notation is used first as an illustration, 
second as an integral part of the narration complementing words; third as a part 
ostensibly substituted in consecutive occurrences by its verbal equivalents 
                                               
224 Even if it can be argued that through the rigorous mathematical form displayed by the counterpointistic 
consequence, the temporal irreversibility is overcome by the very process that establishes it. The sound relations 
being governed by eternal (a-temporal) proportions make everything reversible in the sense of possible 
transformations. This is most evident in regular palindromic structures within regular canons and canonic 
imitations such as in Bach’s Musikalisches Opfer, where the second voice of the canon is in retrograde, 
introducing thus an eternal circularity and identity of a sequence and its reverse movement. 
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according to the arbitrary convention established by the text itself (through Prof. 
Plater’s lessons225, the protagonist’s peculiar interpretations and through the 
recurrence of the “homeric epithets” analysed above as [KA], [CM], [L], 
corresponding to precise melodic [CM], [L] and harmonic [KA] elements of the 
toccata). In the climax moment of the tragic peripeteia, when the protagonist hears 
the sirenic voice tempting him into the abyss, the music – when it is most intense – 
is first evoked in words and only afterwards repeated within the modified score. But 
what is even more important: the scene as a whole is an execution of the musical 
score provided by the novella, as the “crazy Lieder” are really notated as Lieder, 
that is, with a verbal text subscribed under a precise melodic voice – an instrumental 
voice, the voice of the piano, which through this complex operations gains full 
agency: he words inscribed in the score are uttered in concerto (sic!), and, to be 
sure, not by a human voice. 
Having made these observations I would advocate a position that accepts the 
main motivations of “aural-sonicism” (presented in the introductory chapters as an 
element of the current standard view on music) and rejecting only its dogmatic 
consequences. There is irreducibly musical understanding and there is beauty 
which is purely musical. Both are known and given to us humans within the “aural-
sonicism” contingent framework which, however, should not be absolutized. For 
the true formalist cannot be too much attached to the matter, formed by the forms 
he places at the core of his analysis of beauty. 
But if this is music – what kind of music, what form it displays and in what 
relation does it stand with respect to Schumann’s op. 7? 
                                               
225 They are „master interpretations” in the context diegetically established by the narration; Plater, by his 
professorial position, personal authority, erudition and esteem in the eyes of his pupils is invested with the 
necessary powers to “make things with words” to use the title Austin’s celebrated work, or, more precisely, to 
“make sounds speak words”, to grant his crazy intermedial interpretations the stamp of effectivity. In this 
professorial role and intermedial the role of this role (!) Plater resembles Mann’s Kretschmar (who himself, in 
Mann, is even homonymous with Kretschmar, the celebrated authority in musical hermeneutics).  
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Libera’s piece doesn’t replicate the structural outline of the eponymous 
toccata226; rather – it plays with its musical material constituting an independent 
variation on its themes. Just like in the variation technique in traditional music it 
quotes the themes from their source verbatim in the first place and then elaborates 
them applying the composer’s own style and texture making up for a new 
composition. This new composition here combines two semiotic systems on the 
level of producing its score. As a result we get a score for a particular silent 
performance of music and narrative entwined. Musical executions are crucial events 
of the whole plot (mythos) and cannot be reduced to something non-musical without 
distorting the piece’s organic coherence and beauty. 
* 
Beckett on Joyce: “Here form is content, content is form. You complain that 
this stuff is not written in English. It is not written at all. It is not to be read – or 
rather it is not only to be read. It is to be looked at and listened to. His writing is not 
about something; it is that something itself227 
 
 
 
  
                                               
226 Even if the general structure of repetitions could accommodate such a reading. Or maybe this is a three-part 
free fugal form following the toccata? Such motivic connections in pairs toccata-fugue or prelude-fugue are 
rare, but not inexistent in the history of music. Actually, one of the examples is to be found in Clara Schumann’s 
toccata and fugue op. 16 No 3. Suggestion that would enforce the global reading of the piece as an independent 
musical composition and not just a formal derivate (even if Linda Hutcheon in her Theory of Adaptation quoted 
apud Petermann, Ibid. might be right that “coming second is not to be secondary or inferior [nor] o be first is 
not to be originary and authoritative”). I feel that the authorial intention was to create a formal resemblance 
between Schumann piece, “the pianistic Novella on the art of piano” to his own Toccata, that is, the novella. 
Still its facture, the constant presence of three autonomous voices (and the fourth, Richter’s, which speaks only 
over a limited timespan  
227 S. Beckett, Dante . . . Bruno. Vico.. Joyce, [in:] Our Exagmination Round His Factification for Incamination 
of Work in Progress, Faber and Faber, London 1979, p. 14. 
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Chapter 5. From Finneganów Tren to Da capo al 
Finne – More Than a Translation 
I am (…) interested in testing (…) the axiom that  
Finnegans Wake is literature because it contains letters 
Krzysztof Bartnicki228 
Introduction 
We are presented with a whole range of disturbing problems by the 
provocative work of Krzysztof Bartnicki (born 1971 in Opole, Poland).  He is 
among the few people in the world who offered a full translation of Joyce’s 
Finnegans Wake into another language229, making Polish the seventh since the 
original’s publication in 1939230. Yet what will be my focus in this chapter is his 
successive intermedial engagement with Joyce’s text, rather than the translation 
itself. In the first brief section I will describe Bartnicki’s work along most simple 
and down to earth lines, exposing its conceptual elements to the reader and 
providing references to the audible and textual material available. At this stage I 
will limit any comments to the necessary minimum. In the second part I will 
proceed with a discussion of the work, following the paths indicated by Bartnicki 
himself and counterpointing them critically. In the third part I will conclude giving 
the work a place within the realm of musica textualis. 
 Object Description and Genesis 
A recent exhibition at the Zachęta – National Gallery of Art in Warsaw (Życie. 
Instrukcja, 04.02.2017-23.04.2017, curator: Jadwiga Sawicka) confronted the 
                                               
228 K. Bartnicki, Da capo al Fin♫e, 2016. I read “contains” here as “is made of” or “contains almost 
exclusively”, as otherwise it would make little sense, both with respect to received ideas (“axioms”) on the 
essential features of literature and music; and with respect to Bartnicki’s actual work, as analyzed in this 
chapter. 
229 The question of the work’s original language and of the translation languages respectively is a thorny one 
in this case. See the section What Gets Lost in Translation below. 
230 Cf. J. Kearns, Finneganów tren, Da Capo al Finne, and Finnegans _ake Krzysztof Bartnicki, translation 
and authorship, [in:] Authorizing Translation, ed by. M. Woods, Routledge, New York 2017, pp. 96–113. 
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visitors with a group of audio/visuo/textual artefacts embodying/communicating 
Bartnicki’s artistic work upon Joyce following the publication of his translation. It 
is a constellation of recordings, texts and events presented under the title Bartnicki’s 
Variations on Joyce’s Variations on Various Themes231 (Work in Progress232, 2012 
– 2017). The core idea from which all the successive realizations and modification 
stem – is to reduce the text of Finnegans wake into a musical cryptogram, derived 
from the original through a rigorous application of a clearly defined sign-selection 
procedure. I will describe the procedure and its variants in the detailed discussion 
below.  
Bartnicki, after ten years of translator’s work and fervent study on Finnegans 
Wake felt forced to admit that, even if he succeeded in publishing it in Polish as 
Finneganów tren, he fails to appreciate this impressive work qua literature233. He 
felt urged to approach it in some other manner, in a way that would do it experiential 
and intellectual justice, to perform it in a thought-provoking way. This impulse can 
perhaps be interpreted as a striving created by Joyce’s work itself, inscribed by him 
into the text by the utmost semantic frustration its readers are notoriously left with. 
If this were true, Bartnicki’s work could appear at least as a legitimate interpretive 
possibility, one among many others, if not as the key to brake the enigma.  
“If it fails as Literature – why don’t we make an effort to hear it as 
Music”, thought Bartnicki. A simple concept and a set of straightforward rules 
                                               
231 The Polish title to be found in the Exhibition Press Materials is as follows: Krzysztof Bartnicki, Wariacje 
Bartnickiego na wariacje Joyce’a na tematy różne, 2012-2017, praca kontynuowana, cf. Życie. Instrukcja. 
Wystawa inspirowana twórczością Georges’a Pereca. Przewodnik po wystawie, Zachęta - Narodowa Galeria 
Sztuki 2017.  
232 This implies both the actual open character of the work and of course suggests its union or continuity with 
the original title of FW used by Joyce before its publication as a whole under the new title. 
233 This blasphemy can shock devoted Joyceans, especially if it comes from the mouth of one of seven or so 
people on the Globe who managed to publish an entire translation of FW. Cf. his Foreword to the English 
Edition, where he says “Admit, in simplified Quintilian terms, that literature is meant to teach, move, or please 
– to convey information, didactic patterns, or emotions – and see that James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake (FW) 
fails as a literary text”, K. Bartnicki, „Da capo al Fin♫e”, op. cit. 
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governing mechanical operations on (one of the versions234 of) the Joycean text 
permitted him to generate new and unusual versions of this obscure masterpiece. 
These, despite their cryptographic textual support, may turn to be much more 
approachable not only to Bartnicki himself, but, potentially, to the public as well, 
than the original work. His reading of Finnegans Wake is not a reading through its 
notoriously unclear meanings, but despite them, in a procedure called by Bartnicki 
reduction. It consists of rewriting Joyce’s text faithfully with the omission of 
musically insignificant signs. Now this requires a decision on which typographic 
elements contained in FW are musically interpretable and how. Two different 
reduction rules are to be found in Bartnicki’s to-date work: (1) the simpler one in 
“Da capo al Finne” (2012, 2016), a book presented at the exibition, where the set 
of letters taken as corresponding to musical sounds consists of soundnames of the 
diatonic scale plus H (C, D, E, F,  G, A, B, H235) and the more complex one (2) in 
“F _ NNEGANS _ A _ E: Stuite in the Key of Ш”, where the list of musically 
meaningful signs and sign combinations is much longer, as it includes not only 
single letters but also combinations thereof and accepts musical sign-to-sound 
mappings other than the Western European letter notation (for details and 
discussion, see below). 
                                               
234 He used the Viking/Faber and Faber 1958 Edition of FW, cf. J. Joyce and (arr. by) Krzysztof Bartnicki, F _ 
NNEGANS _ A _ E: Stuite in the Key of Ш (1939), 2014, , 376 (Final word). And K. Bartnicki, „Da capo al 
Fin♫e”, op. cit. (Preface). 
235 In the Central European musical convention H means B and B means B-flat. I turn back critically to this 
below. 
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Illustration 1  Bartnicki: Finnegans _ake, p.175 
 This idea and the reductions presented by Bartnicki as independent 
publications gave issue to a series of (audible) musical pieces set by Bartnicki and 
arranged by Wojciech Kucharczyk (born 1969). In these pieces Bartnicki and 
Kucharczyk transform the sound sequences contained in the reductions from Joyce 
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into imitations236 of existing pieces, pieces often created after the times of Joyce. 
The result is a new work (presented at the exhibition as a work in progress under 
the above mentioned title), beyond doubt, but what sort of work it exactly is and in 
what relation to Joyce it stands will be under scrutiny as soon as we are done with 
its primary presentation and analysis. Further on we will discuss the hypothesis that 
it is a work of musical performance or composition or arrangement. For my 
reconstruction of the work I rely on two primary performative sources, namely, my 
visit to the Zachęta Gallery exhibition237 and a concert-lecture given there on 
16.02.2017 at 18h00 by both artists. In this I am aided by printed primary sources238. 
A second239 group of sources includes various critical texts and interviews given by 
Bartnicki and his commentators. Because of the conceptual character of at least 
some of the works constituting this constellation, a sharp distinction between the 
work and its secondary (auctorial) literature is in this case impossible to draw. 
                                               
236 Imitation, the crucial Platonic term and terminus technicus of polyphony, is also central to Wolf-Petermann’s 
theory, leading sometimes to confusions. For Wolf-Peterman a novel cannot contain genuine imitation (in the 
sense of the terminus technicus of music), at best it can imitate textually the imitation technique. This is may 
be very confusing to the unprepared reader. 
237 The Exibition inspired by the work of Georges Perec was subdivided into four parts (in the order of visit): 
ludic (which was home to Bartnicki’s work), sociological, novelist and autobiographical, followed by the 
Reading Room. This context enables drawing links between Bartnicki’s self imposed generation rules and the 
works of the OuLiPo (Ouvroir de Littérature potentielle) and espetially Perec himself. His lipogram technique 
famously used in the novel La disparition, 1969. is reflected in Bartnicki’s letter elimination procedures (if for 
different reasons). Just as the members of OuLiPo, the author of „Da capo al Fin♫e”, op. cit. reflects through 
his works on the problems of authorship, plagiarism, originality and the nature of artistic creation, fascinated 
by mechanical procedures and acting under self imposed constraintes. 
238 Ibid.; K. Bartnicki, Da capo al Fin♫e, Warszawa 2012, Polish Ed.; J. Joyce, Finnegans _ake. Suite in the 
Key of Ш., 1939. 
239 These positions are out of print and hardly available; I use and quote their Prefaces, Notes and the Final 
Word to Finnegans ake, but I have no access to the full text of this work. The Author explicitly refused himself 
to send me a copy for the purpose of this study, yet he sent me some excerpts from the main text and replied in 
detail to my lenghty letters. 
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 The Work and Its Moments 
But even if somebody were able to hear FW in its true rhyme and rhythm, 
under the spell of song, could literature cast as music be better than music 
cast as itself? 
Krzysztof Bartnicki240 
Text as Score 
In order to read Joyce as music, Bartnicki decided to treat the text as a musical 
score. This decision gave birth to a series of correlated artefacts, all standing in 
some derivative relation to James Joyce’s text, but different in nature. The approach 
to the literary text as a partitura was crucial to our reading of Libera’s intermedial 
novella and compatible with our reading of Iwaszkiewicz’s Fourth Symphony in the 
previous chapters. In both cases the musical reading was shown as responding to a 
vital performative suggestion of the text, an appeal to the readers’ musicality241. 
The reader, within that model, becomes a silent interpret of a verbal structure which 
calls for an aesthetic engagement guided by musical basic concepts of form, 
interaction of interdependent voices, semantic transfer between word and 
melo-harmonic elements in both directions, appeal to the inner ear or musical 
imagination. I argued that these texts as we get them call for this sort of 
concretization. In Ingarden’s terms – some parts of the schemata built up with 
quasi-judgments242, on a holistic analysis may be – and preferably are – understood 
as substitutes of typically musical imperative symbols. And what these substitutes 
command to the silent performer are concretizations of selected musical elements 
potentially composing a formal whole. Such concretizations are governed by the 
text as a verbal score, and not necessarily incarnate as – be it physical or imagined 
– sounds.  
                                               
240 Foreword to: K. Bartnicki, „Da capo al Fin♫e”, op. cit. (Bold – mine, J.C.) 
241 It can be objected, that a genuine musical score must be read in musical terms, such an interpretation is not 
optional, as no work at all emerges when not applied, in contrast with the textual music partituras discussed, 
where standard readings are not musicalm, but linguistic.  
242 Cf. R. Ingarden, The cognition of the literary work of art, Northwestern University Press 1973. 
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Now the Joyce-Bartnicki case is radically different, as the mechanism at work 
is of a qualitatively dissimilar nature: it does not involve semantic engagement with 
the sign-chain understood as a specimen of language. The text becomes a musical 
score not in virtue of the sort of linguistic meanings it offers at a first level of 
understanding, but through a shift in the general decoding paradigm – the set of 
semantic rules used in the basic interpretation of the symbols sequenced in the text.  
Jak się zostawi z oryginalnego tekstu Joyce'a tylko litery 
ABCDEFGH (które mogą oznaczać nuty), to tekst przestaje 'znaczyć', 
a zaczyna grać. W ten sposób literatura zamienia się w muzykę (i 
bardzo dobrze!) 
If from Joyce’s original text you leave in only the letters 
ABCDEFGH (which may signify musical notes), the text ceases to 
‘mean’ and starts to play. In this way literature transforms itself into 
music (and very well so!)243 
More precisely, it is a two-step semantic procedure, where both steps are 
separated by a shift between two semiotic systems. The first-grade linguistic 
understanding moment is at hand, but its role is limited to frustrating negativity, to 
the famous “semantic despair”244 it induces in the reader245. Yet this frustrating 
effect has its key function: it leads the distressed would-be reader to other 
interpretive hypotheses on the symbolic system to which the sign-stream belongs 
and within which it contains meaningful information. Among these we find the one 
Bartnicki chooses to explore, namely, that FW encrypts a long chain of musical 
                                               
243 Quote from: Twórca: Krzysztof Bartnicki, n.d. 
244 Fritz Senn’s evocative term quoted in Christine O’Neill, ed., Joycean Murmoirs: Fritz Senn on James Joyce 
(Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 2007), 34, 271 cit. apud Bartnicki, “Da Capo Al Fin♫e,” 2016. 
245 Cf. the refrain of Pippo Pollina’s song featuring Franco Battiato: “James tell me what do you want to say 
with your book, Finnegan’s Wake [sic!]”P. Pollina, F. Battiato, and Nada, Finnegan’s Wake, 1999. [sic!] The 
title - as well as the lyrics - of this cantautore expression of ‘semantic despair’ distorts the title of its Joycean 
purported eponymous work: cf. the cover of the 1999 album Rossocuore as well as the single album – both 
contain the incriminated Saxon genitive. This error (or “error”) can be explained perhaps through the reference 
to the original Irish ballad. But it seems rather a simple proof of how far one can get in realizing the “non 
reading – other creative engagement” hermeneutic principle with regard to FW. The authors of the song know 
“James’s book” only “by ear” – uncontaminated by the orthography of its very title(!).   
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information246. This constitutes the second step which is brutally illustrated by the 
published form of Joyce’s text after reduction: 
 
 Illustration 2  Da capo al finne, fragm. 
Concert performances of these works (or their recordings) at the present stage 
of Bartnicki’s activity make Joyce’s text as literature absent from the perceptual 
stratum of the pieces: the text is entirely transformed into musical sounds. Nothing, 
in principle, excludes though putting both readings in interrelation. In other words 
– after having performed the above described musicalization procedure that 
necessarily annihilates the literary stratum of the text, it is possible to turn back to 
the original text and explore the potential tensions between the two sign chains. 
This opens doors not only to speculation (Bartnicki himself found some striking 
correspondences between the music he “found” in an excerpt and its textual 
linguistic meaning) enabling further anchoring or textual corroboration of the 
musical interpretive hypothesis, but also to further musicotextual experimentation 
within the final musical compositions that issue. One very simple one would be to 
set the Joycean text to the music excavated from its flesh, maybe in a way that 
would emphasize some parallelism or contrast between the expressive or 
                                               
246 Secondary literature to FW is immense and contains many other interpretative keys and hypotheses, all 
aiming at making sense of what does not make sense on the “surface understanding” level. 
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associational meaning impact of the music and the images evoked linguistically by 
the text. 
Let us sum up the stages of this process in points: 
(1) FW frustrates the basic/surface linguistic comprehension on the part of 
the reader. 
(2) The reader, acting upon the interpretive principle of charity, opts for a 
semiotic switch. His reasoning is this: 
a. FW has surface sense (Premise, from the principle of Charity) 
b. FW has no natural-language surface sense247 (from: experience248 
and research249) 
======== 
FW has surface sense in some other semiotic system than natural 
language. 
Now in order to uncover such a meaning, one has to test the text as if it 
belonged to different known semiotic systems. Let us try to interpret it as having 
musical surface sense and see, or rather hear, what happens. The hypothesis of FW 
containing a sequence of musical information is just one among many other options; 
it is, however, partly corroborated by some indications within the text itself and in 
Joyce’s remarks on it elsewhere. 
 
                                               
247 At least none to match the work’s assumed profundity as a literary artwork (that FW is a profound artwork, 
literary or not, is an additional premise made in this reasoning). Cf. here the discussion on musical profundity 
and general criteria of profundity as formulated by Kivy: J. Levinson, Musical Profundity Misplaced, „The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism”, 1992, t.50, no 1, pp. 58–60; P. Kivy, Another Go at Musical 
Profundity: Stephen Davies and the Game of Chess, „The British Journal of Aesthetics”, 2003, t.43, no 4, pp. 
401–411. 
248 In the case of Bartnicki, it must be stressed, from ten years’ intensive translator’s work concluded with a 
successful publication of FW’s seventh translation worldwide. 
249 Bartnicki makes arguments to the effect that the plurality of mutually incompatible readings of the basic 
sense of this stream of linguistic signs proves that we have no reasons to think, that one day such sense will be 
philologically established and widely accepted. 
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Motivation in Joyce: Desemantisation and 
Resemantisation 
The text itself offers close to none coherent quasi-judgments to decipher, at 
least as far as stable, uncontentious quasi-judgments expressed in a natural 
language are concerned. It is typical of artistic literature that its meanings are 
subject to discussion, contention and interpretation, making it common for a literary 
masterpiece, that the corpus of its interpretations and commentaries greatly exceeds 
in volume the primary text itself. But at least of works whose integral texts are at 
our disposal, and especially of such works written within the last two centuries, it 
would be very awkward if the very basic signification of a great deal of phrases 
were unresolvedly250 unstable. This, however, is exactly the case with Finnegans 
Wake. It is a chain of linguistic signs which rarely do constitute well-formed 
sentences of any known modern or ancient language251. Nonetheless, by the very 
use of linguistic signs (letters and punctuation marks, printed in lines on paper 
within a standard paginated book form, and quite frequently: the use of recognizable 
standard English lexemes, in their proper or variated form), it primarily appeals to 
the reader as a readable text. It plays with this invitation throughout the lengthy 
whole: the sign-stream, if not written in correct English, constantly evokes English 
(Irish) meanings, as well as those in ancient Greek, in Latin, French and other 
languages, resounds with plurilinguistic and multimedial assonances, orchestrates 
associations, images and intertextual connections. This the cryptic sign-stream 
continuously places itself anew within the literary, human, civilized and historically 
                                               
250 This instablility due to lack of resolution within any known established system of reference is a feature that 
Finnegans Wake shares with a number of musical works written after the “emancipation of the dissonance”. 
The line of parallel is drawn between the tonal system as a set of established references and directives analysable 
in terms of tensions from dissonance to resolution, where some classes of configurations lead to other, like the 
seventh of a dominant leads to the third of the tonic, to make a simplest example. 
251 There is a whole library of studies on these aspects of Joyce’s work. Bartnicki quotes some of them to 
convince his audience that no possible consensus on virtually any vital aspect of FW’s interpretation can ever 
be achieved and that, therefore, all interpretations are equally indiscernible in their legitimacy. 
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rooted context and strikes as inhumanly uncomprehensive, or comprehensive as 
mere glossolalia252, intolerable balbuciendo253 of the saint or of the mad254. 
Brékkek Kékkek Kékkek! Kóax Kóax Kóax!255 
This memorable onomatopoeia, quite paradoxically, is one of the safest points 
on the page (FW 4), in the traditional reading terms, as it is a clear and 
straightforward quote from Aristophanes and any reader familiar with the Frogs 
will instantly feel comforted at this point256. The intertextual reference, however, is 
thus given priority here over the mimetic direct reference to the outer world, that 
purportedly was the core mechanism of literature, illustrating ante litteram or 
perhaps heralding implicitly the post-modern textological claim, that literary texts, 
primarily refer to other texts. If we get at the image of grotesquely coaxing frogs 
here it is through the recognition of the quote from Aristophanes, not the other way 
round. Thus, the traditional model of primary linguistic apprehension as 
basilar for any other level of apprehension in literature is seriously put in 
question here. Arguably “Brékkek (…)” does not express any judgment, which we 
could primarily understand and consequently ascend to higher orders of literary 
understanding. Instead it creates directly an intertextual bridge to Aristophanes; 
only this intertextual reference invests the quoted line with eventual mimetic 
meaning (i.e. ‘frogs coaxing loudly’). This is brilliantly ironic, as it is done through 
the use of an onomatopoeia (in its original ancient Greek context), a rhethorical 
device arguably closest of all to the ideal of language as direct phonic imitation of 
nature. 
                                               
252 Pejorative phrase used by the fictitious writer Philip Quarles in the celebrated passage of A. Huxley, Point 
Counter Point, Harper and Row, New York 1928., describing what musicalization of fiction ought not be. 
253 Mumbling of the mystic in ecstasy, term used by St. John of the Cross. 
254 Both figures are united in the Russian Orthodox type of saint-madman jurodivyj. 
255 J. Joyce, Finnegans Wake, Wordsworth 2012. 
256 Aristoph. Frogs 209: βρεκεκεκὲξ κοὰξ κοάξ, ρεκεκεκὲξ κοὰξ κοάξ . 
 134 
 
To sum up: traditional accounts257on linguistic meaning as reference to 
nonlinguistic objects, states of affairs (actual or imagined as actual at least within 
the fictional context established by the work) clearly fail to explain the mechanism 
of how Finnegans Wake can be linguistically understandable on the basic level of 
interpretation for the reader. Facing this fact or we search for some other model of 
linguistic meaning to explain the use of language in this work of literature or we 
search for some other model of meaning, not necessarily embracing the work’s 
elementary linguistic (and therefore: maybe even literary258) nature. As nature 
abhors vacuum, this very crisis of the traditional semantic and narrative model 
functions as a springboard towards the alternative possibilities of sense making 
which require reader’s extensive interpretive activity. One of the possibilities, is the 
one explored by Bartnicki.  
Now it is highly implausible that Joyce intentionally inserted the musical 
cryptograme “decoded” afterwords by Bartnicki in his reductions. It is not though 
so implausible, that FW requires interpretations precisely of this kind, namely, that 
it was intentionally designed as an invitation to produce them. On this account the 
understanding of FW would reside precisely in producing interpretations of this 
kind, for further aesthetic and intellectual engagement. 
The Implied Phonetic Apparatus (Sonic Interpretation of 
Linguistic Signs) 
An additional question arising at this point is that of the implied phonetic 
apparatus. If the text is not (simply) English, then how do we know how to 
pronounce it? Normally the two phenomena (natural language in use and its 
corresponding word-to-sounds encryption rules) are co-determined: if I open a book 
and instantly recognize French words and it makes sense to me in French – then if 
I decide to read it aloud, I will act upon this hypothesis: I will read ‘coquillages’ as 
                                               
257 Criticized, to be sure, also within linguistics today, cf. Wierzbicka, but reigning in Joyce’s times in the works 
of logical positivists. 
258 I say: maybe, as this dissertations’ methodology prohibits me to assume a necessary element of a particular 
matter in defining an art. 
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[kɔkijaʒ] and not as in English nor as in Italian. Thus, the phonetic vest of what I 
read depends on the natural language which I recognized at first hand in the text, 
on my natural capacity and on the learned skills (depending on whether I studied 
Latin in Warsaw or in Oxford or in Rome). Sometimes, though, the fictional frame 
may guide me to a different choice, as when a character pronouncing the French 
text in question is characterized as a, say, American lady whose perfect knowledge 
of French grammar and vocabulary can be rivalled only by her intact accent from 
Ohio259. The spectrum of importance of this phonetic element for the appreciation 
of the text’s value is broad, from very low, as in non-artistic texts which serve a 
practical purpose, to very high, as in some genres of lyrical poetry. But even where 
this stratum determines scarcely any aesthetic properties, it is always there, as an 
element of the very nature of the linguistic sign260. Furthermore, this phenomenon 
is extremely complex even in the case of known natural languages, as the variety 
of dialects, personal idiosyncrasies and even phonetically-relevant phisio-
anatomical differences between the speakers is overwhelming. The metodological 
evolution of phonetics within scientific linguistics from more normative towards 
more descriptive stances means to us that little help from science can come in 
establishing the class of “proper” or “correct” loud readings of a contemporary 
literary text. It wasn’t so in the past, where ars rhetorica provided professional 
training and standards of declamation, which differed from place to place and from 
time to time, but still constituted a systematically and institutionally transmitted 
theoretical and practical knowledge on this part of literary performance, comparable 
to the skill of the cantor in realizing the score, according to the requirements of the 
                                               
259 I said: fictional frame, but in other cases it may well be a contextual performative frame. For instance a well 
formed ancient music singer will have good reasons to sing a Latin motet by François Couperin or Charpentier 
using consequently French peculiar pronounciation which differs greatly from all the previously mentioned 
local versions from other places all over Europe. 
260 It can be argued that in some merely pragmatic usages of prose it is completely eliminated, as irrelevant for 
the whole communication process which involves no vocalization, even imaginary, at all. 
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musica ficta rules261, as well as ornamentation and improvisation skills seen as an 
integral part of the mere score reading capacity.  
The problem can be illuminated by a further parallel to music. There, too, it 
arises, with respect to, for instance, instrumental color. Usually the score (in its 
classical form from 17-18th C. onwards) provides instrumentation information, 
limiting the range of sounds acceptable as correct realizations of the work notated 
at least to the sounds producible by the instrument of the indicated kind playing the 
indicated pitches, with the indicated rhythm, articulation, agogics, dynamics and 
other parameters. We may disagree on the bowing choices of, say, Perlman, playing 
Glazunov’s Violin concerto, but as far as it is played on violin and not on trombone 
we know at least that we disagree on the soloist’s legitimate interpretive choices 
rather that on the identity of the work played. Literary notation seems less precise 
with respect to sounds, as on normal occasions it seems not to exclude any sort of 
pronunciation, if contained within the natural language’s phonetic paradigm, and 
this, as we said, is conceived of with increasing liberality within linguistics. The 
linguist feels no more in the position to say that, for instance, lisping, characteristic 
of a prominent range of English speakers, is an incorrect realization of the [s] 
phonemes; instead, she may classify its sonicity as statistically less frequent with 
respect to the standard. But art is less democratic, especially when it plays with lisp 
as means of imaginary instrumentation, scoring some character (like Mann’s Dr. 
Institoris, for instance) as lisping. 
Joyce’s text seems naturally to call for an Irish English phonetic realization. 
Words written by Joyce’s hand, even if inexistent in any dictionary, suggest being 
read as inexistent Irish English words, and not, for instance, German or Slovak. 
This has reasons to be found both through internal and external critique of the 
source. The internal critique reveals the predominance of English words, syntax, 
collocations and prepositional expressions. The external critique considers by 
whom the text was written (Joyce) and where it was first published (Dublin), 
indicating an undoubtedly Irish English context of primary reception. 
                                               
261 Vide: M. Bent and A. Silbiger, Musica ficta [musica falsa], 2017. 
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Unlike in the standard cases, though, this phonetic variable as a separate 
point of consideration is made necessary here by the above described processes 
of dereferentialization. When linguistic unity is broken, it is legitimate to ask, does 
the text determine univocally the phonetic apparatus of its sonic (or 
imaginatively sonic) realization, and if so, how does it do so and what happens 
to this determination in the process of translation. On the other hand, though, it 
may be taken as one of the few constants in this complicated equation. For if we 
cannot agree on the precise meaning of a plethora of neologisms we encounter there 
on each page and of the phrases containing them, it can be argued that at least we 
know the rules of producing their phonetic correlates, which at times make much 
more “surface” sense than their eye-read counterparts. Two are the hints at hand 
here:  
1. Joyce’s own recorded readings of passages from FW seemingly give an 
ostensive reply to this doubt: we can learn the rules of correct phonetic 
interpretation of the inscriptions constituting the body of the text from how Joyce 
himself reads them aloud. There is still, however, room for questions left. Is this the 
normative phonetic interpretation, or maybe one of more legitimate interpretations? 
Perhaps Joyce’s figure is normative as a reader-figure, where the decisive factor is 
the reader’s mother-tongue-driven instinctive reply to the noted sounds, and not at 
all as a coder-decoder author-figure, which provides the only correct way of vocal 
interpretation262. 
2. Passages where words are written phonetically, that is, acquire the 
recognizable shape of meaningful English locutions only if read (or imagined as 
read) aloud within the Irish English phonetic paradigm. This is a stronger 
indication, as on the general principle of charity we are obliged to assume such a 
reading of a text, that makes more sense of it and prefer it over other possible 
readings.  
                                               
262 Both options, of course, accept the wide margins of tolerance characteristic of natural languages in their 
spoken and written version. 
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As we will see in the discussion (3 below) this issue is relevant not only for 
linguistic surface meaning interpretations, but for the musical transliteration 
readings as well: critics writing on FW in the Sixties and quite recently used 
phonetically transcribed sounds of uterances as encoding musical information in 
solfège and letteral notation. 
The text seems to defy the hypothesis that it implies one phonetic apparatus. 
Arguably it contains a substantive amount of French, Latin and other languages 
implied phonemes, and not only etymological roots, especially when they appear in 
italics and in a correct form of the non-English language evoked, for instance: 
L’Auberge du Père Adam 
(FW, p. 124, italics in original) 
Such an inscription seems to call for a French reading, just like the French 
dialogues reported in direct speech in 19th Century Russian, Polish or German 
novels. On the same page we find another challenge to this account, namely 
standard phonetic notation for Slavonic languages mixed with English orthography 
and a sillable accent marking within the word: profèššionally (my italics – J.C.) 
immediately followed by an italicized French-English hybrid piquéd (italics in 
original). 
Thus – even with regard to what was supposed to be the most comforting and 
least contentious stratus of Finnegans Wake, the sonic flow it prescribes, we are left 
with more problems than answers. 
What Gets Lost in Translation 
Translation is one of the possible conceptual keys to the Gordian knot of 
musicalized fiction. Bartnicki’s work – as an independent work “about” the 
translator’s status and auctorial authority performed by the translator himself – adds 
one more problematic layer to the standard ways of linking translation with inter-
art phenomena. As a paradigmatic operation known from the very beginnings of 
literature, theology and philosophy, consubstantial in its practical development and 
theoretical autoreflection with biblical and philosophical hermeneutics – it offers a 
vast cultural background for the study of intermedial transfer phenomena  
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Also from the practical point of view – a comparative analysis of musicalized 
(or otherwise music-related) artistic texts turns out most revealing. In general, it 
may be assumed, that if we distinguish broadly between perceivable sonic 
properties of music, apparent to the ear within the temporal span of audition, and 
its other aesthetic properties, such as architectonic form, mathematic proportion and 
context-based relational features – the latter can be sometimes preserved in 
translation, whereas the former necessarily get lost (if not entirely, for instance 
rhythmical accentuation patterns, alliterations, rhymes – singular elements of the 
text’s sonic organization – can be exactly or inexactly imitated in translation). 
It is not by accident that Peter Dayan’s263 main Word and Music seminar at 
the University of Edinburgh is entitled Poetry, Music and Translation, suggesting 
the key role of translation in understanding the interrelation between Poetry and 
Music. The working formula of this seminar has remained unchanged over years. 
It offers a simple structure of inquiry, which involves reading poems invoking 
music in languages unknown to the majority of participants first in original, then in 
English, and observing their formal and contextual features. One of the standard 
tests which all the discussed texts must undergo is the investigation of what happens 
to the reference to music of the original poem in its translation. Responses vary 
from poem to poem and from translation to translation, but always shed sharp light 
on the way poetry and music are (or are not) entwined in these texts. Through a 
careful comparison of the original and its poetic translation, the seminar’s 
participants gain a privileged insight into the workings of these little ephemeral 
musico-litterary paradoxical miracles which at times take place in poetry engaged 
with music. Bartnicki’s work analyzed in the present chapter stems from his 
struggle with the text in the translation process into Polish; recently it has been even 
interpreted as an open “translation series” in its entirety264.   
                                               
263 He is the first and, to-day, only Professor of Word and Music Studies in the World. 
264 I. Okulska, Intersemiotic Translation to tie-in Products, „Forum of Poetics”, 2016, no Fall, p. 66. 
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Dereferentialisation as symptom and means of musicalization 
 Derefentialization is often used as a means of musicalization265, inviting the 
reader to search the logos (order, sense) of the semantically unstable stream of 
linguistic signs somewhere beyond literature – most typically in its sister temporal 
asemantic art of music. Furthermore, Joyce himself encouraged musical 
explorations of the Wake, calling it “his ‘suite’ in the key of E-flat” and saying that 
the “Anna Livia Plurabelle” chapter is “his ‘melodic’ chapter”266. Up to this point 
standard explorations of music in Finnegans Wake steming from these constatations 
– share the grounds of Bartnicki’s take on Joyce. The fundamental difference 
resides in the relation between the stream of primary linguistic signs as noted in any 
complete exemplar of the book and the musical elements it is supposed to engender. 
While the standard readings accept the linguistic strata, if precarious, as constitutive 
of the supervening musical strata (the pair text-reading is conserved, in that the first 
level of understanding is linguistic, and only its outcome is to be perceived under 
musical concepts), Bartnicki – in order to get to Joyce’s music here – decides to 
discard the linguistic code whatsoever and interpret the symbols common to this 
code and the musical code within the latter.  
   His task, then, is to extract letters that – in the Western musical convention 
– are soundnames (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) and to research the musical readability of 
such a material. His work can be divided in to several steps, phases or stages, which 
fall into three general categories of Conceptual, Textual and Performative. The 
main phases we can distinguish are: 
                                               
265 This is a thought explored by Prieto and erlier by Wolf. 
266 Apud A. Shockley, Music in the Words: Musical Form and Counterpoint in the Twentieth-Century 
Novel..., op. cit., p. 125. 
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(1) Conceptual 
The concept itself (a work of conceptual art267, providing the rule-
determination of the subsequent stages of realization). Let me sketch these 
rules straight away: 
a. Take all letters from the set (Aa, Bb, Cc, Dd, Ee, Ff, Gg, Hh), 
b. Write them down in the order in which they appear in Joyce’s text, 
without omitting nor adding anything. 
c. Take them to be soundnames, applying the Anglophone 
convention, with two exceptions: b stands for B-Flat and h stands 
for B. 
d. Appreciate accordingly. 
Note 
Bartnicki claims that this choice is not completely arbitrary, because it refers 
to the default notation system of Joyce. The exception made for B and H, that is, to 
interpret them according to the Central European system (used, among other 
countries, in Germany), according to Bartnicki, has to do with the celebrated Bach 
Signature-motif, which presupposes the semitone difference between B and H. But 
this is inconsistent with a second argument, advanced by Bartnicki to ground this 
radical musicalization strategy, namely the correspondence between this:  
on the margin of the page and B. C. A. D. capitalized and dotted letters to be found 
right next to it in the novel’s text. It is difficult to understand why would Joyce give 
this “translation muster” here and require the use of the “German” convention 
elsewhere. 
                                               
267 We will deal with this qualification further on. Cf. P. Goldie and E. Schellerkens, Who’s Afraid of 
Conceptual Art?, Routledge, London and New York 2010. 
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(2) Textual 
The book Da capo al Finne containing a brief introductory essay and a chain 
of letters generated by the application of the rules contained in (1) to Finnegans 
Wake. The book, most significantly, was one of the exhibits in the Gallery: one 
could take it into hand, read the essay, flip through the remainder and reflect. The 
book was in one exemplar and it was wired down to the exhibition table which I 
take to be a significant element of framing – thereby it indicated that it was not 
supposed to be read through, book-form generated appearances notwithstanding. 
This musical text notated with letters derives – in all its forms – from 
Finnegans Wake through a series of operations. In case of producing an imitation 
these include a computer-assisted extensive research of this chain of letters for 
recurrent patterns and similarities to sound configurations known from actual 
music, both predating Joyce and posterior. The result is a selection of “reductions” 
– letter sequences which then can be elaborated to form a set of pieces of (audible) 
music. These pieces – musically notated and performable - add to the rigorously 
preserved material the lacking musical elements of rhythm and octave-determined 
pitch.  
(3) Performative 
A collaboration with the sound-arranger and performer Wojciech Kucharczyk 
in order to give the abstract ideas a concrete sensitive form of sonorous 
embodiment: pieces written by Bartnicki are arranged by Kucharczyk as pieces of 
electroacoustic music, presented on meetings with the public268. 
These pieces are not a-logos, in several ways. They derive from the Text 
(logos in the sense of (a) words and the use of language calling for (b) ratio, but 
failing in this). They are consummated within a discursive frame – they are 
commented on philosophically by the author-performer, they are rightly attended 
to as executions of the Text, and the way this is possible is essential to take them 
properly as artworks. The similarity to known pieces of music (Chopin, Williams, 
                                               
268 To be heard here: https://soundcloud.com/gimcbart . 
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Paganini etc.) is supposed to be clear to the audiences’ ear, it is supposed to function 
as spontaneous recognition. This happens in the very moment of clash between the 
intellectual clarity of the work’s constitutive features and its immediate aesthetic 
working on the ear: when you hear it you perfectly know how it is made, what it is 
supposed to illustrate or demonstrate, you know that the musical primary material 
is a constellation written in Joyce’s pages. And there comes the moment of its 
instant recognition as belonging not only to the soundsphere but to the well familiar 
realm of music: you hear this is Chopin, you recognize his music. 
In a word: Bartnicki makes us immediately recognize as music something 
about which we know that is essentially governed by Joyce’s text, by the very 
sequence of linguistic signs written by his hand and published under the name of 
his last novel and masterpiece. Bartnicki is not making any scholarly claims about 
the author’s intentions and plausible readings. He reacts creatively to the enigma of 
Finnegans Wake making its apories sensibly given to us, in an unresolved categorial 
contradiction between how our mind classifies what we are presented with and what 
our ears recognize it as. 
 Some Critical Remarks 
Let us start the critical discussion of Bartnicki’s plurinistantional work by 
observing that at the very core of his idea – namely: reading Joyce’s letters as 
musical sounds – is nothing new to the Joycean ilk, at pains at finding the melodies 
promised by the the writer himself, on various occasions. Margaret Rogers offered 
a similar reading of the musical material for the celeberrima fuga per canonem 
promised by the Author of Ulisses in the Sirens episode. All the numerous critical 
attempts to find its material within the verbal stratum (be it on the level of sounds 
or meanings or both combined) being disputable and incompatible one with another 
– she turned to the potentially musical letters (English system: a, b, c, d, e, f, g) in 
search for the fugue’s soggetto cavato à rebours269.  
                                               
269 À rebours because – as is usual for a number of musicalization strategies discussed in the present dissertation 
– this device reverses the vector of reference or encoding from the one found in standard musical practice in its 
relation to language or other media. In this case what served the composers to encode verbal messages (such as 
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These attempts are prone to severe criticism. One of Bartnicki’s points of 
reference is Prof. Jack W. Weaver, whose musical incompetence is demonstrated 
with clarity on an embarrassingly large number of elementary error examples 
reported by Alan Shockley270. Apart from these mistakes  made literally in the 
musical abc (such as the inability to identify properly the intervals Weaver quotes 
in his analyses as significant for his whole argumentation; the misunderstanding of 
the notion of triad and of the musical key – with his nonsensous “each has three 
flats but not the same three” [sic! he even repeats it several times in his book]; or 
the inability to interpret correctly different notation systems he tries to use and so 
forth) more general criticism is to be addressed to this sort of “musical kabbalah”. 
Sometimes it could lead (if only executed competently, as Weaver’s abc errors lead 
him to false results) to interesting conclusions, such as, for instance, the 
identification of the sameness of the musical “signature” of the four Evangelists and 
its musical identity in matter with Earwicker himself (as HCE). 
Matthew – “Say! Eh? Hah” (FW 559.21-22) – [c – e – h] etc. for all the four. 
In brackets, I provide the phonetic transcription of the utterance analysed as 
containing musical information. As you can see – phonetic reading of their 
respective exclamations does lead to a unifying musical signature. Both “phonetic 
apparatus” and “musical notations” including the solfège are necessarily at work, 
and one mediated by the other, to get to this conclusion. But if music becomes a 
necessary participant in this operation, it does so not necessarily as music (it could 
well be “just” a mode of encryption, parassiting on the musical nomenclature, but 
having nothing to do with the actual sounds that would be called into existence in a 
musical reading. This, however, would seem implausible in the lights of the 
                                               
signature, dedication, quote, mention etc.) in non-texted or, even more interestingly, otherwise texted music 
(cf. Dux Ferrariae), is used within the verbal medium to encode musical material. This musical mode is thus 
reproduced and reversed, making up for a double musicalization (first as an application-transformation of a 
musical technique – because this is a musical technique, one that serves the composer to organize his sonic 
material in a determinate fashion – and second, in the more apparent way, by permitting an aesthetic 
transformation of the water of linguistic signs into the wine of music. 
270 Cf. A. Shockley, Music in the Words: Musical Form and Counterpoint in the Twentieth-Century Novel..., 
op. cit., pp. 128–130. 
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abundance of musical clues left by Joyce himself. Yet, if we remember that “eye 
music” is something not only well customary in the history of music, but plays even 
a greater role in the history of literary musicalizations (Augenmusik in Doktor 
Faustus) – this question remains open. 
Still – this critical point seems to show well that Bartnicki’s sort of operations 
are far less subtle in their workings, as they annihilate the literary texture 
transforming in entirely into music, and this is done in a mechanical way (his rules 
are semi-arbitrary, see below). Bartnicki can defend himself, though, that he doesn’t 
rely on Weaver’s reasonings flawed by his incompetence, and that his work is in no 
way distorted by these misinterpretations; this would be true. And furthermore, he 
could well argue that precisely because he does not claim any sort of unicity or 
priority of such a radical musical reading over other “keys” to Finnegans Wake – 
his operation by no means closes paths to further elaborations and mises en relation 
of layers emerging in divergent interpretation strategies. And this, effectively, 
would also be true.  
It is understandable to accuse Bartnicki of performing an “easy” or even “ani-
humanistic” reading, missing the meanders of the challenging text, which disappear 
when it is no longer treated as a linguistic utterance. But it is undenayable that 
Finnegans Wake precisely in the way it is linguistically challenging as to the 
methods of interpretations – gives way to a certain legitimization of such gestures, 
as far as they do not claim to have the last word on the text’s interpretation (which, 
again, is obviously not the case with our author). Furthermore, such a gesture 
performed by one of those seven humans who succeeded in publishing a complete 
translation of FW, cannot be easily dismissed as an “easy” gesture. Its preparation 
or preliminary work lasted ten years. With Levinson’s distinction of two types of 
interpretation271 we could classify Bartnicki’s enterprise on the side of exploring 
interpretations with no aspiration to determine the text’s meaning (at least intended 
as something stable and expressible in words; arguably the artistic actions such as 
                                               
271 DM/CM interpreting. Cf. J. Levinson, Two Notions of Interpretation, [in:] Contemplating Art, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2006, pp. 275–287. 
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Bartnicki’s constellation are different ways of understanding Joyce, comparable to 
the ways in which normally we display understanding of music: by dancing, moving 
our bodies, singing along or being able to recall and sing or play the music we 
understand. In sketching such an interpretive possibility (of Bartnicki’s interpretive 
work on Joyce) I point towards a deeper level of musicality his creative enterprise 
would involve. 
Conclusion 
If there is any sense in my last remark – the proper conclusion of my 
interpretation may itself take form as doing, rather than telling: the Reader will find 
it in the Appendix to the present Chapter, containing an experimental piece of music 
I wrote to conclude my reflections on Bartnicki. The piece, La ci darem la mano in 
FW, constitutes an integral element of the present argument and should be played 
back from the provided audio link. 
We saw Bartnicki’s case as a provocation of incertain nature – somewhere in 
between OLiPu, with their contraintes, and blatant misinterpretation or intellectual 
illusionism. Whatever our final judgment of value will be, we may recognize the 
systematic difference in type of the musicalizing operations at work here. As 
discussed in the earlier parts of this chapter – the way Da capo al finne and the 
following arrangements interpret a text of prose as music is radically dissimilar of 
other cases of musica textualis. It annihilates the literary tissue, making the presence 
of music no more a consubstantiation, but a true transubstantiation. The secular 
bread of literary signification loses its linguistic nature in the moment of 
“consecration” and assumes entirely the “divine” nature of musical flesh. What was 
readable – now is hearable and the copresence typical of standard cases of musica 
textualis of both elements in their aesthetic working gets entirely suppressed in 
favour of music. Having said this, we need to remind ourselves of the crucial role 
of the conceptual element which, in contrast with the aural evidence of musical 
presentation, reminds us both of the Joycean (that is: literary) nature of the work’s 
materia prima and of the fact that it is legitimated uniquely by how this literary 
nature is realized in Finnegans Wake. It is in Finnegans Wake a s  l i t e r a t u r e  
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where reasons for this musical transubstantiation lay. Thus – we can dispute 
Bartnicki’s work and especially –  the arguments which he provides in his “program 
notes” to the effect that Joyce’s text really grounds such operations. But leaving the 
outcome of such a discussion aside, we must conclude hypothetically, that if the 
suggestions of his work on Joyce are true, and they are at least true in the sense272 
that they “happen on stage” (are performed and have their aesthetic and speculative 
impact on the audience), then his work participates in the idea of musica textualis: 
it creates an aesthetic and intellectual illusion of music striving there inside Joyce’s 
text. 
                                               
272 Roman Ingarden most helpfully distinguishes different important uses of the Truth-predicate with regard to 
art, and in particular: with regard to a literary artwork. Cf. R. Ingarden, O różnych rozumieniach 
«prawdziwości» w dziele sztuki, [in:] Studia z estetyki, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1966, 
vol. I, pp. 395–412; R. Ingarden, O tak zwanej « prawdzie » w literaturze, [in:] Studia z estetyki, Państwowe 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1966, vol. I, pp. 413–464.  
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Appendix to Chapter 5 
Joyce’s La ci darem la mano  
What I Found in Finnegans Wake Initial Two 
Paragraphs Trying To Reduce Bartnicki Ad 
Absurdum 
This Appendix contains a report from an experiment designed to prove that 
using Bartnicki’s method you can “find” virtually any musical piece in Finnegans 
Wake273 and set up to provide grounds for further considerations. In a concise way 
I describe the whole process, I present its results (a piece of experimental music 
reproduced below) and I offer some concluding commentary on this outcome. 
Initial hypothesis 
The position I wanted to test by this experiment can be resumed as follows: 
(H) Applying Bartnicki’s constraints on the reduction and imitation procedure you 
can produce a convincing imitation of any tune you please, if it is of a reasonable 
lenght and if it can be transposed into a combination of abcdefgh; in addition – there 
is no need to search for it, you can start wherever you choose. The rules of 
transcription allowed by Bartnicki are sufficient to get an impeccable reproduction 
of the desired melody, with several options of “neutralizing” rearrangement of the 
remaining material in accompanying voices. What remains to discover is: (1) how 
long will it take to find the desired sequence and (2) will the outcome indeed be 
aesthetically convincing (univoquely recognizable as the imitated source). 
The first question is of a statistical nature and can be answered by a 
calculation. The second question requires realization: it needs a piece of 
experimental music to be written and assesed. My experiment answers the first 
question with respect to the tune I quasi-randomly chose, leaving the probability 
                                               
273 Just as in any other longer piece of writing in Latin characters; but here we focus on FW, as in part Bartnicki’s 
argument relies on some properties of this text as it is, linguistically (and not musically) intended. 
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calculus to my fellow statisticians274. It answers the second question in the form of 
a written composition, of dubious musical value, but undobtedly voicing Mozart’s 
La ci darem la mano. 
Procedure Applied  
I decided to stick to the most severe set of rules among those used on different 
stages of his work in progress by Bartnicki himself, namely: (1) redcution to 
abcdefgh, (2) all sounds must be presented in the exact order to be found in Joyce’s 
original275. This imposes a linear order (no more than one sound can start 
resounding at a time, even if you can build accords by prolonging notes in other 
voices). In result by reading the score you are able to reconstruct the exact sequence 
of letters from the original. 
This is how I set the initial challenge: let us see how many letters from the 
beginning of Joyce’s book will it take to collect a random tune that will come to my 
mind. Strictly speaking: quasi-randomly, in the sense that I chose something of my 
liking, spontaneusly in a radical aesthetic and historical contrast with the pompous 
and bombastic Williams found by Bartnicki in Joyce in startling abundance; and 
preferably diatonic276. The first phrase of Don Giovanni’s Duettino with Zerlina – 
seemed to me a perfect candidate for the purpose. It fulfills the above-mentioned 
preconditions, it came to me spontaneously, and despite its diatonic simplicity it 
                                               
274 I went through this path with my friend Łukasz Ponikiewski, whom I would like to thank here. 
275 These are Bartnicki’s original constraints. In several later pieces, he allowed for vertically arranged sound 
combinations, but only of „palindromic” structure – such that give the same sequence of letters, regardless of 
whether read from the bass to the treble or vice versa; on rare occasions Bartnicki used also even more liberal 
rules, leading to more attractive sonic arrangements, but making it impossible to decipher the original 
arrangement of letters in Joyce without further specific clues. 
276 This was for the sake of simplicity, because the actual set of admissible sound combinations is expanded by 
the B-flat included in the set under the name of h. Furthermore: non-diatonic melodies of a limited ambitus or 
simply not containing certain grades of the scale can be successfully notated within this set. For sure you will 
never find any dodecaphonic series in FW. But the crucial point here is this: melodies possibly “encoded” in 
FW depend on the assumed reduction and transcription model and not on the disposition of the text itself (of 
course within reasonable limits, as the text provides necessary material which – if lacking – cannot be 
“outsourced”). 
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uses the major scale’s full material with the exception of the fourth grade and – 
most importantly  – it is highly characteristic, memorable, unconfoundable with any 
other tune277.  
For Bartnicki – the first step to his imitations is the search for a tune in the 
immense block of the reduction (published as Da capo al Finne). I decided not to 
search for letter sequences, but simply impose an arbitrary tune and an arbitrary 
starting point: the very beginning of FW. Before I took the book in hands I wrote 
down Mozart’s melody in C major and – below the stave – the letters. They are 29, 
I realized (I counted in, most naturally, the appoggiatura). Then I opened Finnegans 
Wake on the first page of the main text and searched for the first c. I found it in the 
second line in the word ‘commodius’ and went on circling with a pencil the nearest 
occurences of the 29 letter sequence. I was amused to find the last c in the last word 
of the first full paragraph: ‘aquaface’. “Brilliant” – I thought – “welcome to the 
over-interpretators paradise!”, with my head buzzling with ideas of most 
improbable and absurd elucidations of the opening paragraphs of FW coming at 
hand and perfectly provable on the grounds of my “discovery”. 
This was the first spontaneous go at the experiment, and it showed me that La 
ci darem “is there” and that it is contained in the very first lines of the book. The 
second go was lenghthy and systematic. It is of course the latter, systematic version 
                                               
277 Chopin, too, was haunted by this ear-catching little melody and honoured it with a composition for at least 
two reasons atypical of him: form and orchestration. Variations in B-Flat major on the Theme La ci darem la 
mano op. 2 are a theme and variations form and count among the very few orchestral works he wrote, together 
with both concertos and the Rondo à la Krakowiak op. 14, all form the Warsaw period. Another Variations for 
piano and orchestra belong to this period, namely the Fantasy A Major on Polish Airs op. 13 (Published as 
Fantaisie Brillante sur des Airs Nationaux Polonais pour le Piano avec accompagnement d'Orchestre in Paris 
and under similar titles in London and in Leipzig). This delightful composition starts with a theme recognizable 
probably to any Pole, Laura i Filon. What is singular abut this merry folk tune is that it was spontaneously 
associated with a pre-existing poetic text from the late 18th C. by Franciszek Karpiński. This extremely musical 
poet, author of dozens of songs, including the Song on the Lord’s Nativity, which is still sung as a Christmas 
Carrol, to a polonaise tune, hymns and psalm paraphrases, wrote it as an idyllic romanza. The piece recalls in 
its first part an operatic love aria, and in the second – an operatic duetto. It is perharps this intermedial 
collocation of the original poetic piece that made its musical version gain great popularity within a very short 
time. Chopin wrote his Fantasy as a student of the Warsaw Conservatoire around 1828. 
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of the experiment, which I expose in detail in the following points, leading the 
reader step by step from Joyce’s text as it is to the musically notated final product 
– Don Giovanni’s first phrase to Zerlina contained entirely in the first two 
paragraphs of Finnegans wake. 
I. Joyce, Finnegans Wake 
1. The Text as it Is 
riverrun, past Eve and Adam's, from swerve of shore to bend 
of bay, brings us by a commodius vicus of recirculation back to 
Howth Castle and Environs.  
Sir Tristram, violer d'amores, fr'over the short sea, had passen- 
core rearrived from North Armorica on this side the scraggy 
isthmus of Europe Minor to wielderfight his penisolate war: nor 
had topsawyer's rocks by the stream Oconee exaggerated themselse 
to Laurens County's gorgios while they went doublin their mumper 
all the time: nor avoice from afire bellowsed mishe mishe to 
tauftauf thuartpeatrick not yet, though venissoon after, had a 
kidscad buttended a bland old isaac: not yet, though all's fair in 
vanessy, were sosie sesthers wroth with twone nathandjoe. Rot a 
peck of pa's malt had Jhem or Shen brewed by arclight and rory 
end to the regginbrow was to be seen ringsome on the aquaface. 278  
 
                                               
278 FW p. 3, I conserve here the division into lines of the standard FW edition. Stats: 850 signs with spaces; 708 
signs without spaces. 
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2. Punctuation and Spaces Removed 
RiverrunpastEveandAdamsfromswerveofshoretobendofbaybringsu
sbyacommodiusvicusofrecirculationbacktoHowthCastleandEnvironsSir
TristramviolerdamoresfrovertheshortseahadpassencorerearrivedfromNor
thArmoricaonthissidethescraggyisthmusofEuropeMinortowielderfighthi
spenisolatewarnorhadtopsawyersrocksbythestreamOconeeexaggeratedth
emselsetoLaurensCountysgorgioswhiletheywentdoublintheirmumperallt
hetimenoravoicefromafirebellowsedmishemishetotauftaufthuartpeatrick
notyetthoughvenissoonafterhadakidscadbuttendedablandoldisaacnotyett
houghallsfairinvanessyweresosiesestherswrothwithtwonenathandjoeRot
apeckofpasmalthadJhemorShenbrewedbyarclightandroryendtothereggin
browwastobeseenringsomeontheaquaface 279 
 
3. Letters Other Than AaBbCcDdEeFfGgHh Removed 
eaEeadAdafeefhebedfbabgbacdcfeccabacHhCaeadEaedaefeheheahadae
ceeaedfhAcahdehecagghfEeedefghheaeahadaecbheeaceeeaggeaedheeea
eCggheheedbheeaheeacefafebeedheheafafhaeacehgheafehadadcadbeded
abaddaacehghafaaeeeeehehheahadeaecfaahadhehebeedbacghadedheegg
babeeegeheaaface 280 
Note  
The second paragraph (or the first full, as the first one begins famously in the 
middle of a phrase, one that begins at the end of FW; note here in addition that the 
last line of the this second-first paragraph begins with the word ‘end’) ends with the 
word ‘aquaface’. This is another biblical reference to the Genesis, consequently in 
reverse order (I quote Gen 1:1-3 from the Vulgate to make apparent the matrix of 
reference, including aqua, facies and facio, -ere): 
                                               
279 Stats: 685 signs. 
280 Stats: 264 signs. 
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in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram [2] terra autem erat inanis et 
vacua et tenebrae super faciem abyssi et spiritus Dei ferebatur super aquas 
[3] dixitque Deus fiat lux et facta est lux 
 The word is composed of two lexemes belonging to two languages, Latin and 
English: ‘aqua’ and ‘face’ (and both cross-interpretable in both languages, for the 
Latin ‘aqua’ is highly assimilated in English and understandable as relating to 
water, cf. aquapark, aquazoo etc. and as the English ‘face’ comes directly from the 
Latin ‘facies’ and is also the imperative form of the verb alternative to ‘fac’, as if it 
contained the order to act). What is even more striking, the word ‘face’ is one of 
these words which do not “get lost in translation” according to the severe 
denaturating model applied by Bartnicki here. Being composed entirely and 
exclusively of “musical” letters it stays where it was, unmodified, in the musical 
reduction, gold probed in fire, marking, as it does in the Joycean text, the end, the 
verge, the borderline of our extract (being both the last word of the opening 
paragraph of FW and the word where we find the last of the 29 notes of Don 
Giovanni’s seductive tune, for the extraction of which form Mozart’s score, see 
below): 
ccdecadhhhcdgccdecadcchaggahc 
These characteristics make of this point a true interface where both codes connect 
and are exposed as a surface with which the interpret (be it literary or musical or 
both) interacts.  
The actual reduction  
The actual reduction starts with the first of the 29 letters and ends with the 
last (typed in bold): 
cdcfeccabacHhCaeadEaedaefeheheahadaeceeaedfhAcahdehecagghfEe
edefghheaeahadaecbheeaceeeaggeaedheeeaeCggheheedbheeaheeacefaf
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ebeedheheafafhaeacehgheafehadadcadbededabaddaacehghafaaeeeeeheh
heahadeaecfaahadhehebeedbacghadedheeggbabeeegeheaafac 281 
 
Now when we know exactly how this reduction was made and we see the way 
it contains the 29 letter sequence, it’s high time to go through the simple procedure 
of getting this sequence out of Mozart’s score. To this task now I turn.
                                               
281 Stats: 238 signs. 
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II. Mozart, La ci darem la mano 
1. First 8 measures of Don Giovanni’s part in the Duettino 
(Act I, Nr 7282).  
1.1. Melodic line alone 
2. Id. transposed from original A major to C major: 
 
3. 29 pitches in letter names (h for b, b for b-flat) 
sequenced283. 
ccdecadhhhcdgccdecadcchaggahc  
                                               
282 W.A. Mozart, Don Giovanni, ed by. G. Schünemann and K. Soldan, trans by. G. Schünemann, Peters, 
Leipzig 1941. Schünemann was a Nazi (from 1933 in NSDAP) and apart from this “magnificent” work of 
teutonising Da Ponte’s libretto he also must be remembered for having “entjudetet” [“un-Jewed”] the German 
translation of Le nozze di Figaro. I use this compromised edition to make several points en passant. It shows 
how translation and interpretation can exercise outspoken violence – both against persons and artworks. And 
the German Schloss which adapts the Italian “casinetto” in a fashion most faithful to the “hier in Deutschland” 
(cf. Leporello’s “Catalogue” aria, emphasis mine – J.C.) helps me add final gloss to the present ad absurdum 
argument, see below.  
283  In the English notation the sequence is: ccdecadbbbcdgccdecadccbaggabc. Observation: it takes 
266 musical signs from the beginning of FW to get these 29 letters in the right order. 
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4. Id. Transposed into F major: 
 
5. 29 pitches in letter names284 sequenced. 
ffgafdgeeefgcffgafdgffedccdef  
6. Id. Transposed into B-Flat major: 
 
 
7. 29 pitches in letter names (h for b, b for b-flat) 
sequenced. 
bbcdbgcaaabcfbbcdbgcbbagffgab 
8. Id. Transposed into E-Flat major: 
 
9. 29 pitches in letter names (h for b, b for b-flat, s for e-
flat) sequenced. 
ssfgscfdddsfbssfgcfssdcbbcds  
                                               
284 B-flat being the fourth grade of the F major scale (and IV is the only grade lacking from this melody) makes 
it irrelevant, which notation (English or Central-European) we choose. This choice is, however, relevant for the 
further elaboration of the material (the richer the reduction matrix is, the more “diluted” the reduction will be 
and the more notes foreign to the melody and in need of arrangement it will contain. 
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III. Transition from Text to Hearable Music 
All the above presented letter sets encoding Mozart’s melody could be found 
in Joyce’s text, reduced accordingly (the E-Flat major version would require a 
reduction to abcdefghs)285. 
 Now, to get a reduction of this quasi-randomly chosen theme from the text, 
with no violation of Bartnicki’s rules, it is sufficient to write these 29 notes in the 
proper rhythm by Mozart and the rest on accompanying staves, in a way suitable to 
your needs:  
a. To get the pure melody – write them in unhearable or barely hearable 
frequencies286. 
b. To get accompanied melody – allow for sounds that are acceptable 
harmonically and apply (a) rule only to those too contrasting. 
c. To get the melody with unmozartian accompaniment, group the 
remainder to form distinct melodic lines above and below, in a 
different register and colouring (use distinctive instrumentation). 
To be entirely faithful to Bartnicki’s method, I opted for the C major 
transposition notated in abcdefgah (steps 1-3 above). The result of my arrangement 
is this287:  
                                               
285 The F major transposition is, as already mentioned, convention-insensitive, containing no si sounds, whereas 
the C major transposition could be noted in both English and Central-European convention. 
286 Bartnicki’s own strategy is writing the undesired notes in very fast rhythmical values. I adopt this strategy 
extensively in my La ci darem la mano in FW but a simple operation (three octave transposition upwards of 
the Flauto piccolo part realized by a synthesizer capable of emitting these high frequencies and respective 
downwards transposition of the bassoon part) would do the trick. The use of unhearable or barely hearable 
sounds or “primordial sounds of nature” on the verge between the articulate and the viscerally perceivable is 
nothing new nor shocking even in the greatest works of the classical canon, starting from the Postromantic Era. 
Consider here Wagner’s Vorspiel to Rheingold with the music’s gradual emergence de profundis or, on the 
opposite side of the spectrum of musical and hearable frequencies – the prelude to Lohengrin with its extremely 
high piccolo tones played pianissimo or Mahler’s First Symphony opening movement. 
287 You can hear the piece (on a computer-generated, mechanically interpreted recording) here:  
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0BwTBNjwE48-hbmxWdUhxbWhDZm8 
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IV. Commentary 
The above presented work contains strictly the 264 sounds you get by 
rewriting the first two paragraphs of Finnegans Wake with the ommission of all 
characters but the soundnames abcdefgh. All these sounds are played in the linear 
order in which they appear in Joyce’s text. Don Giovanni’s theme is conferred to 
the Viole d’amore (part realized by at least two instruments called also Liebviol). 
The first six bars constitute an introduction realized by the bassoon – 25 souds 
preceding the first occurrence of the letter c in Finnegans Wake. After Don 
Giovanni’s theme finishes one last letter, e, from ‘aquaface’ remains and is duly 
played by the piccolo as the major third of the still resounding final tonic. 
The Mozartian theme is aurally evident, vibrant, even vulgar in the 
straightforward and unveiled way it dominates the whole material, thanks to its 
rhythmization and instrumentation. The test is passed – the arbitrarily chosen theme 
emerges within a very limited span of exactly two first paragraphs of the text by 
Joyce – it resounds in an undisputable manner, through an uncompromised 
scandito. The rhythm is a strict augmentation of Mozart’s, with the only exception 
in bar 21 which has no negative influence on the aural recognizability of the phrase 
(it’s hardly perceivable for the ear and in perfect congruence with the stress-pattern 
of the Mozartian original). The augmentation is compensated by the agogic setting 
of the piece in M.M. alla breve = 120. 
Despite the arbitrary character of the theme-selection process the arrangement 
displays striking levels of symbolic entwinement with the source text. Don 
Giovanni and Zerlina are a transposition of the archetypal pair from the book of 
Genesis. Howth Castle corresponds without doubt to Don Giovanni’s “Schloss” 
from the hideous German mistranslation, violating the original Italian for the sake 
of morose nationalistic self-infatuation. What Don Giovanni does to the newly wed, 
naïve and disarmed Zerlina - could not be better described than as violer d’amores, 
violer d’amour. This theme could not find a better instrumentation than the viole 
d’amore, to become a musicoliterary instrument par excellence in the hands of the 
humble hagiographer Serenus Zeitblom.  
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Just as the Biblical order is reversed within the literary layer of the text (Adam 
and Eve – “past Eve and Adam’s”), so it is in its musical rendering: La ci darem la 
mano is a duetto of seduction, but it is the woman who is being seduced by the 
man288. The legitimacy of musical coding in letters here is further corroborated by 
the presence of the most famous of all musical signatures – the BACH motive – in 
the very first bar after the introduction289. I was at pains at making it recognizable 
for the ear, but Joyce’s arrangement of the material makes it necessarily an 
Augenmusik feature. Where Mozart surfaces for the delight of the senses and 
seduces the ear while staging seduction – there Bach comes inaudibly refined and 
reserved for the intellect290.  
I leave the rest of the true “Oconee” of possible interpretations in this vein to 
the phantasy of my Reader. Mine “exaggerated themselse” sufficiently to ground a 
solid conclusion. 
Conclusion 
Bartnicki’s work is an intellectual provocation, a witty one, for when it gets 
unmasked as such – its thought provoking potential only accrues, instead of being 
once for ever combatted. For what is presented as a rigorous process of “reduction” 
and “search for imitations” allegedly to be discovered in Joyce’s text – in order to 
offer a new and stimulating performance of its Prothean potential – is actually far 
less conceptual and more aesthetic. Our experiment gives grounds to ask the 
question: why are Bartnicki’s imitata only subtle echoes of the imitanda, on the 
boarderline of recognizability within the foreign musical matter, when is is 
musically possible to make them so strikingly direct, as I demonstrated it in La ci 
darem la mano in FW? And my answer is that: most importantly because Bartnicki 
                                               
288 I will spare the Reader the observation, that the material from the line 6 of FW where the text reads  
“ h i s  p e n i s o l a t e  w a r ” (emphasis mine – J.C.) falls exactly after the letters-sounds corresponding 
to Don Giovanni’s “la mi direte si” (would the flauto piccolo playing these notes frivolously and in an irritating-
hi-pitched mocking tone provide thus a doubly ironic commentary on some serious complex of the infamous 
libertino?). 
289 Cf. bar 7 of my score above, in the part of bassoon. This is indeed an interpretive sforzato. 
290 This is a cliché on Bach’s art I particularly abhor. 
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wants this misterious, alien, unfamiliar veil to cover what otherwise would be 
charmlessly evident; the aesthetic point stays precisely in making the recognition 
process not to easy, not to obvious, to leave space for the audience’s imagination, 
memory and sensibility, to give room for a free interplay of their musical 
recollections. A regognition in this aesthetic modality not only gives more 
immediate sadisfaction, but first and foremost: seemingly “proves” all Bartnicki’s 
claims, makes them appear more profound and invests the melodies “found” in 
Joyce with an air of mystery and puzzling aesthetic quality. 
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PART III. Philosophical Perspectives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
musica ad omnia extendere se videtur 
 
Jacobus Leodiensis 
 
  
 164 
 
 
 
  
 165 
 
Chapter 6. Musica textualis as an Aporetic Field 
Introduction 
As it was stated already in the first part – musica textualis is first and foremost 
an aporetic field, an exploration of the problematic potential of transmedial 
realizations of music in prose, rather than another positive theory or typology of 
interrelations of music and literature. From the philosophical perspective both 
music and literature are in a way given, preceding any reflection on them, and in 
another way – they are construable contextual concepts, all but independent from 
their intellectual history. This duality of givenness and the need for an intellectual 
reconstruction ab ovo is a rudimentary trace of the philosophical attitude, starting 
from the Ionians asking for the principle element of all things. Later on, this 
philosophical sentiment was expressed in Aristotle as the feeling of awe in front of 
what is291. In this optics, all starts with a feeling of wonder as a reaction to what is 
given, the world, the self, and in our case: the idea that music could be achieved in 
a novel with fulgurating Exaktheit, no more merely depicted, but embodied, made 
present and effective. This idea fills me with awe292 when I aesthetically live its 
incarnations, such as in the little space of white paper separating in Mann’s 
Buddenbrooks the rendering of Hanno’s piano improvisation from the medico-
encyclopaedic report on typhoid fever and from the other blank space after which 
Hanno and his music are already and irreversibly gone, giving retrospectively the 
modulations and transitions of his music the highest grade of efficiency known to 
epics, namely that of necessary causation within the plane of the plot, or the tragic 
mythos. 
                                               
291 Arist., Metaph. I, 2, 982 b, 13-17. Cf. E. Berti, In principio era la meraviglia: le grandi questioni della 
filosofia antica, Laterza, Roma 2007, passim. 
292 Cf. Goehr’s declaration of wonder produced by her reflections on the intellectual history of the work-
koncept: „This chapter […] does not reach a final conclusion. It is designed to leave readers sharing its author’s 
sense of wonder at how human practices come to be, succeed in being, and continue to be regulated by one set 
of ideals rather than another” L. Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works..., op. cit. 
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In the second chapter of the first part, Music Beyond the Senses, I argued that 
there is a consense between most continental and analytic philosophers of music of 
our day that, to put it again with Bernard Sève’s words, if art was not already there, 
the philosopher of art would have nothing to think. An analytic philosopher is most 
interested in picking up the understanding of concepts common to the ordinary 
reasonable and suitably educated people. This very methodological cornerstone 
makes it questionable, whereas analytic philosophy can claim any legitimate insight 
at all into at least such regions of art, which proclaim their outspoken dispise for 
mediocrity and evenness, or those which put these cathegories in question293. If the 
role of art is to produce ostrannienie - then the whole enterprise of sober reasoning 
on intuitions shared by common people, with the (necessary) qualification, even 
more difficult to accept, that nevertheless they should be “suitably prepared” is (to 
say the least) doubtful. When such concept is roughly delimited, the analytic 
philosopher wishes to analyze it, that is: reconstrue its contents in a coherent, 
reasonable, argued way, one that illuminates the understanding of the “folk 
concept” in question and avoids inconsistency, ambiguity and other logical and 
semiotical flaws. The repertoire of arguments in such a discussion is mostly divided 
between (1) appeal to intuitions or sensible communis opinio, as the general premise 
of the whole enterprise is to analyze something already given there, if residing in 
unclear or otherwise confusing forms of shared conviction; (2) appeal to general 
rules of good reasoning (logic, legitimate use of examples, fair dealing with other 
people’s positions and so forth); (3) appeal to introspection, especially valid within 
analytic philosophy of art, where at some point reflexive kowledge gained in first-
person aesthetic experiences becomes a necessary point of reference; finally (4) 
appeal to other thinkers’ works, especially those canonized in the anglophone 
analytic circles, in the form of polemics or adaptation. From the technical (and 
simply factual) point of view this repertoire of more general idealized 
methodological cardinal standpoints has to be completed by more down-to-earth 
                                               
293 In fact an art that would not do so at least to some extent – and this not only on Shklovsky’s account of art 
– is hard to conceive of. 
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observations on the academic practice within which analytic philosophy of music 
is articulated. What I mean here is a certain relatively closed circuit of prestigious 
anglophone academic journals (such as the British Journal of Aesthetics or the 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism) and publishers (Oxford U.P., Cambridge 
U.P., Routledge, Blackwell, to quote only a few). For discussions of more technical 
musicological issues secondary sources include mostly, once again, anglophone 
journals, such as Nineteenth Century Music or the Journal of Musicology, for 
instance. Quoting primary sources and secondary literature only in English 
translations is an embarrassing standard and the instrumental use of historically 
embedded concepts of non-anglophone thinkers or even entire learned traditions is 
not an uncommon practice294. What is outside this restrained limelight – simply 
tends to inexistence295. This approach, if frustrating and often extremely 
impoverishing and unfair, has its good sides: at least it is tendentiously clear and 
transparent, having all the arguments on the table, apart from the (more or less) tacit 
political premise that “there is only good philosophy or bad philosophy; good 
philosophy is what we practice, and the rest or can be adapted or is bad 
philosophy”296. 
Now, as is apparent from the way this thesis is construed, despite the above-
mentioned reservations, it is the analytic philosopher whom I frequently address in 
                                               
294 Zangwill states openly and without any hesitation his disinterest in historical and exegetic intricacies 
concerning the concepts central to his latest book and its hero, Eduard Hanslick. 
295 This tendency sometimes is truly grotesque, as in the case of Peter Kivy who in his last book on music 
mentions that its first chapter Mozart’s skull has been previously published in the Harvard Review of 
Philosophy, he gives even a precise date of a Harvard conference where it was presented in 2009, but says 
nothing about the fact that it was originally published in a prestigious Polish journal Res Facta Nova in 2008. 
Prestigious, maybe, but on the other side of existence! Well, c’est la vie! Cf. P. Kivy, Czaszka Mozarta, „Res 
Facta Nova”, 2008, t.19, pp. 189–201; P. Kivy, Sounding Off. Eleven Essays in the Philosophy of Music..., op. 
cit., p. xii and 3-22. 
296 There is no place here for any further assessment of the form of spiritual activity (or exercise spirituel, to 
borrow Pierre Hadot’s phrase) offered by the analytic philosophy of art, but I tend to be both (a) extremely 
critical of the limiting and anti-humanistic aspects of the said philosophical paradigm and (b) intensely engaged 
with its results, as it is evident from the references made in the present dissertation. Perhaps such a position is 
practically untenable in a longer perspective.  
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these pages. This is why I will dialogue with some of the analytic definitions of 
music in the enterprise of commenting on a possible definition of musica textualis. 
 On defining music 
“What is music?” 
I put the question above in quotation marks – even though this is also my 
question – but it is actually impossible to indicate one author from whom the quote 
comes. This is the question posed by the Discipulus in Scholia Enchiriadis in 10th 
C., as it is the question asked by the two great German musicologists ten ages 
later297. We still happen quite not to know how to answer it, which does not really 
mean that we do not know it. Of course we do! And some of us very well, by 
intimate and lifelong acquaintance. This is why quite a good answer to the m-
question is just to stand up and sing it or sit down and play... or..? Well I understand 
my task in the present dissertation as mostly performing this kind of deixis with 
respect to works which up to this point were less obvious bearers of musichood: 
some of the novels and short stories. My discourse is thus intended as preparation 
(and when necessary: elimination of obstacles, such as the myth of sonicism or ear-
idolatry against which I argued in the First Part) and of pointing out to the features 
one needs to perceive and perform for oneself in order to “hear” this other music. 
But once this accomplished our question comes back: we know it, because we 
experienced its charms (or its pains and humiliations!). But we still do not know 
how to conceptualize it adequately. 
This therefore is not an easy question. It is not only difficult to be answered, 
but even difficult to be sensibly asked. And its exegesis is a fascinating, unobvious 
and adventurous enterprise. These are clear symptoms that the question in question 
is a genuine philosophical problem. 
To some ears it sounds simply as a more specific version of the general 
problem posed by the philosopher of art (and by the devil, which, at least in Doktor 
                                               
297 In the title of their exquisite little book 
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Faustus’ Chapter 25 might be the same298), namely: “What is art?”.,. But as we 
have already seen – music is not always a subspecies of art. We are already aware 
that music as medium (or an anthropological universale; a social phenomenon; a 
practice) is something broader than art. Not all music is art, just as not all art is 
music. And at the beginning of our journey we revisited times and contexts where 
music was not art, but metaphysical order and universal harmony and the science 
thereof. The new question emerging thanks to musica textualis is this: is there 
musical art outside the medium of music, musical art realized within the medium 
of literature? 
Music cannot be defined. Yet we theorise it (theory of music, musicology, 
philosophy of music, psychology and sociology of music, anthropological 
perspective on music). All these disciplines must dispose of some local, technical, 
implicit or rarely explicit, concepts of music. Or not? At last, alongside with the 
musical life, education, institutions – they determinate denotations of the term. 
Note that: these terms become crucial in the avant-garde contexts, (vide, e.g. 
Mattietti Boulez spartiacque, 2016, where Boulez’s institutional and political 
functions come along with standard activities of composer and conductor). Maybe 
this is much more than a contingency – maybe avant-garde music uses these 
channels of auto-determination not least than the standard acts of artistic 
indication299 where this explains the composer’s activity, but in a broader sense, it 
refers perfectly also to the performer’s power: what he performs is music). If this is 
true, alongside with some traditional means of establishing music, contemporary 
music would be determined and created, effectively designed and lawfully 
established outside of the traditional spheres of musical performative practice and 
notation.  
                                               
298 The exact question posed by the Adornian devil in Mann is “What is art today”? 
299 Vide J. Levinson, Musical Concerns. Essays in Philosophy of Music..., op. cit., pp. 45–57‘Indication, 
Abstraction and Individuation’., see also: J. Levinson, What a Musical Work Is, „The Journal of Philosophy”, 
1980, t.77, no 1, pp. 5–28.. 
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Still, some try to define music. This might seem prima facie typical of the 
analytic tradition, but it is not exclusive to it. A survey of the definitions shows that 
the emerging definienda are certainly all but one sort of thing. The term ‘music’ 
seems irreducibly and fundamentally polysemic. In other terms: a descriptive 
definition of music seems unavailable, because of the fluid and polymorph nature 
of music itself. People have always thought of radically different sorts of entities 
(processes) under this concept and this seems to be more a definitive feature of it 
than any other (isn’t this exaggerated? Certainly, it is not true of sculpture, for 
instance; but it might be true of poetry…). One should at least distinguish between 
logical types of definitions that we encounter: some are descriptive, and some: 
prescriptive. Some are purely rhetoric: by the form of “music is x” they want the 
reader to realise some important feature of music (or, conversely, of x, where it is 
defined as m). These rhetoric ‘apparent definitions’ can make use of paradoxes or 
be provocatively false or partial, if taken literally. 
Examples of analytic definitions of music: 
Def. m. in Kania300 
Music is (1) any event intentionally produced or organized (2) to be 
heard, and (3) either (a) to have some basic musical feature, such as pitch 
or rhythm, or (b) to be listened to for such features. 
Def. m. in Levinson301 
Music is “[i] sounds [and silences302] [ii] temporally organized [iii] by a person [iv] for 
the purpose of 
enriching or intensifying experience through active engagement (e.g., listening, 
dancing, performing) [v] with the sounds regarded primarily, or in significant 
measure, as sounds” (1990a: 273)  
 
                                               
300 A. Kania, „Definition”, op. cit. 
301 J. Levinson, „The concept of music”, op. cit. =1990a 
302 Added in Ibid., p. 270 n. 
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An example of other contemporary definitions of music: 
Def. m. in André Boucourechliev303 
La musique serait… un système de différences qui structure le temps sous la catégorie du 
sonore. 
A modified definition of Kania, which accommodates musica 
textualis: 
Def. m. *Kania-MTx 
Music is (1) any event intentionally produced or organized (2) to be 
perceived, and (3) either (a) to have some basic musical feature, such as tone 
or rhythm, or (b) to be attended to for such features. 
 
Prolegomena to the future definition of musica textualis as part of music 
I want Musica textualis to be the philosophical category for a special kind of 
music, most commonly coexisting symbiotically with literature, that does not use 
tone (just like other musics which refuse to use it, e.g. concrete music or silent 
music discussed above); precisely that which substitutes tones with words or 
smaller linguistic units; the musical play might involve their sonic values – among 
others – or might be collocated at the level of senses / representations / semantic 
values. 
Kant’s free play of the cognitive powers as central to the judgment of beauty 
would redirect and guide this line of thought. The risk is that the concept be too 
broad: all art would be music; this is the symbolist position304. A lighter version 
would be monism as to the deep nature of all aesthetic experience without 
reductionism to music. An intermediary solution: music renders this free play 
                                               
303 Le Langage musical, Paris, Fayard, 1993, p.21. Cit. apud B. Sève, L’Altération musicale. Ou ce que la 
musique apprend au philosophe..., op. cit., p. XV. 
304 The „myth of great musicality” paralell to the „myth of great literarity” in symbolist period: M. Głowiński, 
Wokół książki Stefana Jarocińskiego o Debussym..., op. cit. 
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directly / immediately audible, by organising external sounds and in this universally 
artistic manner it renders the nature of the play aesthetically evident. 
Such a position, if further developed, could possibly offer a critical insight 
into the misstating of formal properties of literature from the neo-formalist 
positions305 where we find the absurd claim that the only formal values in prose 
would be those inherent to the sequence of words considered as mere sounds when 
read aloud306. Formalism should not be confused with materialism. 
Music itself creates its own material307. It does not occur ex nihilo in every 
single composition, but on the level of the whole musical system, in which the piece 
emerges. The tonal harmony system proclaims the palette of twelve tones (and their 
implicit interrelations), which remains a sieve of the entire spectrum of hearable308 
pitches; the instrumentation provides the timbre axis of choice. Their intersection 
generates ‘everything’: the whole musical universum. Beyond it – there are non-
musical sounds, and non musical silences – musical nothing. The late 18th Century 
first loosens the rules of possible sound combinations (always limited to the above-
mentioned palette). The early 20th Century offers new sets of rules for combining 
this material (e.g. dodecaphony). Then it broadens the palette itself: microtones, 
new timbres, and finally: non-tones: noises, registered street sounds and speaking 
voices. Now, consider the problem: and what if in the same period, roughly 
speaking, Thomas Mann, instead of musically organising white noises and clatters, 
decided to organise in this fashion the structure of his novel, as well as the position 
of every single word in one or more of its paragraphs? On what basis should we say 
what he does is not music at all? The fact that we are used to hear music in concert 
                                               
305 N. Zangwill, The Metaphysics of Beauty, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 2001; N. Zangwill, 
Music and Aesthetic Reality. Formalism and the Limits of Description, Routledge, New York 2015. 
306 Cf. N. Zangwill, The Metaphysics of Beauty..., op. cit. 
307 B. Sève, L’Altération musicale. Ou ce que la musique apprend au philosophe..., op. cit. explains it through 
the concept of alteration. 
308 This is dialectic as, even if physiologically we still are able to register the “odd” frequencies – we do not 
perceive them in a measure in which our ear is calibrated by the musical system in which we are musically 
raised. So – ironically – the musical system has the power to calibrate, to a certain extent, our physiological 
perception (need for some up-to date research reference in the Psychology of Music, perceptive magnet etc.). 
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halls rather than read it in a book seems insufficient as a criterion for serious, 
scientific classifications. 
 What Reality? 
According to the classic Aristotelian view, Truth is a function of Reality309. 
What makes a judgment true is its adequacy to Reality. A judgment is true if and 
only if things out there are just as it states (Cf. Arist., Metaph. Γ 7, 29; however, 
this position is also expressed in Plato’s Dialogues, for instance in Plat. Crat. 
385b310, or in Soph. 263b, where it is voiced by the Stranger). 
But Art, says Plato, is far from truth. For what it tells is fiction, and what it 
depicts is – at best – a faint and distorted imitation of what really is311. 
This Platonic point has been ever since a source of contention and of great 
confusion. Why? Because we equally agree with its major premise (the Classic 
Conception of Truth, or the Correspondence Theory312) and disagree with its 
conclusion. 
We accept the fair point, that art’s use of meaning and of representation is far 
from truth. Obviously, contrary to what is written in Kafka’s Trial, the tribunal with 
offices in the attics, has never prosecuted Joseph K. Neither did pigs ever say that 
“all animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others”, as is written 
                                               
309 This whole section is kept admittedly as simple as possible. This is why my fellow logicians and historians 
wil pardon me the way I discuss fundamental problems of their fields; the present argument is humble in its 
means, but I found it nevertheless necessary for the elucidation of my point. 
310 Socrates formulates it as a question: „[…] speech which says things as they are is true, and that which says 
them as they are not is false?” and Hermogenes confirms. Eng. Transl. in: Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12 
transl. by Harold N. Fowler. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 
1921. 
311 Or, even worse, an imitation of an imitation, as for Plato the objects imitated by art – sensibilia – are 
themselves already faint copies of the trully Real Things – the Ideas. 
312 I assume it is still valid for the common sense view, even if of course it has been contested in philosophical 
logic (non-classical logics). Without doubt it is a principle accepted by whoever takes „negativist” stances on 
„literal” vs. „metaphorical” usages of musical predicates in musicoliterary scholarship (cf. Introduction, supra). 
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in Orwell’s Animal Farm. But nevertheless, we are profoundly convinced that: 1. 
these texts do not affirm falsity; 2. they are profoundly true. 
How is this possible?  
Simply, we deny that these affirm the content of the “judgments” they are 
made of.  
Note: in what follows, by ‘ps’ I refer to narrative quasi-judgments (cf. infra). 
The actual picture is rendered far more complex by the actual entwinement of such 
judgments with genuine313 judgments (historical, political, social, economical, 
psychological, moral, theological and philosophical) which typically appear in 
many works of fiction. Here I let this complication aside. 
The logical form of judgment is altered in narrative, giving rise to what 
Ingarden calls the quasi-judgement. The link between Judgment and Reality as 
constituting Truth is conserved (Tarski famously expresses this Aristotelian link as 
the material criterion for a satisfactory definition of truth), but the vector of 
adequacy is reversed. Literary Reality (LR), in contrast to Reality tout court (R) is 
not the pre-existing, given, outer world, to which judgments conform or not, but 
something that comes into being within the complex process of a literary reading. 
This process consists partly in the imaginative interpretation of the chains of quasi-
judgments constituting the literary text314. 
In the standard use of language, a sentence p is true if and only if it 
corresponds to Reality. In the narrative use of language, this convention is used to 
create new Rs, by establishing the states of affairs they are made of, through writing 
ps. The reversed correlation between Judgments and Reality is conserved, but Truth 
is seemingly rendered trivial: if L-Reality is made with ps, for whatever p there is 
                                               
313 The factual judgments, for instance, claims on historical or natural facts, have their truth conditions; some 
other judgments, such as metaphysical claims, are object of theoretical contention; and in the postmodern era 
even the factual claims have been desconstructed and made problematic. This does not, however, alter my 
argument. 
314 On an individual level, and on an intersubjective level. 
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a corresponding state of affairs, which belongs to LR. Therefore, all ps are true 
(within LR).  
But this picture is over-simplified. It would be an error to think, that LRs are 
mechanically composed of the states of affairs indicated by the ps of the narrative 
text. They are not. All ps appeal to the Reader’s imagination, and, yes, this appeal 
is due to the underlying acceptance of the Correspondence Conception of Truth. It 
is however in the Reader’s act of Aesthetic Experience, or, to say it with Ingarden, 
aesthetic concretisation315, that the L-Reality is actually created. Some very 
important elements of LR are not expressed directly in any of the ps of the literary 
text, nor even logically inferable from them; still they rise in the mind of the Reader, 
and become crucial elements of LR. Furthermore, among the text’s ps there might 
be some p and some ¬p. This does not, however, make LR necessarily explode (as 
in polyphonic discourses, both of the Bakhtinian type in Dostoevsky, and of the 
musical type, as showed above in Iwaszkiewicz, where in order to avoid 
contradiction, the reader allows for independent voices to be constituted; thus, the 
logical principle of non-contradiction, expressed in three different ways by 
Aristotle, is used artistically in order to achieve polyphony316), even if narrative 
contradictions may also have this function (for instance, in some works of Beckett); 
and still, arguably, the debris of the LR after explosion is the moon-landscape 
“depicted”, or – better even – performed through the use of this semantic 
dynamite317. 
This is why ps constitute the work’s “schematic” structure, and not the LR 
directly. This schematic structure – in the act of concretisation – provides the 
                                               
315 For his doctrine of the literary artwork as a schematic formation, containing necessarily places of 
indeterminacy, which call for an aesthetic concretisation – see: R. Ingarden, The cognition of the literary work 
of art..., op. cit. The objects of such aesthetic concretizations may subsequently become objects of cognition. 
316 In order to avoid any misunderstanding, let me repeat: Bakchtinian polyphony need not be a musicalizing 
device, but it may be used in this way, just as any other literary device or feature, such as alliteration or division 
into chapters. 
317 These pyrotechnic metaphors refer, needless to clarify, I hope, to the logical law of explosion (ex 
contratictione quodlibet). 
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Reader access to the LR. Literary Reality is given in its determinacy in the Reader’s 
experience. 
In this sense narrative ps contained in a novel, do not refer to reality. What 
they actually do, however, relies on the validity of the link between Judgment and 
Reality. As a result, we must distinguish: 
1. Assertions of logical judgments. 
2. Narrative use of (quasi-) judgments. 
Both rely on the Correspondence Theory, but in different ways: (1) can be 
Truth-evaluated thanks to it, whereas (2) cannot318. (2), in virtue of the 
Correspondence, acquire the creative power, becoming verbum ponens. They act 
on the reader through what they state. They might posit imaginary worlds by 
describing how things are there319. This creative action must be consummated in 
the Reader’s intentional acts – stimulated and governed by the disposition of ps in 
the text – for the Literary Reality to emerge. This is its proper way of existence, to 
which the L-True predicate is correlated320. 
It is only in the lights of this extremely condensed discussion (of a problem 
which alone would merit an entire dissertation321), that we can give a clear answer 
                                               
318 Of course it can still be locally applied, as the True-in-LR, which is the common ground for arguments in 
cases of contention with regard to a particular work’s content (for instance, consider the question: „in 
Gargantua’s opinion - what is the best equivalent of toilet paper?”; if I said „silk”, I would give a false answer. 
But if I said “a soft little rabbit” this would be True-in-LR, even if still literally false. An inexistent person 
cannot, arguably, hold convictions, even to this effect). 
319 Some postmodern fictions, such as R. Pinget’s Passacaglia, are ostensively logically incongruent and, 
arguably, as in Beckett as well, what they posit is not “a fictional world”, but the very act of telling and 
construing fiction. 
320 This conclusion does not delegitimize attempts at evaluating such a L-Reality’s verisimiltude or truthfulness 
with respect to the laws of nature, psychology etc. known (both by ordinary experience and by scientific 
investigation) from Reality. It only avoids confusion between the two ways of existence and their correlated 
Truth Predicates, which is responsible for the undesirable second implication of the Platonic account of art. 
321 Furthermore, this picture was sketched here with respect to judgments, but it applies as well, mutatis 
mutandis, to names, individual descriptions, quantifiers, modal operators and many other elements studied in 
different branches of logic and philosophy of language. 
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to the question posed at the end of the first chapter: What reality do we refer to 
when we speak of music’s real presence in some verbal artworks? 
Is it the reality of the tree growing here in N., where I am now achieving my 
work, the same reality of the paduan columns and frescoes, which silently 
accompanied me in the past three years? Or is it rather the L-Reality of King Lear’s 
Throne and Madame Bovary’s Hat? After all, even the most fervent Flaubertian 
scholar does not need to affirm R-Reality of that exceptional hat in order to analyse 
its refined functions and workings, nor to praise the novel, which „affirms” its 
existence as a true masterpiece. 
Cannot we now just give up the idea of musical silences elicited by word 
formations as musical, as really musical, and put them in a row with trees, tables 
and windows, people, places and events populating the beautiful L-Real worlds? 
And cannot we meekly agree with the certainties proclaimed by some of the 
reasonable and respectable Word and Music Scholars, that musical elements in 
novels are musical at best sub specie analogiae, with no power to change the 
aesthetic and therefore ontological status of the works which contain them? To be 
sure, among these L-Real people populating novels there are musicians, L-playing 
L-violas d’amore and L-composing L-infernal cantatas, which can be even analysed 
formally and even emulated in R-real musical works322. None of them needs to be 
taken as existent in the R-world. So even though in Verona the lovers still pilgrim 
to Giulietta’s tomb, and in Vilnius there is a plate commemorating the place, where 
Konrad323 was kept in prison – we do not need to search for Leverkühn’s bones or 
the manuscript of Wagner’s Der Rattenfänger von Hameln324. 
                                               
322 For a beutifully competent study of these compositions, see: T. Ziolkowski, Leverkühn’s Compositions and 
Their Musical Realizations, „Modern Language Review”, 2012, t.107, no 3, pp. 837–856. 
323 The plate reads „D.O.M. / Gustavus obiit / M.D.CCC.XXIII Calendis Novembris. / Hic natus est Conradus 
(…)” commememorating the transformation of the heroe of the III Part of Mickiewicz’s Forefathers’ Eve. 
324 P. Huelle, Śpiewaj ogrody..., op. cit., pp. 303–307. The protagonist of Huelle’s novel, a musician from 
Danzig, who discovered Wagner’s unfinished manuscript and witnessed the rise of German National Socialism, 
is (not) to be confused with E. T. A. Hoffmann. The manuscript vanished after it was taken away by the Soviets 
(just as Mr. Hoffmann himself). 
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But the question still persists: are the musical elements which emerged in the 
interpretations performed in Part II supra, such as the sonata-form in Iwaszkiewicz, 
or the Platerian crazy Lieder (which we can still hum now, cannot we? tell me, my 
Reader! be honest!), or Mann’s h-e-a-e-es (oh, wait a second… Mann’s, or 
Leverkühn’s? To whose work do they belong?) are these elements really entities of 
the same kind as the piano in the curve of which Pietia saw for the first time the 
beautiful knyaź? 
My answer it is a convinced: no, they are not. 
They are genuine musical elements and therefore works containing them are 
not only literary works, but musical works as well; and experiences we have of 
these works, when we silently perform them with musical taste, imagination and 
skill, are genuine musical experiences.  
 Away with Ockham’s Razor 
In the previous section I sketched an argument, which can now be restated in 
points: 
1. In ordinary uses of language Truth is the congruence of what is said with how 
things actually are. 
2. In fictional uses of language – and in artistic prose such use of language is 
predominant – the form of connection between how things are and what is 
said (previously called Truth) is maintained. However, the vector of 
congruence is reversed, making what is said responsible (ontically) for how 
things in the fictional world are. 
3. This is the ontic principle of fiction: creation trough making special quasi-
judgments. These are no genuine judgments, as they do not serve to describe 
the world (what is). They cannot therefore be True. These judgments rely on 
the relation between facts and utterances – called Truth – in order to establish 
new Realities. 
4. It is an error to think, that these Realities are composed with quasi-judgments 
(phrases written in novels and short stories). They are not. 
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5. Instead, it is correct to think that these quasi-judgments construe a schematic 
formation (the literary work of art), which by its very nature appeals to be 
realized (executed, interpreted) within the act (performance) of reading (silent 
or aloud or both, depending on the work and its context). 
6. What we experience in such interpretive acts, the intentional object of these 
experiences, is the fulfilment of the literary artwork’s telos. Literary artworks 
are composed for such realizations. 
7. Typically, the literary text is a very complex tissue, where quasi-judgments 
are entwined with genuine judgments (true or false) and other propositions, 
such as philosophical, moral or metaphysical statements. Furthermore – as 
Theory well shows – all these propositions are to be interpreted within an 
infinitely complex net of intertextual and intermedial connections, within 
contexts and conventions, making any straightforward account of fiction as 
logically composed of the sum of the judgments expressed in its sentences 
patently inadequate. 
Up to this point, we were analysing the special literary use of sentences which 
seem to assert things, but actually build fictions. This account draws freely on 
Ingarden’s account and sympathises with elements of the Reader Response theory. 
It should work well with performative accounts of literary reading, such as 
Kivy’s325. In the present thesis, I adopt this performative view: the literary score 
requires a literary performance on the part of the reader. I repeat “literary” (as 
earlier on in the analogous formula on music I repeated “musical”) because of the 
skills and competences required on the part of a reader are specific to literature. 
Knowing to read is just a liminal prerequisite of these skills. High level reading of 
a literary artwork requires no less refinement, knowledge and experience, than 
reading the score of the Waldstein or that of Machaut’s Messe de Nostre Dame. 
                                               
325 This book irritates at times with its excessive lack of historical and contextual awareness, and has some 
naive and debatable points. Its overall thesis, though, that the literary reading is an individual performance of 
the narrating voce, according to the score constituted by the work’s text, has to be cherished. P. Kivy, The 
Performance of Reading. An Essay in the Philosophy of Literature..., op. cit. 
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There is just the contingent difference, that most people in modern societies are 
literate (know how to interpret vocally verbal signs of their mother tongue and grasp 
the basic meanings of a number of words), just as most people are musically 
illiterate (cannot decipher musical notation). This makes of music something 
“elitist”, whereas everybody believes they can read literature.  
This account is perfectly symmetrical to the account on music. The relation 
between score – work – performance – object of aesthetic experience we were using 
implicitly up to this point for music can now be symmetrically applied to literature, 
with the necessary adjustments. 
This whole (re)construction was necessary for the next point to be formulated: 
8. On special occasions, a reading of the literary score might force on us the 
conclusion: “Parbleu! Here it reads: make music! It clearly does!”. Such an 
instruction, if obeyed (to avoid misinterpretation), appeals to the musician in 
the reader and commands him to make music: 
‘μουσικὴν ποίει’ [!] 
In the course of the analyses presented in the second part I tried to show in 
detail how such a command may be realized. 
The crucial conclusion is this:  
1. Music is a performative art, (at times) using scores, but always requiring 
someone to make music and someone to hear it as music. 
2. In cases of musica textualis this someone is you.  
3. Musica textualis is music, a special type of music (to be sure, in certain 
important aspects, far less bizarre and fare more conservative than many a 
composition performed at contemporary music festivals).  
4. It would be incomprehensible to expect from it to be “materially present” 
somewhere in the book which contains it. Of course, it is not there in the 
inscription! It must be performed!  
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And as long as the reader will be misguided by negativist, apriorical, 
dogmatic interdiction on having music in prose – this of course will not happen. 
Imagine a person who has no idea of Western music and of musical notation. 
Handle them a score of the Hammerklavier sonata. What do you expect to happen 
there? Will there be any music? 
Mitigating acritical or incompetent usage of musical paradigms in 
interpreting literary texts cannot justify blindness to musical directives some works 
of prose arguably contain. Which musical interpretations of prose are good, and 
which are harmful, both to the interpreted artwork and to its audience? 
This question is perfectly symmetrical to the problem of evaluation criteria 
for musical interpretations (performances). This symmetry provides only one more 
argument in favor of musica textualis as a genuine, if undeservedly underestimated, 
kind of music. 
Let me address one possible objection, to the effect that scientific rationality 
demands the methodological principle of ontic and terminological economy to be 
respected. This is a fair point. Why do I need to speak of the musical sonata form 
in Iwaszkiewicz, if I can analyze this very same structure using descriptive terms 
and operating on narrative units of the text understood simply as a short story, 
which, after all, it is? 
To this my reply will be short: I need these terms in order to perceive the 
elements to which they refer – perceive them musically (hear them “i n  m y  
m i n d ’ s  e a r ”). If aesthetics is still about the Baumgartenian cognitio sensitiva, 
it is reasonable to question the universal validity of Ockham’s razor as its 
methodological principle. This principle, in general, is a methodological directive 
for scientific theories. Scientific theories formulate hypotheses about the world and 
aim at combining the greatest degree of simplicity with the greatest explanatory 
force. Does cognitio sensitiva belong to this family? I doubt. 
It is a known psychological fact, that the more nuances of snow’s color and 
quality we recognize, the more words we have to distinguish them (as is the case of 
the Inuit). If then Aesthetics still speaks for cognitio sensitiva, it should arguably 
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seek to broaden constantly its vocabulary, find new words for new experiences and 
sensations. For its principle source of knowledge is not intellection, not synthesis, 
but first of all: pathos. The more you can experience – the better. The only case one 
should refrain from multiplying terms and ontological postulates, of course, is when 
two terms refer to the very same experiential quality or relational feature. But as I 
hope to have shown – developing musical vocabulary with respect to such works 
as Libera’s Toccata in C major responds to the necessities inscribed in the work as 
it is, gives proper names to experiences it elicits, educates the reader, hoping that 
the next musicoliterary performance she will give of it, or of another piece of 
musica textualis, will be musically better, more conscious and more refined. It 
amplifies the work’s aesthetic potential and thus magnifies its artistic value. 
There is another logical peculiarity resulting from the inversion of the truth 
triangle with respect to literary quasi-judgments.  
With respect to empirical judgments such as “all ravens are black” the only 
case of gaining secure knowledge is to disprove this hypothesis, by finding one 
raven which is not black. Then, at least, we will know for sure, that it is false that 
all are black. Because we have seen the one which is not. It is impossible to confirm 
the statement “all ravens are black” empirically. At best, you can corroborate it by 
multiplying your raven-observations.  
With respect to quasi-judgments and the LRs they constitute – the exact 
opposite principle is valid. You can “dis-corroborate” an interpretation by finding 
more and more people who do not see its point, but the only epistemic certainty 
available, can be gained in confirmation. You know my interpretation of the sonata 
in Iwaszkiewicz is L-True if and only if you manage to perceive aesthetically what 
the interpretation postulates.  
Music must be interpreted (musically understood and performed, according 
to the performer’s inventiveness, taste, skill and intelligence). There is amatorial 
music-making and spontaneous singing. But in order to interpret masterpieces of 
western artistic tradition one needs years of training, and of special skills, such as, 
for instance, the ability to read and properly interpret the way a piece is notated. 
 183 
 
 
This is why we desperately need to acknowledge the musical status of musica 
textualis, this is why we need this concept. Without taking this step, we will be 
unable to learn how to interpret musically these musicoliterary scores. Any 
argument to the effect that this music is not music, because it is fiction, derives from 
a categorial mistake, for it fails to distinguish quasi-judgments that compose 
equivalents of imperative symbols, from quasi-judgments that establish trees, 
tables and talking cats in fictional worlds. This was the core of Szulc’s error and 
it is repeated over and over again, if in milder forms. Szulc was convinced that 
literature disposed only of this second sort of creative tools; that pianos, bells, 
concerts and compositions were elements of the represented world of the same 
nature as those fictional trees, cats and fancy hats. Many of them are. Musical 
objects and situations can be merely thematized as anything else, and can well serve 
artistic objectives other than making music with words. In fact, genuine candidates 
for musica textualis are a precious rarity. But we need a way to recognize them and 
to respond to them with competent and tasteful musical interpretations, that is: to 
do them fundamental justice. 
We need a clear concept to grasp the specificity of this peculiar musical 
function of (some) devices used in works of prose, in order to learn how to perform 
them, how to appreciate them musically, how to integrate them in our philosophical 
reflections on music and how to enjoy their beauty. Hopefully a step towards the 
establishment of such a concept has been made in the present thesis. 
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Conclusion 
1. Musica textualis in its definition depends on the definition of music, 
because it participates in the idea of music. Music, taken in its broadest and most 
inclusive sense, is its genus proximum. Leaving for a while aside the fascinating 
and yet unresolved problem of the essence of music, it is however possible to state 
something more specific on the differentia specifica. Musica textualis is music 
shaped in linguistic primary matter. The art of shaping linguistic primary matter to 
produce beauty is literature. On occasions literature does so more musico, imitating 
musical workings in the way it shapes its content to appeal the reader’s musicality 
and in the sort of aesthetic interplay it produces in the audience. If we accept this 
broad aesthetic definition of literature (and by explicit exclusion of verse and drama 
we further limit its scope to prose) – we arrive at the core of our concept. 
2. The works of musica textualis are literature, but literature that not only 
aesthetically and axiologically, but also ontically strives to transcend itself and 
become its other – music – not (primarily) through external hybridity of media but 
by the very literary means. In this it arguably remains literature (T); nonetheless 
– to the measure it succeeds in its striving, it becomes music (AT). 
This formulation is not paradoxical in itself, as it is not analytical to neither 
of the concepts that their extensions are disjunct. Historically the whole 
contraposition of arts within the Système des Beaux Arts326 is quite a late invention; 
at their origin, music and literature are one. A contradiction raises only if such a 
disjunction is explicitly introduced in their respective definitions, or if an element 
is introduced, from which such a disjunction follows.  
                                               
326 For a discussion of this concept, see: P.O. Kristeller, The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History 
of Aesthetics ( II ), „Journal of the History of Ideas”, 1952, t.13, no 1, pp. 17–46; W. Tatarkiewicz, A Note on 
the Modern System of the Arts, „Journal of the History of Ideas”, 1963, t.24, no 3, p. 422; J.I. Porter, Is art 
modern? Kristeller’s ‘Modern System of the Arts’ reconsidered, 2009, pp. 1–24; P. Kivy, What Really 
Happened in the Eighteenth Century: The ‘Modern System’ Re-examined (Again), „The British Journal of 
Aesthetics”, 2012, t.52, no 1, pp. 61–74; J.O. Young, The Ancient and Modern System of the Arts, „The British 
Journal of Aesthetics”, 2015, t.55, no 1, pp. 1–17. 
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An example of such an element, as we have seen, is the presence of actual 
sound regarded primarily as sound and perceived by the physical ear introduced by 
some thinkers into their definitions of music. If music is necessarily this, then it 
follows that a piece of literature can never become it (because its sounds are not 
regarded primarily as sounds, but at least equally as sounds and linguistic signs, or 
because it is appreciated in silence). Historical, contextual and aesthetic arguments 
were advanced in the previous chapters to the effect that such an element should 
not be introduced into the definition of music. 
On another plane, though, it has been shown that it is in the vital interest of 
both arts, music and literature, to cultivate some myths and stereotypes with regards 
to the other. Music is often represented as a power transcending the powers of 
language in many respects, becomes the symbol of emotion, of the mystic, of the 
infinite; of wisdom, of death and of love. It is invested with diabolical powers, 
moral agency and political responsibilities. It is presented as something irrational, 
seductive, pre-human, anamnestic, sexual or – vice versa – angelic and disincarnate, 
atemporal and purely intellectual. It is a mirror of self-cognition and existential 
meditation. In all these extraordinary capacities, it is presented as something 
radically different from discursive language, an autonomous and mysterious realm, 
often reserved only to the initiated. A formalist stereotype of music elevated above 
all servility to expressing meanings and having representational content is very 
keenly cultivated within its literary presentations. In this “unlikeness” resides its 
attractivity, the very crucial challenge for intermedial imitative strivings. If there 
was no musical essence, no systematic advantage of music over language, there 
would be no point in emulating it in verbal art. 
Conversely, music seeks for literature (especially: poetry) as its quintessence, 
as its higher, more spiritual part, which has to be understood by the initiated listener. 
Through the Wagnerian idea of Gesamtkunstwerk and the practice of musical 
drama, music seeks to regain the union with its sister art dramatic literature (and 
other arts), producing thus hybrid compositional devices, such as the Leitmotiv, 
which combine the literary with the musically formal in one texture. 
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This technical development at the very core of music creates space for 
substantial imitation in literature. Literature wants music in its purity and alterity, 
but it uses all possible means to make the intrinsic obstacles evaporate. Music is the 
art of repetition, substitution and playful equivalence of non-identicals, the art of 
arbitrary investing its matter with local senses and rearranging these equilibriums 
over and over again. And literature keenly uses this feature of music, substituting 
sonic elements with narrative bits, recurrent phrases, places, situations and other 
elements both of the fictional worlds represented and of the linguistic expressions 
it is made of in its verbal constitution. 
3. Let us repeat it: musica textualis remains literature; however – to the 
extent it succeeds in its core transgressive striving – it becomes music. 
The only measure of success and of truth in achieving this goal is aesthetic 
effectiveness. The only ontological criterion is thus experiential, as it is uniquely 
within the aesthetic experience that the musical properties are given. Berkeleyan 
esse est percipi is the ultimate ontological principle in this domain. This follows 
from the intentional nature of all music.  
This feature of music is paralleled by the intentional nature of literature. The 
specific literary quality that makes the difference between the literary and the non-
literary within the linguistic is intentional in nature. Take two physically 
undistinguishable objects, printed texts, two pages long, one of which is Kafka’s 
Vor dem Gericht, a literary artwork, and the other is a standard court report, not an 
artwork. No objective test can prove with certainty which one is which327. In order 
to recognize their literary nature, one must interpret them. 
                                               
327 A counterargument from stylometry could perharps be formulated. Let us just observe that even if correct 
attributions were possible (and I doubt in their accuracy), this could never be done without a corpus of texts 
previously classified as artistic by human subjects, which is: in acts of sentient interpretation and aesthetic 
experience. Still, arguably, such a machine would be easily duped by a work form Borges’s Babel Library (yes, 
but, after all, is there anyone, who would not?). 
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4. If we accept that music, just like language, is a natural kind, an 
anthropological universale328, we might need to accept, that the art of music is not 
necessarily uniquely realizable in this medium. 
5. Pure329 music is an essentially formal art330. It is the art that generates its 
own material, by the power of alteration331. This material is being dynamically 
worked by the alternation of higher levels to form a temporally extended object 
(performance) to which corresponds in some traditions an atemporal paradigm 
(opus perfectum, indicated by a notated musical text). Traditionally it takes sound 
as the substratum of the primary alteration. This is an undeniable fact. But effective 
sound-stimulation of our physical ear is not necessarily essential to music. This 
reservation permits us not to discriminate the inaudible musics, and to experience 
them under a unitary concept with standard cases of music. Thanks to this operation 
we can observe their organic interconnections not sub specie analogiae332 but 
realiter (in the intentional sense). 
                                               
328 Among many others, cf. K. Moraczewski, Kulturowa analiza muzyki i historia kultury, [in:] Fenomen 
muzyki, Poznań 2012. 
329 The idea that it is possible to extract the purely musical element in music, which of course enters into many 
„impure alliances” with theater, poetry, cinema etc. is – as virtually any other idea - a concept, which emerged 
in the course of intellectual history. More precisely, it emerged within the history of western music, in particular 
conditions determined by the politics, social powers and economy in Western Europe around 1800; it can be 
sociopolitically deconstrued and criticized on many levels. The processes responsible for its emergence, though, 
are collocated on a level which cannot annihilate it as an idea, as a paradigm, as an experiential and intellectual 
option. Arguably both ways of dealing with concepts (essentialism vs. contextualism) are worthwile and should 
be complementarily performed, in research as well as in concrete engagement with the arts. I am afraid that in 
saying this I might acheive the impossible: both the essentialist and the contextualist will agree – for the first 
and last time in their lives – they will agree that I am wrong. 
330 This position is genuinly formalist, and therefore not materialist. Some formalists (but not Hanslick and not 
Kant) are in fact materialists, rather than formalists.  
331 In B. Sève’s technical sense of the term. 
332 Cf. Remarks of Prieto in – partially – a similar spirit (at least to the extent in which he argues convincingly, 
that the WMS quest for non metaphoric scholarly nomenclature is radically misguided, E. Prieto, Metaphor 
and Methodology in Word and Music Studies..., op. cit. 
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Alterating the raw material and musicalizing it is nothing less than making 
music. This is an operation on our intentionality, on our aesthetic disposition333. 
Musicalization is not exclusive to literature; it is the essential and indispensable 
mechanism of all music.  
                                               
333 « La première altération est celle de l’écoute du son selon un certain mode intentionnel » B. Sève, 
L’Altération musicale. Ou ce que la musique apprend au philosophe..., op. cit., p. 171. 
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Abrégé de thèse doctorale en Philosophie de l’Art 
(French) 
 
Musica textualis  
 
Une approche philosophique des incarnations textuelles de la musique 
 
 
Introduction 
Cette recherche philosophique repose sur l’hypothèse que la musique peut 
être réalisée dans des textes en prose. Par « texte en prose » j’entends une séquence 
de signes linguistiques disposés, sans usage de rime ni de vers, d’une manière qui 
se prête à une interprétation et à une appréciation musicales, et même les exige. 
Cette approche « faible », qui fait reposer la musicalité textuelle sur l’interprétation 
et les modes de perception plutôt que sur les propriétés de premier degré du texte 
(ses qualités objectives), est pourtant enracinée dans la « faiblesse » propre de la 
musique en tant que telle334. La musique vit en effet dans l’interprétation ; le texte 
musical (au sens musicologique traditionnel du terme, la partition) ne fait naitre la 
musique que dans l’interprétation musicale qui en est donnée. En dehors de 
l’interprétation le texte reste lettre morte335 ; il n’est musical que par rapport à ses 
interprétations possibles. Ceci peut sembler constituer un cercle vicieux, mais cette 
circularité est propre aux arts performatifs - et même à tout art, si l’on prend par 
exemple en compte la question du « regard pictural » dans les arts plastiques. On 
cherche par là à souligner l’ontologie intentionnelle de tout fait musical et de toute 
propriété musicale. La musique est une certaine manière d’articuler les différents 
                                               
334 De même, la l i t t é r a l i t é  d u  t e x t e  l i t t é r a i r e  ne réside nulle part physiquement, elle n’est pas 
tangible dans un texte en dehors d’une interprétation littéraire. 
335 Exactement comme un cadavre est bien autre chose qu’une personne humaine. 
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niveaux de la perception et de l’entendement ; l’écoute musicale elle-même est 
musicale non seulement par la nature de son objet, mais aussi parce qu’elle le co-
établit dans l’acte de l’expérience musicale. Et ceci n’est pas une option en dehors 
de laquelle on aurait aussi de la musique en soi, une musique objective. S’il y a un 
en soi musical, il l’est dans cette modalité intentionnelle, qui nécessite l’action 
transfiguratrice de l’Esprit, spiritus vivificans de l’interprétation musicale. Je répète 
l’adjectif « musical » pour souligner qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une interprétation 
quelconque, mais que les règles et compétences pratiques qui y sont mises en œuvre 
sont le résidu de la musicalité beaucoup plus forte du texte musical (partition). Le 
principe ontologique de Berkeley, esse est percipi, a valeur universelle dans le 
monde de l’art (au moins au sein des approches esthétiques de l’art – les propriétés 
esthétiques ex definitione ne sont données que dans les expériences d’un sujet 
humain sentant). Et si les arts différents ont quelque chose qui pourrait être conçu 
comme une essence – ce quelque chose se trouve non pas dans les matériaux que 
l’on utilise (dans leur dimension physique), mais dans les modalités selon lesquelles 
leurs arrangements sont perçus et appréciés. En ce sens, les matériaux ont aussi leur 
place dans la caractérisation spécifique des arts qui en usent, mais seulement au fur 
et à mesure qu’ils déterminent les formes du jeu de sensations propres aux différents 
arts. À partir de l’aspect hearing (transposition de l’aspect seeing de Wittgenstein 
et des seeing as et seeing in de Wollheim336), notions inspirées par la Gestalt-
Psychologie comme l’est aussi le quasi-hearing de Gurney ou Levinson, on monte 
aux niveaux plus élevés des intentionalités musicales. Bernard Sève (2013) souligne 
le caractère primordial de l’altération musicale, déclinée sur tous les niveaux du 
royaume musical qu’elle engendre, à partir de l’altération des sons (même par la 
simple répétition) qui les répartit entre sons non musicaux (bruits, paroles, sons de 
la nature etc.) et éléments de la palette musicale. Ces sons musicaux sont rangés 
dans des échelles, inscrites dans le corps des instruments de musique et, par 
conséquent dans l’oreille du musicien, dans la voix du chanteur, et, encore une fois, 
                                               
336 Cf. R. Wollheim, Art and its objects. With six supplementary essays, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2015. 
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dans l’oreille du public. Les deux niveaux les plus élevés de l’altération musicale 
se trouvent dans l’organisation concrète des sons dans une œuvre, puis dans 
l’interprétation de l’œuvre et son devenir historique. Il me semble juste d’observer 
que l’altération musicale n’est rien d’autre – sur tous ces niveaux – qu’une certaine 
calibration de notre perception, réalisée par des moyens variés que l’on peut 
analyser. Mais que ce soit l’enfant qui apprend son solfège pour altérer son écoute, 
pour former son oreille musicale, afin qu’elle devienne prête à entendre les sons 
comme intervalles, degrés, accords, modulations, ou que ce soit Beethoven quand 
il regroupe les huit sons de son thème de la Vème symphonie (sur quatre hauteurs 
différentes seulement), lequel seront ensuite repris comme un ritornello très 
éloquent dans la composition narrative de Kundera337, dans tous ces cas il s’agit 
d’un travail de l’altération musicale, sans lequel la musique ne peut exister. 
Ce que j’appelle musica textualis serait une telle auto-altération du texte, qui 
conduit son lecteur à abandonner le mode de lecture purement littéraire et en exige 
(aussi) une lecture musicale, laquelle – comme dans les cas standard de musique – 
peut assumer formes très diverses. En d’autres termes, cette musique est 
doublement textuelle. (1) C’est l’interprétation linguistique du texte qui mène le 
lecteur à entendre le même texte comme structure musicale, musicalement 
interprétable en le transfigurant en musique. (2) C’est le texte lui-même qui devient 
chair de la musique, qui en est le matériau altéré. Je parle d’une transfiguration, car 
ce qui était le corps linguistique du texte devient altéré et donc transfiguré en corps 
musical de la pièce. Si les modalités de musicalisalisation possibles sont très 
variées, comme aussi variées sont les musiques qui en résultent – ce qui reste 
toujours valable est le moment de l’interprétation textuelle, qui mène à une nouvelle 
hypothèse interprétative – l’hypothèse de l’interprétation more musico – et en 
l’exigeant – exige aussi une auto-transformation (comme si le texte s’annonçait 
comme étant plus qu’un texte littéraire, aussi comme étant aussi une partition 
musicale). Ce qui devient matière première d’un telle altération musicale est parfois 
                                               
337 M. Kundera, Nieznośna lekkość bytu, trans by. A. Holland, London 1984. En français L’Insoutenable 
légèreté de l’être. 
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de nature sonore, comme le son, le rythme, la cadence des paroles qui composent 
la prose, mais est le plus souvent – insonore, créant une musique sublimement 
silencieuse, une musique qui n’est pas faite pour l’oreille de la chair, mais pour 
celle de l’esprit, pour le sensus musicalis interne. À ce répertoire des possibilités 
(ou modi de la musique textuelle) on ajoute celle offerte par l’œuvre de Krzysztof 
Bartnicki. Ce traducteur polonais de Finnegans Wake travaille sur le texte de Joyce 
et le transforme complètement en musique audible, en le privant de sa valeur 
littéraire (au moins dans ce qui en est sensiblement perceptible). Cette procédure 
rigoureuse (dite réduction) est introduite toujours à partir du texte entendu comme 
énoncé linguistique et seulement en deuxième moment violemment transformé en 
musique. 
L’appel à la musicalité humaine est universel dans toutes les formes de 
musique ; cette sensibilité humaine, nous en sommes d’accord, est historiquement 
cultivée à travers l’exercice de l’art des sons, et donc également formée par les 
propriétés physiques des ondes sonores et physiologiques du sens de l’ouïe.  Mais 
dans la troisième partie nous défendons l’idée que le résultat d’une telle éducation 
musicale de l’homme n’est pas limité à des perceptions nécessairement audibles, 
qu’il peut s’étendre à d’autres jeux de sensations, sans nécessairement cesser d’être 
musique (comme la musique après la dissolution du système tonal n’a point cessé 
d’être musique). 
Articulation logique de l’argument 
L’argument s’articule en trois moments (sur le plan logique, qui ne coïncide 
pas avec celui de l’exposition) :  1. pars destruens, qui argumente contre les 
oppositions possibles à cette inclusion des textes littéraires dans le domaine 
musical (argument de la silent music dans le Chapitre Music Beyond the Senses) ; 
2. pars construens, où on souligne des aspects fondamentaux de la musique qui se 
révèlent essentiels pour concevoir la musique textuelle et sa place parmi les autres 
musiques (les deux plans fondamentaux de l’intentionnalité musicale, le caractère 
universel des procédés de l’altération musicale comme calibration de la perceptivité 
musicale et la démonstration que le phénomène de musicalisation étudié par W. 
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Wolf, E. Petermann et alii, selon la célèbre formule huxleyenne musicalisation of 
fiction, ne se limite pas aux cas de l’imitation textuelle de la musique dans la prose, 
mais est de même nature que toute autre altération musicale) ; 3. pars ostensiva, où, 
à travers les analyses de certains exemples tirés de la littérature polonaise 
contemporaine – les différents modi possibles de cette musique sont rendu palpables 
pour le lecteur. 
Résumé des chapitres: 
1. Argument de la musique silencieuse (Schulhoff, Cage et alii). Résultat : 
le son ne fait pas partie de la définition de la musique comme un élément 
physique nécessairement présent dans tous les types de musique. 
2. Expérience esthétique de la musique en prose. Deux niveaux 
d’intentionalité musicale à l’œuvre. Discussion de la pièce de L. Berio 
Thema (Omaggio a Joyce, 1958) et de son programme artistique comme 
modalité d’altération du texte de Joyce pour le rendre objet d’expériences 
musicales, sans lui faire perdre sa nature textuelle. 
3. La quatrième symphonie de Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz (1970) interprétée 
comme pièce polyphonique dans sa facture et comme forme sonate (T1 
en r mineur et T2 en P majeur, nomenclature expliquée et démontrée en 
détail) dans son architecture musicale. 
4. La toccata en Do majeur d’Antoni Libera (2013), l’auteur de Godot et 
son ombre et du roman Madame (titre originel en français), analysée dans 
la complexité de ses contrapositions musico-littéraires, à partir du rôle 
primordial des citations et réélaborations de la partition de Schumann (op. 
7) dans le tissu tu texte. 
5. Analyse critique du corpus des œuvres de Krzysztof Bartnicki (travail 
continué), le traducteur de Finnegans Wake de James Joyce en polonais. 
Son ouvrage Da capo al finne et ses autres travaux sont des interprétations 
musicales du texte de Finnegans Wake à travers sa technique de 
réduction. Considérations critiques et théoriques, qui l’instituent au sein 
de la musica textualis comme un modèle extrême de transsubstantiation 
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du texte littéraire en texte musical (alors performable et audible). À la 
suite du chapitre : une annexe contenant une pièce de musique 
expérimentale (La ci darem la mano in FW) écrite par l’auteur de la thèse 
pour étayer sa discussion de l’œuvre de Bartnicki. Il s’agit d’une réduction 
de deux paragraphes initiaux du texte joycien, faite en fidélité absolue aux 
contraintes de la méthode Bartnicki, dans laquelle on entend clairement 
le thème mozartien du fameux Duettino de Don Giovanni et Zerlina. La 
procédure suivie dans la création de la pièce est minutieusement 
exposée et son résultat interprété. 
6. Le dernier chapitre et la conclusion apportent une précision 
supplémentaire sur le concept de musica textualis, enrichi par les résultats 
des analyses contenues dans la deuxième partie. La musique textuelle ne 
se prête plus aux définitions de la musique tout court, mais peut 
néanmoins être suffisamment caractérisée pour être un concept clair et 
applicable, en tant que domaine aporétique de réflexion réglé par l’idéal 
de la musique réalisée en matière verbale. Ce qui, pour la communis 
opinio, est simplement irréalisable, trouve pourtant, comme cette étude a 
cherché à le démontrer, ses incarnations et vit de la force de son statut 
paradoxal de musique hors de la musique.  
De la méthode 
Il est bien de commencer une philosophie de l'art à partir des phénomènes et 
pratiques artistiques déjà existants338. Le philosophe suit avec sa pensée les 
                                               
338 Cette thèse (Sève 2013, p. II) peut sembler presque tautologique, puisque le terme 'philosophie de 
l'art' présuppose l'existence de son objet. Mais ce fait logique ne peut fournir aucune garantie que l'art dont 
traite une théorie philosophique particulière et l'art que l'on trouve dans le monde coïncident. Notamment, 
comme on le verra, la musique en tant que pratique réelle des musiciens, pour toute une série de raisons, est 
souvent très éloignée de l'objet des recherches philosophiques. En particulier, l’idéalisme allemand est un 
champ fécond pour les spéculations métaphysiques sur la musique qui, dans toute leur beauté et charme 
intellectuels, sont majoritairement fondées sur des idées peu correctes du point de vue musical. Cela ne veut 
pas du tout dire qu’il n’existe pas de relations extrêmement profondes et importantes entre ces deux catégories 
d’objets. En remarquant l'écart entre la musique et sa philosophie, on est justifié à postuler une nouvelle 
méthode de penser – celle qui accepte sa postériorité épistémique par rapport à son propre objet. Cela ne veut 
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propriétés caractéristiques de son objet. Dans notre cas, la pratique artistique à partir 
de laquelle se construit notre démarche est la recherche de faire de la musique avec 
les mots qu’on trouve chez certains auteurs. Il n’y a pas lieu de préjuger 
l'impossibilité de la réussite d'un tel projet à partir des définitions préétablies de la 
musique, définitions que l'œuvre littéraire ne pourra jamais satisfaire.  Il s’agit de 
comprendre ces essais et leurs effets dans leur complexité et leur portée, d'abord 
esthétique, puis artistique et enfin philosophique. Là où l'écrivain veut accomplir 
l'impossible, il convient de devenir plutôt observateur attentif et penseur précis que 
de se braquer dans la posture de l’avocat acharné du bon sens. 
Notre recherche se fonde partiellement sur les résultats de la philosophie 
contemporaine de la musique ; mais elle offre une série des résultats qui n’auraient 
pas pu être obtenus sur le seul champ classique de cette discipline.  
Qu’est-ce que c’est la musique ? Telle est une des questions fondamentales 
que se pose le philosophe devant la multiplicité des phénomènes que l’on associe 
avec l’idée de la musique. La réponse n’est pas facile, pas plus que l’exégèse de la 
question en soi n’est univoque.  
1) La réflexion scientifique sur la musique, dès l’antiquité, a fourni beaucoup 
de modèles théoriques, dont on peut en général noter la forte indépendance par 
rapport aux pratiques sonores effectives. Le modèle boécien de la tripartition de la 
musique indique sans équivoque le statut auxiliaire, périphérique, de ce que le bon 
sens d’aujourd’hui appelle musique sensu stricto : l’art sonore, qui fait appel à 
l’oreille humaine339. Dans la plus grande partie de l’histoire de la philosophie le 
sens le plus primordial et ordinaire du concept de la musique la considère in primis 
                                               
pas dire, cependant, que l'on annule, réfute ou rejette les conceptions antérieures de la musique. Au contraire : 
un des fruits les plus intrigants de l'introduction de la nouvelle méthode est qu’à partir de ses résultats on peut 
travailler de nouveau sur les anciennes conceptions de manière comparative. 
339 Celle-ci n’est point une définition de la musique, mais un compte rendu de ce que l’on tend à penser 
comme conditio sine qua non d’une quelconque définition de cet art conforme au bon sens. Il faut également 
préciser, que par „art” ici on entend une habileté humaine à donner forme au matériau sensible d’une manière 
sensée (doté d'un sens immanent). 
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comme science rigoureuse de l’harmonie universelle, et ensuite comme facteur de 
la paideia et de la vie politique. 
2) On remarque, non sans raison, que cet écart entre la musique « réelle » et 
la réflexion systématique qui la prend comme objet, peut être envisagé comme 
compromettent du point de vue épistémologique. Et s’il y a des sens 
fondamentalement divers du lexème ‘musique’, il faut finalement fonder une vraie 
philosophie de la musique dans notre sens, une philosophie qui prend comme 
unique point de départ le phénomène sonore de la musique et non pas des idées 
abstraites, dérivées des principes métaphysiques et théologiques (Pythagore et 
pythagoriciens, Boèce) ou psycho-socio-politiques (Damon, Platon, Aristote). Ce 
postulat du retour au concret sonore de la musique a notamment dans la philosophie 
française sa version apophatique (Jankélévitch) et positive (Sève), ayant pour 
patron ancien Aristoxène. 
3) Le fait que l'on réclame justement l'attention pour la musica instrumentalis 
ne nous oblige pas à dénoncer toutes les autres musiques comme métaphores vagues 
ou projections spéculatives nocives pour le véritable entendement musical. Au lieu 
d'abandonner les musiques inaudibles en tant que vieilles idoles, il serait plutôt 
préférable de savoir sauvegarder la plurivocité du terme ‘musique’ en en distinguant 
bien les différents sens. Il faut souligner notre assomption primordiale : ‘musique’ 
est une de ces paroles-fondements de la culture de l'Occident (comme aussi 'logos' 
– opposé à la musique par Philodème), dont la force et la fécondité spirituelle sont 
étroitement liées à sa polysémie.  Bien qu'il soit inacceptable d'en confondre les 
différents sens, il est également déraisonnable de prétendre que le discours musical 
rigoureux doive renoncer à cette richesse. 
4) On peut avoir l'illusion qu'il soit néanmoins possible de renoncer aux 
discours métaphoriques pour parler de la musique au sens primordial. Mais le 
développement actuel de cet art écarte cette possibilité en mettant en question tous 
les universaux de la musique, un par un, dans le concret de l’œuvre (d'une 
performance). Ainsi le retour à des musiques inaudibles semble nécessité par la 
praxis même. 
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5) Nous nous représentons ainsi les sphères de la musique et de l'audible :  
 
 
 
 
 
en se rappelant qu'il y a des universaux de la musique qui (a) peuvent 
s’absenter d'une pièce particulière de la musique (b) se réaliser hors de la musique 
et même hors de l'audible. 
6) Nous voulons bien relativiser chronologiquement non seulement nos idées 
sur la musique et sur son rapport aux autres arts mais aussi la constitution de la 
musique effective comme telle. On veut insister sur la portée théorique du fait 
historique de l'union de la musique (dans le sens moderne) avec la parole (soit 
lyrique, soit épique, soit dramatique) dans l'antiquité. Selon nous ce fait qui peut 
sembler banal et évident est en réalité négligé dans notre manière effective de 
penser et de percevoir les arts340. 
Une Musique hors musique 
Il s’agit, dans toutes ces réflexions, de fonder la possibilité de parler 
sérieusement d'une « musique hors musique », d'une musique qui se réalise dans 
un medium autre que le plein son, sans cesser d'être intimement liée au noyau du 
concept de musique, et parfois même en permettant d’y accéder mieux que par 
l'audition. Dans le présent travail, nous explorons la présence d’une telle musique 
dans le texte artistique en prose. Comment donc la musique peut-elle y être 
inscrite ? 
Par « texte artistique » nous entendons ici toute séquence de mots dont le sens 
essentiel n’est pas entièrement réductible au sens « transcendant » (le sens 
                                               
340 Sur l'ignorance des philologues classiques en cette matière, qui compromet l'image de la tragédie 
contenue dans plusieurs ouvrages savants, voir M. West, Ancient Greek Music, Oxford 1994. 
Musique Audible 
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transcendant est celui qui implique une référence à un monde extérieur, réel ou 
fictionnel). Pour mieux encadrer notre intérêt, nous nous limitons à la prose, dont 
les cas paradigmatiques sont - en littérature - le récit (le roman, la nouvelle), mais 
aussi le texte philosophique. L'inclusion de ce dernier est liée au fait qu’en 
philosophie la méthode fait par définition toujours partie du contenu essentiel. Et 
ainsi la manière dont un texte philosophique est écrit, même s’il est stylistiquement 
humble, n'est jamais entièrement dissociable du contenu traduisible (sens 
transcendant). Ainsi envisagé, le texte philosophique tend à accomplir les trois 
conditions de l’œuvre d'art formulées par Arthur Danto (Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace)341. Pour des raisons pragmatiques nous nous sommes cependant 
contentés de n’analyser, dans le présent travail, que des textes littéraires, tirés de la 
production polonaise contemporaine. Nous espérons pouvoir ultérieurement 
poursuivre ce travail sur des exemples philosophiques.  
Un support méthodologique pour une telle démarche se trouve dans les études 
comparées musique – littérature. La discussion critique et la possible amélioration 
de cette méthodologie (dans le contexte du débat spécialisé existant entre les 
comparatistes musico-littéraires et les représentants de la nouvelle branche d'études 
nommée Word and Music Studies) était inévitable ; elle n’est pourtant qu’une 
question subordonnée au vrai problème philosophique (qu'est-ce qui se passe quand 
on fait de la musique avec des mots ?) et a donc été traitée assez brièvement dans 
l’Introduction. Par contre nous avons critiqué un critère de démarcation proposé 
pour la catégorie de multimedialité, le critère de la nécessaire présence physique de 
                                               
341 Il est clair pour moi que cette thèse est discutable, surtout dans sa version forte. Par contre il est 
sûrement moins contestable que l'on peut parler des cas limites entre la philosophie et littérature (Platon, 
Lucrèce, S. Augustin, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, pour ne citer que quelques noms). Cf. „Necessary and sufficient 
conditions on arthood : 1. Artworks « are about something (or the question of what they are about may 
legitimately arise)”,  A.C. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1981, p. 124. 2. « [I]t is analytical to the concept of an artwork that there 
has to be an interpretation » Ibid., pp. 147–148. 3. « [W]orks of art, in categorical contrast with mere 
representations, use the means of representation in a way that is not exhaustively specified when one has 
exhaustively specified what is being represented » Ibid., p. 148. Tous les 3 conditions citées et discutées par P. 
Kivy, The Performance of Reading. An Essay in the Philosophy of Literature..., op. cit. 
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signifiants typiques de plus d’un medium (“in which the typical signifiers of more 
than one medium are physically present”342). En effet (1) le signifiant saussurien 
auquel l’auteure fait référence n’est pas de nature physique et ne peut donc être 
physiquement présent nulle part ; (2) une simple occurrence du « signifiant 
typique » d’un medium n’implique pas automatiquement la multimedialité, car il 
est en outre nécessaire que ces signifiants soient interprétés comme tels, ce qui n’est 
pas toujours le cas (par exemple un fragment de notation musicale citée dans un 
texte peut être utilisé comme illustration générique ou ornement, et non pas comme 
une vraie trace de la musique notée). 
Mimesis et diegesis littéraires de la musique 
 Il faut travailler sur ces deux concepts platoniciens en vue de la (1) musique 
en tant qu’objet représenté dans l’œuvre littéraire ; (2) musique en tant que 
structures (forme musicale) transposées en composition littéraire ; (3) musique en 
tant qu’effets sonores (imaginaires, dans l'oreille de l'esprit, pour s'exprimer un peu 
paradoxalement). 
La musique thématisée (1) contient (entre autres) : 
a. La pensée sur la musique (p. ex. les dialogues et lectures sur la musique 
des personnages de la Montagne magique de Thomas Mann343, les considérations 
adorniennes dans Doktor Faustus, l'avis sur la musique de Wagner que donne 
l'organiste dans les Buddenbrooks, les convictions sur la force nocive à la virilité  
de Thomas Buddenbrook, les dialogues sur la musique dans plusieurs romans et 
nouvelles de Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz, comme Sława i chwała, Mefisto-Walc, 
Czwarta symfonia, Martwa pasieka etc.) ou sur sa réception (p. ex. dans la Sonate 
à Kreutzer de L. Tolstoï etc.). C'est un cas particulier du principe de portée générale, 
présenté dans l'ouvrage, selon lequel une voix portant sur un problème en débat ne 
perd pas sa validité hors de l’œuvre (dans l'historie du nihilisme on cite la définition 
                                               
342 E. Petermann, The Musical Novel. Imitation of Musical Structure, Performance, and Reception in 
Contemporary Fiction..., op. cit., p. 12n. 
343 T. Mann, Der Zauberberg, S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 2002. 
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qu’en donne Bazarov, alors même qu’il est un personnage fictif du roman Pères et 
Fils de I. Tourgueniev).  
b. Les descriptions (ou autres représentations verbales – voir points (2) et 
(3)) des œuvres musicales (b1) existantes comme la sonate op. 111 de Beethoven 
décrite, jouée et analysée par Kretschmar ou la toccata op. 7 de Schumann décrite, 
citée, analysée, interprétée (soit comme telle, soit dans des diverses interprétations 
et enregistrements, comme celles de Cziffra ou de Richter) par le Professeur Plater, 
personnage de la nouvelle d’Antoni Libera, et par le narrateur-jeune pianiste ; (b2) 
fictives comme Apocalipsis cum figuris d'Adrian Leverkühn ou la Sonate de 
Venteuil, ou comme l’apocryphe wagnérien intitulé Der Rattenfänger von Hameln 
dans Śpiewaj ogrody de Paweł Huelle344. Dans Doktor Faustus on trouve également 
un exemple de crypto-citation où la pièce décrite (et évoquée structurellement dans 
le sens (2) en utilisant les moyens (3)) est préexistante (le prélude de l’acte III des 
Meistersinger de Wagner) sans être identifiée comme telle dans le texte. Ces cas – 
ici simplement esquissés – posent de grands problèmes de nature esthétique et 
ontologique. L'oratorio diabolique de Leverkühn ne fait-il pas partie de l'histoire de 
la musique ? 
c. L’exécution musicale (p. ex. le récital d'Elżbieta Szyller à Paris dans le 
roman Sława i chwała d'Iwaszkiewicz345, les diverses exécutions de l’héroïne du 
roman Consuelo de George Sand, comme aussi d’Anzoleto et des autres chanteurs) 
d. La perception musicale (p. ex. le concert dans le roman Le Cœur absolu 
de Philippe Sollers) 
e. Les instruments de musique (p. ex. le vieil orgue dans Le Salon du 
Wurtemberg de Pascal Quignard). 
f. Les vies de musiciens : (f1) réels (f1.1) biographies (p. ex. par Stendhal : 
vies de Haydn, Mozart, Rossini et Métastase ; de Beethoven par Adorno ou de Bach 
par A. Schweitzer) (f1.2) éléments biographiques dans la fiction : (f1.2.1) musiciens 
                                               
344 P. Huelle, Śpiewaj ogrody..., op. cit. 
345  
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comme personnages dans la fiction (p. ex. Nicola Porpora, Alessandro Marcello 
dans Consuelo) ; (f1.2.2) musiciens comme modèles ou inspirations pour des 
personnages fictifs (l’ardente controverse autour de la présence de Schönberg chez 
Mann) et (f3) fictives (f3.1) (auto-)biographies (R. Rolland, Jean Christophe ; 
Mann, Doktor Faustus. Das Leben des deutschen Tonsetzers Adrian Leverkühn 
erzählt von einem Freunde; Iwaszkiewicz, Czwarta symfonia; ou Au piano de Jean 
Echenoz346); (f3.2) musiciens comme héros littéraires (Villa Amalia de Pascal 
Quignard. 
Ces exemples sont parfois profondément engagés dans des structures musico-
littéraires à la fois très complexes et artistiquement essentielles pour l’œuvre en 
question. C’est seulement après avoir effectué cette recherche qu’il devient possible 
de s’interroger sérieusement sur le statut de figures telles que la musique silencieuse 
de Pascal Quignard. 
(2) Musique en tant que structures (forme musicale) transposées en 
composition littéraire. 
(3) Musique en tant qu’effets sonores. 
Contrairement à la thématisation de la musique dans le texte qui, étant établie 
au niveau des sens linguistiques, n'est pas contestable comme catégorie, les deux 
catégories qui suivent appartiennent (mais non pas sans exception) à un autre ordre 
d’interprétation. Ceci, en fait, suscite des problèmes et désaccords parmi les 
chercheurs. Le débat contemporain est fortement marqué par la critique 
méthodologique de l'abus des termes musicaux dans l'analyse des œuvres littéraires. 
La mode romantique et symboliste de musicaliser la réalité « hors musicale » a 
suscité des discours emphatiques et peu rigoureux au XIXème siècle et au début du 
XXème, empêchant ainsi la critique littéraire d'analyser les phénomènes effectifs 
de la musicalité. Aujourd'hui, avec un scepticisme modéré, on tend à accepter les 
deux musicalités qui suivent. 
                                               
346  
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Les deux sortes de musicalité du texte (2) et (3) ne sont presque jamais 
autonomes l'une par rapport à l'autre : la forme musicale réalisée en paroles se sert 
souvent des sonorités verbales en les composant dans l'ordre temporel. Les 
sonorités « naturelles » des paroles acquissent leur caractère musical à travers le 
travail formel. Ainsi le « son musical » en littérature est analogue dans sa structure 
profonde au son musical tout court. Dans les deux cas le procédé musical en se 
déroulant crée son propre matériel, le ton, qui parfois est physiquement identique à 
des sons non-musicaux de la nature et parfois est entièrement artificiel. La parole 
est, dans son état de nature, pour ainsi dire, sonore. Mais cette sonorité est rendue 
inessentielle ou même superflue quand la fonction informative (référentielle) du 
langage domine ; par contre elle peut toujours être mise en jeu pour devenir 
« musiquée ». C'est précisément le moment ou la parole littéraire dépasse le niveau 
descriptif pour musicaliser sa propre chair et en composer une structure 
musicalement sensée qui nous intéresse. 
Ainsi la musicalité dans le troisième sens a ses deux moments 
philosophiquement bien distincts : quand elle est en puissance et quand elle est en 
acte. Dans notre réflexion critique sur la notion de la musicalité du texte, nous avons 
cherché à éliminer les usages métaphoriques et redondants par rapport aux termes 
bien établis de la poétique. On a recherché, plutôt en vain, un critère extérieur pour 
la validité méthodologique d'un tel discours (comme les indices sémantiques ou les 
critères d’admissibilité des termes musicaux, étudiés par Wolf). En réalité ce que 
l'on appelle inexactement la musicalité du langage n'est qu'une partie de son 
potentiel musicalisable. On peut formuler une hypothèse qui explore la cause du 
passage de ce potentiel de la puissance à l’acte : peut-être serait-il possible 
d’appliquer la notion d’altération musicale347 aux processus qui gouvernent la 
transfiguration du textuel en musical. La prose doit aussi se servir d’instruments 
pour produire de la musique, doit altérer le discours dans une manière qui fait la 
différence pour notre oreille intérieure : ceci n’est plus un flux des paroles 
                                               
347 Voir aussi le lien entre cette pensée et la notion de ostranienieïe (défamiliarisation, qui serait une manière 
d’altération fondamentale, soit comme mécanisme de base de l’art, soit comme effet principal sur l’auditoire). 
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gouvernées par la logique discursive et narrative, c’est le flux unique, inénarrable 
du temps durée perceptible et vivable dans l'instant de la lecture (audition 
intérieure). 
Doktor Faustus de Mann peut servir ici comme une source exhaustive, étant 
une espèce de Kunst der Fuge dans le domaine de la musique textuelle. En principe 
Mann cherche une formule d'explicitation des filiations musico-textuelles intérieure 
(mais aussi extérieure, notamment à travers son ouvrage Die Entstehung des Doktor 
Faustus. Roman eines Romans348) à la narration même. Son génie sait unir dans la 
même construction littéraire cette motivation musicale avec les motivations 
rhétorique, expressive et symbolique. Notre réflexion choisit cette œuvre comme 
paradigme. Sa réalité artistique ne requiert pas de corroboration quasi-empirique 
dans des autres ouvrages littéraires. Elle nous suffit comme un univers 
artistiquement accompli, doté de sa vérité artistique.  
 
De la fiction esthétique 
 
En philosophie dire le faux est intolérable, même pour le trivialiste349 (car 
selon sa position extrême et inconsistante tout est vrai). 
L'art, parfois, se fonde sur la création de (belles) illusions. Son moyen 
décisif d'agir est donc une fausseté systématique au niveau de la constitution de son 
objet. La narration « parle » (et même cet acte de parler n'est qu'une imitation du 
vrai raconter) d’événements fictifs, vécus par des personnages inventés et dans des 
lieux inexistants. Le trône du roi Lear est « en vérité » simplement une chaise sur 
la scène et le déjeuner sur l'herbe n'a jamais eu lieu. On aperçoit clairement la 
double fiction constitutive de ces œuvres : (1) la fiction systématique inscrite dans 
                                               
348 T. Mann, Doktor Faustus. Die Entstehung des Doktor Faustus..., op. cit. 
349 Terminus technicus anglais : est  trivialism pour la doctrine logique la position selon laquelle tout jugement 
est vrai: . 
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la mimesis en tant que telle (critiquée par Platon pour sa fausseté par rapport à l’être 
véritable et pour ses reflets dans les objets), le fait que les fruits de Zeuxis ne 
peuvent pas nourrir les oiseaux, et que le rideau de Parrhasios ne pourra jamais être 
levé ; (2) la fiction des objets ou situations représentés, qui devient paradoxalement 
encore plus évidente quand le héros lui-même n'est pas inventé et coïncide avec un 
personnage « réel », comme Napoléon chez Tolstoï ou Stendhal.  
L'art exige de son public la capacité de voir en (Wollheim) une strate de 
teinture vernie sur toile un visage humain ou un paysage, mais exige aussi, en même 
temps et avec la même nécessité, la conscience que ce visage n'est point fait de la 
chair chaude que l'on pourrait embrasser, ni que la pluie orageuse du paysage ne 
pourra nous tremper. En un mot, il semble que la fausseté soit un élément 
indispensable soit de l’expérience esthétique de la belle fiction, soit de la vérité de 
l’œuvre qui la contient. 
On voit clairement que dans les deux points précédents on parle de la 
fausseté par rapport à deux vérités bien différentes. Il semble que la première 
« vérité » soit simplement la valeur logique et la deuxième – la valeur artistique, 
l’intégrité globale de l’œuvre, sa raison d'être la plus profonde et immanente. Mais 
pour ce qui concerne (I), la vérité logique, c'est la philosophie même qui délibère 
sur le sens de la vérité. Notamment, c'est elle (dans diverses logiques 
philosophiques), qui recherche une « bonne » formulation et formalisation de cette 
notion ; et cette délibération est riche et pluraliste (logique classique, logiques 
paraconsistentes etc.). La question de Pilate représente toujours un grand problème 
de la philosophie, toujours actuel, même si aujourd'hui on l'envisage dans des 
termes bien différents de ceux des logiciens médiévaux p. ex. Il en est ainsi parce 
que l'idée préréflexive de la vérité semble toujours subsister dans toutes les 
formulations systématiques de cette notion, comme un idéal régulateur qui organise 
toutes ces recherches. Elle est bien liée, même si les logiciens analytiques n'en 
seraient pas forcement d'accord, avec une notion métaphysique de la vérité en tant 
que principe qui conditionne et précède chaque notion de vérité particulière et qui 
nous dirige vers sa découverte (voire sa formulation). En tout cas, pour ne pas 
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retomber ici dans la polémique antimétaphysique, il nous suffit de voir la vérité 
dans ce premier sens comme la vérité de la connaissance, la vérité épistémique, liée 
à sa définition aristotélicienne par la notion de correspondance entre la réalité et le 
jugement (ou autre représentation des faits). Pour ce qui concerne (II), la vérité 
artistique se pose comme problématique en relation avec la vérité épistémique, en 
en étant bien distincte. Roman Ingarden dans sa recherche sur la « vérité » dans 
l’œuvre littéraire, en distingue justement huit sens différents350 qui précisent la 
distinction générale proposée ci-dessus. 
On pourrait faire l’hypothèse que la prédilection de certains philosophes 
pour la musique en tant qu’art sublime, pur, ontologique, au delà de l'ordre de la 
représentation (Schopenhauer), est liée au fait que dans sa forme absolue, purement 
sonore et dépourvue de sens linguistique, l'art du son est innocent : il ne ment pas, 
il n’use pas de mensonge. Il réussit à créer avec puissance de belles perceptions qui 
ne sont pas trompeuses, qui n'imitent rien de ce monde, qui ne sont point des 
illusions, mais le jeu actuel de beaux sons351. Bien clairement, ce que nous venons 
de dire crée une autre menace : cet art qui se refuse à imiter ce monde nous expose 
au risque de suivre son charme ineffable et de nous perdre en détournant nos regards 
du vrai, en quête de l'au delà irréel (on envisage ici à la fois la langueur musicale 
qui mène à la mort chez Mann, le cas de Hanno Buddenbrook, et la rancune contre 
la musique des Sirènes, déraisonnable et ambivalente, dont parle Jankélévitch352). 
Ce qui est essentiel pour nous c'est que le sens musical se dévoile ici comme 
indépendant de la vérité logique sur le niveau constructif de l’œuvre, qui - dans le 
cas de la musique absolue - manque tout simplement en absence de son possible 
substrat (jugements). 
En général on peut noter que la vérité artistique peut (et souvent doit) se 
servir des faussetés épistémiques en les mettant en jeu qui exclut leur réduction. Le 
                                               
350 R. Ingarden, „O tak zwanej « prawdzie » w literaturze”, op. cit.; R. Ingarden, „O różnych rozumieniach 
«prawdziwości» w dziele sztuki”, op. cit. 
351 Cf. E. Hanslick, Vom Musikalisch-Schönen. Ein Beitrag zur Revision der Aesthetik der Tonkunst..., op. cit., 
tr. it. Il bello musicale, trad. M. Donà, Alessandro Minunziano Editore, Milano 1945. 
352 V. Jankélévitch, La Musique et l’Ineffable..., op. cit. 
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lecteur ou spectateur doit avoir la conscience de leur statut fictif en se laissant 
séduire par la vraisemblance de la fiction, au point de voir en, ce qui est conditio 
sine qua non de l’expérience esthétique des représentations artistiques. 
Un des pouvoirs de l'art est qu'il est créatif. L'art sait établir de nouveaux 
univers, poser des entités qui n'étaient pas au monde avant leur création. On peut 
bien dire que dans la conscience collective l'individualité personnelle d'un Pierre 
Bezouchov n'a pas moins de réalité que celle d'un général Koutouzov, pour ne pas 
donner l'exemple d'un soldat inconnu mort à Borodino, dont l'histoire ne conserve 
même pas le nom. Il ne s’agit pas ici de nier l'existence aux inconnus, mais au 
contraire de l’accorder, d’une certaine manière, aux êtres inventés. 
C'est précisément ce pouvoir créatif qui se sert de quasi-jugements, comme 
dit Ingarden, pour établir le schéma intentionnel qui se concrétise dans l'acte du 
lecteur. Les jugements exprimés par des phrases identiques dans un contexte hors-
artistique, seraient-ils tout simplement faux, ayant pour référence la réalité des faits. 
Mais dans la forme artistique les mêmes phrases deviennent porteuses du précieux 
Verbum créatif, fécond, ponens. Ceci a pourtant besoin de la collaboration de 
l’auditoire ; si les places indéterminées de la formation schématique ne sont pas 
déterminées dans l'imagination coadjuvante du lecteur ou dans l'esprit et l’œil du 
spectateur, l'acte créatif ne reste alors qu'un tentative inaccomplie, suspendue dans 
le vide, dépourvue de pouvoir, exactement comme une symphonie entendue par un 
patient qui n'est pas physiquement sourd, mais qui souffre d'une amusie cérébrale. 
L'attitude esthétique, une certaine disposition sensible et spirituelle est donc 
indispensable du coté de l’auditoire. Sans elle l’œuvre ne peut prendre chair, ne 
peut devenir création effective. La vérité artistique ne peut pas s'actualiser et donc 
se décompose. Voici nos hypothèses : 
 
H1 L'héritage réflexif de l’esthétique, de la philosophie de l'art, de la critique 
et des filiations intermodales dans les arts, dans la mesure où ces discours expriment 
certaines thèses sur l'art, son essence et ses potentialités, a toujours un rôle ambigu. 
D'une part, surtout dans les cas des discours rigoureux, ils visent à la vérité. D'autre 
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part, ils font nécessairement partie du jeu que l'on appelle art, dans le sens où ils 
modifient et forment des attitudes esthétiques, bien que les idées créatives mêmes. 
L'art, à son tour, a le pouvoir de créer des fictions esthétiques : comme il peut 
nous émouvoir par les péripéties de héros inexistants, il peut nous faire 
« comprendre » et « concrètement goûter » (voir en) les merveilles de 
l’esthétiquement imperceptible. 
 
H2 L'étude simultanée du sens musical et du sens narratif peut éclaircir notre 
analyse de ce dernier. Il vaut la peine de prendre pour paradigme du sens artistique 
tout court le modèle interprétatif de l’œuvre de la musique absolue, plutôt que tenter 
le contraire (on en a plusieurs exemples dans le narrativisme musicologique). Le 
vrai sens (la vérité artistique) d'un grand roman, voici notre hypothèse, n'est pas 
plus déductible des vérités partielles des énoncés dont est constitué son texte, 
que le vrai sens d'une fugue de la vérité de son sujet et contre-sujet (sic !). 
 
Cela ne veut absolument pas dire que l'on entend ignorer le sens 
propositionnel dans l’œuvre littéraire. On est bien loin d'une telle position intenable. 
On veut insister, cependant, sur le fait que la vérité des œuvres artistiques mérite 
d'être étudiée à l'abri de l'intentionalisme et du sémanticisme qui semblent régner 
chez quelques philosophes de l'art éminents de notre temps (P. Kivy, par exemple, 
qui sait bien écarter la musique de ce paradigme, mais l’accepte dans les analyses 
des autres arts). Tout ceci peut s'accomplir sur le champ bien étrange de la musique 
littéraire, qui engendre l'utopie de la musique textuelle et nous la fait 
« entendre » dans ses œuvres. Mais cette utopie n'est point une exception dans 
l’historie des arts. Elle semble, au contraire, exemplifier un mécanisme propre à 
l'art comme tel. 
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